

RETURNING TO SCHREBER

15th December 1994*

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Giving a commentary on this formula of Lacan according to which 'the unconscious is the social', implies accepting at first a curious decentering, since to postulate that the Oedipus complex is the organiser of subjectivity, and therefore of desire, is equivalent to privileging the family stage as being where the destiny of the subject is played out, is determined. It is no doubt one of the reasons why the psychoanalysts, in a more or less, intuitive way, consider that the field of their responsibility comes to a halt at the boundary of family organization and that they do not have to make any pronouncement, to become engaged, when they are challenged by the social field. This is also what one sees on the part of neurotics who make of the family scene this permanent and ineradicable locus of passions, of complaints, of grievances, of unpardonable sins, which obviously give to our family lives a very curious tint. You have to chose: either family life is really very good and, in that case, the results are not very good, precisely as regards the determination for a subject of his desire since the aforesaid desire is only supported by shocks, by accidents, even traumas; or indeed - and it is much more frequent - family life is bad and it gives rise to this type of historicizing and consequences which is scarcely any more satisfying.

No doubt Freud should be singularly thanked for having put the accent on this prevalence of family organization in subjective determination even though he, for his part, because of his history, because

*This paper is the transcription of one session in the teaching of Charles Melman. It is taken from the English translation of Charles Melman's *Returning to Schreber, Seminar 1994-1995, Hôpital Henri-Rousselle, Paris, Edition de l'Association freudienne, 1999, trans. C. Gallagher, pp 79-91. The paper appears here by kind permission of the Association freudienne.*

of his heritage, had every reason to question the social field, which did not prevent him from making these excursions that are called *Civilisation and its Discontents*, *The Future of an Illusion*, *Why War*, etc., very remarkable excursions on the part of the secular man that Freud was in political matters, despite what one could call his uneducated character in this material, excursions which are still valid and which make us astonished all over again at seeing how the relation to the social field is badly handled, badly treated by psychoanalysts. This sends us back then to this singular formulation of Lacan, 'the unconscious is the social', of which I already spoke on several occasions but that I would like, this evening, to take up again to develop a point about which I would like to have your reactions, I would like to subject myself to the test of presenting it to you.

The point is the following. Lacan already denatures the traditional idea people have of the ego by testifying that this attachment that I may have to what appears as most private to my own person is only an attachment to an otherness (*altérité*) whose absorption in a way, I do not dare to say introjection, but ..., identification to which guarantees that this otherness, the image of the small other, of my fellow is henceforth going to be internal to me; it is going at the same time to guarantee my link to my fellow, because I am already conceived in the image of this fellow. This shows the interest that I have in him, the phenomena of transitivity that Lacan speaks about, it also shows the suffering I may endure from noting his inadequacies, the fact that I can be led in my choice of friends, in my judgments etc., to turn away from someone who appears too inadequate in the measure that I always experience that the mirror relation with my fellow engages me, whether I want it or not, that his inadequacy compromises me directly. Hence curious reactions of intolerance, rejection, etc. But if this is in a way the imaginary aspect of what links me to my fellow, and therefore guarantees my interest in the social group to which I belong, even if my interest is of the order of a refusal, of isolation, of rupture, this does not have the slightest importance, there is no doubt another dimension that we can explore and which for its part is rather on the symbolic side, if one recalls this strange thing that 'a signifier is what

represents a subject for another signifier'. In effect if one draws the consequences of this formula one can see clearly how the subject \$ is what is supported between two signifiers, one and the other of which find themselves legitimately incarnated by different figures. It would be necessary, if what I am putting forward holds up, to consider that the subject, far from being localised within the corporeal meningeal envelopes or whatever you wish, is properly speaking something that is, something that lies between S1 and the one who incarnates the S2. The subject therefore can only be validly completed at first in the measure that a couple like this is found to be effectively realized.

What testimony can we find of this very curious arrangement? Testimonies of the phenomenological order but perfectly experienced by everyone, a theme that I amused myself in sketching out in conversations with one or other of you; you do not experience the same perceptions when you are alone or when your subjectivity is sustained by the partner here in the position of S2. It is completely verifiable at elementary, extremely common levels. If you go to the theatre on your own, you will not see the same play as when you find yourself in the other position that I have just recalled. It is obviously the same for other satisfactions, a meal for example. It is still more troubling to be able to note that here the choice of the partner, the one that comes into the position of S2 - I am putting S2 to facilitate things but I will explain this right away because it could also be in S1, everything depends on the signifier from which you primordially sustain your subjectivity - can for the same play, the same meal, the same situation, modify your perceptual field in what nevertheless seems to be what is most essential to your organisation. Without for all that you being able to be accused of mimicry or of malleability or things of this kind.

