The Psychoanalytic Discourse

A second reading of Lacan’s Etourdit

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Presentation

Discourse creates a social bond. How express (dire) the social bond specific to psychoanalysis? Must we base ourselves on the persons concerned by analysis?

Discourse in general does not have protagonists; it is not determined by the agents that are supposed to precede it. On the contrary, it is the discourse which gives their place to people who will find in it their consistency by allowing it to resonate in them. It is the master discourse which determines the master and not the inverse. It is the hysterical discourse which challenges the hysteric and makes her exist and not the inverse. It is the academic discourse which knows how to organise the academic and not the inverse. In the same way, the psychoanalytic discourse is not the discourse held by the analyst, nor is it the discourse held by the analyser. There is no analyst and no analyser who maintains the psychoanalytic discourse. It is on the contrary the latter which maintains and sustains them. One should not confuse the psychoanalytic discourse and the discourse of the analyst.

The discourse of the analyst consists simply in discoursing on the analyst, about the analyst. Whoever is engaged more or less closely in the process of analysis can discourse about the analyst in one mode or another, master, hysterical, academic. That is called transference whoever may be the semblance who engages in it the analyst, the analyser, or a simple individual outside a psychoanalytic treatment.

From the Rome discourse to the end of his life, Lacan did not cease to inscribe himself in this transference by constantly putting the psychoanalyst ‘on the spot’. From beginning to end, the thread of his discourse has as object the analyst and his function.

One can discourse in a thousand ways about the analyst. Rightly or wrongly. And if it is wrongly (which is never lacking), it is better to traverse its impasses and its impossibilities to discover a path.

To speak about the analyst, it is better to follow the thread of psychoanalysis itself, it is better to be on the inside of a discourse which is supposed to be properly analytic, it is better to thread the discourse on the analyst by way of a psychoanalytic discourse.

Such is the knot of psychoanalysis: to weave the chain of the discourse on the psychoanalyst, that of transference, with the texture of an experience of free speech, that of the psychoanalytic discourse.
It will be a matter of specifying the psychoanalytic discourse starting from the experience engaged in free speech or again starting from the signifier as difference, as the movement where there is played out the production of differences (introduction).

The structure of the signifier up opens different possible functions for the analyst. These are the ‘roles of the analyst’. These roles provide an imaginary presence which expresses and reveals the very question of psychoanalysis (first chapter).

One must get rid of these roles of the analyst to remain within the movement of psychoanalyse itself. The absence of the analyst and of these roles gives way to the surprise of invention, of creation. The whole symbolic process which is engaged in it depends on this absence (second chapter).

How can one treat this foundational absence? The answer will come in the real circuit of impossibilities, which will be explicitated in the different logical formulae, of sexuation. These formulae, do not concern a particular logic, but the circuit of a succession of logics which are linked together to the point of revealing the ‘notall’ (third chapter).

These first three chapters privileging respectively the imaginary, the symbolic and the real are nevertheless not sufficient. They culminate at an indefinite ‘notall’ that must be specified by a new turn.

The imaginary roles of the analyst take on their meaning from the signifying operation, which implies cutting and stitching. This operation works on the imaginary consistency no longer simply of the analyst, but of the psychoanalytic discourse (fourth chapter)

The structure of the psychoanalytic discourse makes there appear the radical impossibility of forming a psychoanalytic group. The absence of the analyst is reflected in the absence of any psychoanalytic group. This impossibility (‘there is no relationship’) allows us to mobilise the sense of each discourse. The novelty of the psychoanalytic discourse is to symbolically modify the other discourses while at the same time preserving their content (fifth chapter).

The real logic of the psychoanalytic discourse is to be found in the real articulation of the imaginary material and of the sense which is symbolically renewed in it. The psychoanalytic discourse has the very structure of interpretation. It knots the imaginary of meaning, the symbolic of sense and the real of sense (sixth chapter).
The proposed double-looped circuit of the imaginary, of the symbolic and of the real does not come out of nowhere. I quoted Lacan. One cannot get rid of great authors. One can just barely be inscribed in the movement of a saying and attempt to prolong it. This is what is called ‘reading’, in this case ‘to read in psychoanalysis’.

I proposed a first reading of Lacan’s *L’étourdit*, a word by word commentary, published in 2002. I am proposing here a second, different, loop of reading: it is no longer a matter of approaching the things said and understood in the field of psychoanalysis, even if they are Lacanian. It is rather a matter of engaging myself, with its risks and perils, in the act of saying proper to the psychoanalytic discourse. the imaginary, the symbolic and the real are nevertheless not sufficient. They culminate at an indefinite ‘notall’ that must be specified by a new turn.
Introduction: The differ\(\text{a}n\)ce

Let us start from the inaugural experience of psychoanalysis. A first experience which can be found anywhere at all.

A little difference. A nothing, a trait, a sensation, a breath, a silence, a crumb which falls, a dragging foot, a hello or its absence. Just one. A unary trait. What matter, provided that it is not quite the same thing, provided that difference is insinuated or even simply doubt about the identity of the thing. It’s that and it’s not that. I observe it like that and it is already not quite the same thing. I observe the difference in what the one who is speaking has said or in what whoever does not speak has done. Speaker or autistic, it is from the similar to the same. Already different, bearer of the little differ\(\text{a}n\)ce, of a process of differentiation.

A differ\(\text{a}n\)ce advances and grabs me. Why? How?

No need of even a word. It is always already there.

I observe this differ\(\text{a}n\)ce as it is in the process of being made ‘\(S_1 - S_2\)’ I make a ‘signifier’ of it. ‘The signifier is what represents the subject for another signifier.’

The movement is given: a signifier in relation to another signifier has the effect of representing the subject. Whether he speaks or does not speak, it is the unary trait bearer of the little differ\(\text{a}n\)ce...which has as effect the ‘analyser’.

By the very fact of understanding the unary trait as the speaking signifier and therefore of reducing it to what pushes on towards meaning, one runs the risk of not allowing oneself to be grabbed by the differ\(\text{a}n\)ce itself.

‘The signifier is what represents the subject for another signifier.’

What is meant by ‘a signifier’, the first one? And then what is meant by ‘other’?

Is the other clearly separate from the first? And in that case there are two of them. The relationship of one to the other.

Or is the other always in continuity with the first? And then there is something of the one. Can we still speak about relationship?

It is not the same destiny.

*On the one hand, the two signifiers face to face.* We are placing ourselves within a tongue (linguistics), one can observe that there is a differential relationship at every
level. From the semantic point of view, the signifiers observed already have meaning. For example ‘père’ and ‘mère’ are differentiated to put in place the framework of the family and the structures of kinship. The anthropologist and the psychologist thus find the material to construct the geometry of the oedipal triangle and to set up their object of observation or their patient in a series of relationships which assures and reassures the structure. There is a sexual relationship between Adam, the first father, and Eve the first mother. On this side of semantics (and still at the level of the tongue), one can come back to the atoms from which meaning is supposed to be constructed, to phonemes for example. The phoneme does not signify anything in itself. Here indeed, it seems, is a ‘signifier barred from the signified’. The phonemes of the tongue are thus defined by a system of pure synchronic difference. For example ‘père’ and ‘mère’ are differentiated by their first phoneme or their first letter: ‘p’ is different to ‘m’. Their difference creates a relationship between them.

On the other hand, one and only one signifier becomes other. It is a matter of the differential relationship within the signifier itself. It is this type of signifier which is in question from the very start of L’étourdit. From the semantic point of view, a single signifier, for example ‘père’, would differentiate