One could, I am not going to develop it here and now, recall all the difficulties that are experienced by someone who, for different reasons, finds himself led to sustain his subjectivity systematically from a single one of the signifiers, the master signifier, for example, and misses out on the reprise, for which it would be necessary to find more exact metaphors

to qualify what occurs then, which comes from the S2, which at the same time cannot be perfectly in accord, and which cannot either be a complete divorce and which is situated then in a sort of extremely delicate and variable margin but which in any case is appropriate to incarnate, to support the expected response on the side of S2. That is the first remark. The second remark is that this arrangement would account for the fact that a subject, this moreover is beyond question, does not have a determinate sex. Everything depends on the signifier put into the master position to sustain your word as subject. We see clearly in this arrangement how it is justified and how this famous bisexuality proper to the speaking being is effectively inherent in the one who speaks. He has no choice, except obviously to search despairingly in imaginary representations some comfort for his sexual identity. So then, you will say to me, are there only imaginary representations to bring comfort to the sexual identity of this subject who qua subject may moreover express himself in a virile style or in a style that is supposed to be feminine? No, since there are obviously symbolic determinations, ideal imperatives, which themselves are symbolic and which command the subject to keep his word, to organise his subjectivity in one or other fashion and therefore to sustain his phantasy and his desire.

To engage oneself along this path has obviously disturbing consequences. The first advantage is to break radically with the whole tradition of the ego, ego psychology, a tradition that Lacan remarks not alone goes back to Aristotle but is outstandingly sustained by the religious tradition and constitutes progress in a valid sense of the term in a completely different direction which appears to me to be the following. I told you that the task of the psychoanalyst, like that of the artist, bizarrely, is to make vacillate this boundary ordinarily fixed between the Symbolic and the Real. Note that this challenges the paternal reference, which would have it that this frontier should be traced out once and for all. To amuse oneself by making it vacillate, is to upset his tomb, to carry out something that is most sacrilegious, no longer to respect it, to profane it. Now it is quite clear that the whole work of what is called reason was only there, in

the very measure that it is proposed as universal, the most ordinary case, to serve the ruse of the master, the one who settles once and for all what is involved in the limit between the Symbolic and the Real, saying: 'don't touch, that's how it is!' That is why the last time I was questioning you: if we hold that an argumentation can never be universal, what is to be said about psychoanalytic argumentation? To maintain that the subject is what takes its place not within the limits of the meninges but between two signifiers, eventually incarnated by different creatures and ordinarily of a different sex, is at the same time to upset this facility, this immediacy of the relation of the subject to the dead father.

What is this figure, Antigone, to whom Lacan attached himself so much and that we have undoubtedly to take up again? Antigone is the one who says that the laws of the city are not the ultimate laws and at the same time cannot be considered valid for all. In certain cases, to refuse the laws of the city is to respect a law of a higher order that commands the laws of the city. Pay attention to the fact that this is a formulation that directly concerns the events that some people here knew personally or that other younger people know from books, the events of the last world war. The problem was indeed that, fidelity, obedience, duty, was it to respect the laws of the city, or indeed to consider that there was a law that could be superior, and impose itself, and go against the laws of the city? Some time ago, the editors of the review *Autrement* thought they should ask me for a paper for a number devoted to courage. I therefore wrote this paper. It happens, as it always does, that in recalling it now for myself, namely, in making a second approach, reading again what I nevertheless wrote black on white myself, I noted that unwittingly, because I do not believe that I said it as clearly in the paper, that what I specified as courage was in no way to obey the laws of the city, which requires fidelity more than courage properly speaking. For even if it is a matter of dying in this case for the city, this remains inscribed in the accomplishment of a duty which can appear to be of the order of the necessary. If you belong to a community, you do not have the choice. Because otherwise what would you become? Not simply a traitor, you are condemned to wander off and never again

find your place.

To judge what you see being produced before your eyes in central Europe, for example, I would put forward for my part that the people there do not have a choice; depending on whether you are born on one or other side you cannot but gut your neighbour, given the disputes that exist. Except, and it is the only exception, the only reference that you can oppose to these absurd laws, because notice carefully that our brilliant intellectuals do not go any further than take one side or the other, they cannot get out of the difficulty, thinking that the fate of humanity is supported by one or other of the protagonists, depending on their personal inclinations. But everyone feels the despairing character for the spirit of such commitments because what they mean is that there is really no law, precisely, that is universal enough to introduce some vacillation into the commitment of those who are caught up by these affairs. Antigone is there, at the price of a sacrifice that is no less obvious, in order to come and say that there is a law of a superior order, and as it happens, and it is here of course that I wanted to get to, the analyst can do nothing but endorse this law. If this were better perceived by psychoanalysts it would introduce a certain pacification in their morals and would make them more apt as regards their taking sides, their commitments, their judgments.

So then I am making you take this journey in order to testify simply to you that the way in which saying that 'the unconscious...' as Lacan did, with this very condensed character of a formula, and with that sort yourselves out, my friends! It is a formula that is effectively active and living in reality, even if we overlook it.

I was speaking earlier about the splits in the neurotic who remains highly attached to the familial scene but one could also distinguish the person who on the contrary makes of the social field what is responsible, no longer for his castration, but for his frustration and his privation and who therefore engages in a social struggle with the same dynamism as the other does in family conflict. One can see how the position of the psychoanalyst allows him to avoid both ways of going astray and allows

him to think. Is it thinking a universal? In any case it is thinking something general because we could not postulate a universal. But qua subject, and here once again I fall on my feet, to expect of S2 not that he will respond to me, in an identical way to my own formulation 'yes there is a universal' but that there is separated out this type of response which, while accepting the split, while accepting separation, does not attribute it to some frustration or privation but knows how to recognise in it the very thing that ensures sexual enjoyment. And therefore instead of making a grievance of it, make of it rather the occasion of an attempt, not at harmony, not at reconciliation, but of correct response. This assuredly does not exist, because you will find no kind of romantic form of this exercise, this attempt between a man and a woman to formulate interpellations and responses that one could consider as correct and which at the same time would make their dialogue pathetic, much more so, obviously, than the pathetic nature, which has become so worn and ridiculed, of dispute, grievance, complaint, denunciation, plaint, accusation, excess, fault, all the usual things. I am telling you all of this in order of course that you should start using your pens when you get home and begin to reflect on what such a dialogue might be, that of a subject who would no longer be sustained by his parental, paternal particularity but who would be a subject equal to Antigone.

So then, this is the type of cogitation to which a formulation like the one I recalled earlier, 'the unconscious, is the social' may lead. I simply want to tell you that when you make remarks like the ones I am summarising for you before an audience of students in the provinces, students of the Arts Faculty and of psychology in the provinces, students who only have a rather vague glimpse of what psychoanalysis is, to your astonishment, you see that this gets through, you see that this is understood. So then you say to yourself, if the profane can understand such unbelievable remarks, perhaps there is something in them that deserves to be taken up and developed. The term unbelievable brings us back to president Schreber, as if we had ever left him, because if president Schreber wrote his book, it was for what reason? Precisely to have an S2. He says that he wrote it first of

all for his wife. President Schreber who had this fantastic experience, now that he is feeling better, even though disguised as a woman and spending his days in front of the mirror, needs to have, at the place he is addressing, someone who at least listens to what he has to say and eventually answers without too much disfavour. So then we have not really left president Schreber.

Let us return then to what I evoked a moment ago, the question of incredulity and credulity. There is a very difficult problem that I am also submitting to you. In the real, there are signifiers which are rejected, I am not specifying the mechanism, just as much by neurosis as by psychosis. There is in the real at-least-one which ensures that this real is for me the locus where I can love a God or a father. Is he there or is he not? In other words do I believe in him or do I not believe in him? Here there arises the problem of belief. This problem of belief obviously is resolved in the psychotic. He says it to us and he is going to put us on the path of certainty. There is no doubt. In what Schreber calls the posterior divine kingdoms where I live Ormuz and Arhimam, the Indo-European gods, he knows very well that they are there, there is no possible doubt about this. This is what would call in our language delusional certainty.

But if one is neurotic, one believes in the God of religion in a quite different way and when one of our friends starts really believing, namely when he is certain about it, one becomes a little bit concerned about him. The mystic quest, yes, I agree, but a quest, an attempt to encounter it or to hear it can end up with hallucinations, can go very far, but in any case remains in the dimension of effort. While for the psychotic, there is no effort, he knows, oh how well he knows that it is there. As for Schreber there are a whole lot of forecourts that obviously keep the gods at a distance, ordinarily, when the order of the world is respected. There are all the stages, it is like Jacob's ladder, there are steps but in any case, at the top of the ladder, he is there. No doubt about it. As regards credulity and incredulity, what brings it about that for the psychotic, the fact that the real is inhabited in this way by signifiers and amongst others by the gods, is not be doubted, for him it is of the order of certainty, and that for the

neurotic it is of the order of belief? In the late Lacan a curious formulation says that the difference depends on the fact that the neurotic 'believes in it' while the psychotic 'believes it', it is a problem of the direct or indirect complement. It is interesting because this seems then to bear witness to the fact that the place where the gods are situated for one and the other is not the same.

But nevertheless the real, the dimension of the real exists for the psychotic. Obviously it is a fluctuating real, it is a real which, as long as the delusion is not systematised is a real that moves, that changes, that is displaced, and therefore obviously the subject with it, and undergoes all kinds of metamorphoses. This indeed is what Schreber tells us. There can even be several reals, foci from which things are activated at the same time; Schreber saw perfectly clearly two suns at the same time. And then what is called the work of delusion allows a systematisation through the imaginary, namely, succeeds in establishing a history that localises this real, interprets and in a way masters it. Once the delusion is systematised, the real is caught and there is no question of a delusional person querying his system in any way because this would be once again to enter into the throes of what is called acute delusion and all the transformations, the metamorphoses, the identifications, all the processes that you know. But why qua neurotic, is it for me of the order of belief or disbelief? I cannot believe in it. For example, Creon believes in it, Antigone, not in the same way. Perhaps she for her part does not even believe in it.

So then there is in Lacan's development a work that is very attentive to this question. What can we say about it? What is the difference, why does the psychotic escape this dimension of belief, why, for him, does this immediately impose itself on him as being of the order of certainty? Can we not recall that in psychosis, what does not take place is the cut. Which means that the unary trait present in the real is present in a materiality which is not itself the trace of any cut. I often point out to you that the \$ means that what makes the 1, the first 1, is the cut. Which means that you can take the bar on the S either as the materiality of the

trait 1, or as the simple mark of the cut, of the slit. I tried to show you how the clinic of hysteria was sustained by this double incidence. Can we think that in psychosis, the indubitable presence in the real of the unary trait is valid as pure materiality but not at all in so far as the unary trait might be here the mark of a cut? The unary trait here is only sustained by its permanent positiveness. Is the phenomenon of belief not supported by this curious physical property of the unary trait, which is to present itself with this double face, either of material, physical trait, or of being slit? While for the psychotic, there is only this pure materiality, positiveness that, for its part, leaves no place either for doubt or for perspective. We should take it up again in connection with the schema R, I should perhaps ask Darmon to come and take up again for us here the schema R, namely, the effects of hyperbolic geometry. But in any case, for the psychotic, it is a world organised otherwise than in the register of perspective.

Have I got a clinical illustration to give you for this point that I am putting forward? Yes, there is one that is interesting because it takes up another problem that I so often tried to circumscribe in obsessional neurosis. Schreber tells you that the *Grundsprache*, the fundamental tongue, this archaic and racy German is rich in euphemisms. In reality these euphemisms are antonyms, namely, where the fundamental tongue uses the word white, you have to understand black; purified means on the contrary impure. Namely, that each signifier is to be understood as opposite to the habitual conventional meaning. The figure of speech known as antonym, then. I had occasion to point out to you that the power of the symbol was to establish an affirmation only on the basis of a negation and that the negation did not fail in a way to reintroduce itself into the operation of the tongue. But what dominates, is nevertheless the affirmation carried out by the symbol, the negation comes there as a response of the real. While for the psychotic, perhaps I should take up with you either some pages of Schreber in German, or other texts collected in French literature in connection with the writings of psychotics, in order to take up the question again of what a delusional metaphor is. Lacan uses this term but what is a delusional metaphor?

In any case, in the way in which the signifier is understood by Schreber, the prevalence of antonyms — it is not at all a euphemism, they are not at all, in following Schreber himself, metaphors or metonymies, they are antonyms; you simply have to decipher that what is good means what is bad and inversely, etc., you have to ceaselessly carry out this reversal. Can we not read then in this very strange operation precisely what happens to the signifier in the psychotic once its positiveness is no longer affirmed by the Bejahung, once what comes to deny this Bejahung no longer comes from the real, but that the only way for the signifier to make sense, is simply to carry out this reversal, this simple negation of itself, isolating in this way a referent which is nothing other than itself, the unary trait, but which taken as referent, in the locus and the place of the phallus, can only be understood in this systematisation, in this rudimentary coding.

Why then, you will say to me, does the signifier in the psychotic not always mean exactly what it says? First of all, yes! Very often, for a psychotic, the signifier means strictly what it means. But, in Schreber, there is a refinement of this operation; the totality of signifiers refer to a referent but this referent, in the measure that it is not organised by a cut and therefore opening onto a depth which is that of an enigma, that of uncertainty. To the extent that this is lacking, the putting in place of this referent can occur only through banality and the very mechanical, very limited character of the production of sense, simply by this reversal.

Schreber tells us that God is always outside, God only knows the living man from the outside, 'God was not omniscient and omnipresent in the sense that he continuously saw inside every individual living person'. Well then, I understand this in the following way. There is no question in psychosis of the subject being able to inhabit the locus where his God is, but that the subject is always outside him, they are always outside one another. And this indeed will be, I will develop it for you in January, Schreber's drama, not only the exteriority of the subject with respect to God, but also this permanent struggle between them, which means that the victory of the one can only be expressed by the death of the other, and

the subject can only get to the place where his God is — if it is true that this God is only sustained by a pure materiality and no longer by a cut in which the subject could assert his existence — because if he asserts himself in this locus of the signifier, this signifier can only be outside the divine signifier or enter into mortal competition with it. It is either you or me. A singular ordeal!

To conclude this evening, a little word once again, but in a clearer fashion perhaps, on the problem of the foreign language. Because there are situations which can in an artificial and experimental way reproduce devices analogous to those of psychosis. If I speak, if I try to speak a foreign language, for example English, which I do with a lot of trouble, what is the message that I receive in return for my word, what is sent back to me in my use of this tongue, even if we suppose that I am speaking it correctly, fluently, what is sent back to me? What, if not that I am outside the tongue, that I am a stranger to it, and a stranger highlighted here not as subject - I am not a foreign subject in it, because as subject, I am not understood in it - but foreign to my being.

There you are! Let us suppose that my maternal tongue is French. Therefore I am speaking my maternal tongue. To realise myself in it in my being is not easy, it is a whole quest, it is a whole labour. Because if I function in it as subject, what am I in it as being? But as subject? All the work of philosophers to try to specify, to define what should be understood as being. I can say that I am as existing (*étant*) but as being (*être*), I do not know. On the other hand, if I speak a foreign tongue, I can be at ease, because as regards what is involved for my being, it is immediately accomplished, it is posited in this tongue as foreign, but at the same time as characterising me in my being. I realise my identity, namely, my being in a foreign tongue. But at the same time what functions as a referent in this foreign tongue takes on for me a positiveness that excludes any gap in it. It is compact, it is even so compact that it makes me veer away, namely, that it is only in the measure that I speak a foreign tongue that I can take on the entire dimension of what is called positivism. Perhaps you have to take this route in order to become a

positivist. You see better now what we can call a maternal tongue, which is not at all necessarily the tongue that mammy spoke. The maternal tongue is the one that records - I believe that we are making progress, all the same - the wound, the cut that I have inscribed in it as speaking being, and that not alone accepts the aforesaid wound but what is more loves it. So then the maternal tongue is the one that accepts the cut that qua speaking being I have inscribed in the Other, provided I lose my being in it.

So then if I am making this final remark to you, it is in order to try to strengthen by examples which are more immediately tangible for us and which have not simply individual but also social effects, to strengthen what I am evoking for you in connection with psychosis, in connection with Schreber and how the fact of speaking a foreign tongue can permit a neurotic or a psychotic to find the solution to a certain number of problems described as personal, since in speaking a foreign tongue I become an other. Not necessarily another subject but in any case, if I fail to find my subjectivity in it, I find my being there. And then I find a positiveness which perhaps may suit me. Positiveness also means that the aforesaid tongue is no longer to be heard in the interplay of its metaphors and its metonymies - no, this is not important - but simply that for me qua stranger it means nothing other for me than what it says and so there you are! It is moreover in this way that in general one teaches foreign languages.

That's it for this evening. Despite the stupefaction you are struck by, have you remarks? Nathalie?

N. Delafond: - It is in relation to what you were saying about the unary trait. I had two cases of interpretative delusions unleashed by the simple repetition of a word, of a number, and when the phenomenon was laid bare in a way, it was this simple repetition. Obviously, one might say that in that case the signifier no longer operates as signifier but probably as sign, it becomes the sign of an intention in the Other which is directed at

the subject. But it always seemed to me that this had something to do with the fact that the psychotic fundamentally cannot conceive of the fact that this repetition may not have a sense, namely, that the enigmatic point that you are speaking about, the enigmatic point created by the cut is completely absent. So then is...?

Ch. Melman: - Yes, but I am afraid that in what you are evoking, in it there was not the well known hallucinatory phenomenon which is that his own thoughts may be spelled out and repeated by his voices. There are psychotics among whom this hallucinatory phenomenon is limited. Moreover it is also one of the features of Schreber, the voices repeating ceaselessly, permanently, there is a sonarisation of his own thoughts. Perhaps the fact of activating this in reality is something that comes in his case to solicit this phenomenon which is always rather painful for a psychotic.

G. Pariente: - Yes, for my part this makes me think of those psychotics who present hallucinations without delusion and who are these rare persons who want to be absolutely rid of this certainty. In that case does one not occupy this place or this locus which could rid them of what they have a certain certainty about most of the time?

Ch. Melman: - Listen, I've known for some time - I don't dare to say the number of years - a patient who is doing very well and whose only symptom is constituted by hallucinations that are perfectly identified because they are emitted by her husband from who she has been separated for a great number of years, and who besides is dead. She learned of his death two or three years ago and she came to me, a little surprised saying 'It's funny! He's dead and it still continues'. So now, it is the husband and his pals. She has spent her whole life with these hallucinations, she is absolutely not deluding, and thanks I would say to a therapist, she functions peaceably and calmly with them, it is scarcely an inconvenience. And I was even led on several occasions to remark to her that if they

stopped, she would feel a little lonely. And the worst thing is that when the neuroleptics clean out, effectively the psychotic has a feeling of being deserted and of being abandoned. This is an old woman now, who had a professional life, she worked up to the age of retirement, she brought up her daughter, and she has always lived with that. She walks the streets, she does not need a Walkman.

B. Vandermersch: - A question on the unary trait of the psychotic. What is difficult for me to represent is what its topology might be? If it is not a cut at the beginning, what does it cut, which means that one can say that it is all the same a unary trait, that there is something of the one in it, what does it mean that it dominates the remainder, in other words?

Ch. Melman: - Well! There is a cut, this indeed is where the flaw, as I might say, of the tongue is. The way of constituting it makes discreet elements of the tongue, the simple operation of the tongue introduces the cut, whether you are psychotic or not. Only it seems that something more is necessary, it has to be said, for this cut — we are not going to say to be recognised as such since it is not recognised precisely — in any case is decisive for the functioning of the tongue, gives to the functioning of the tongue a reference, settled, grounded, established once and for all. But which aforesaid referent at the same time is just as valid, ceaselessly commemorates the cut, is its representative.

C. Lacôte: - I wanted to pose you a question. I find that what you have said about the distinction between being and the subject goes very far in what is happening in the field of psychological sciences, for example, the American ones. Someone was talking to me recently about the Gordon method, and I was wondering whether what you were saying this evening did not allow there to be grasped this kind of method in which it is a matter of properly speaking fully inhabiting, in all certainty, the words one pronounces, of interpreting them in another way than by suggestion but by making our relation to language psychotic.

Ch. Melman: - Yes.

C. Lacôte: - Because today that is rather easily interpreted in terms of hypnosis or other suggestions. Here we can perhaps understand that, because it is a matter of completely filling each word that is emitted with something that also resembles the by heart of the tongue one is learning, the foreign tongue also, there is something there which seems to me to be very important.

Ch. Melman: - Yes, but fundamentally, it was already what Plato wanted, a very ancient wish, a very precocious wish; his repudiation of poets, the poets must be driven out of the City, they are dangerous people. On the other hand, all thought about the concept goes in the direction, precisely, of an accomplished positiveness. On these questions we never do any more than take up or give rise again to ancient data, we never invent very much.

So then goodbye, to the month of January!

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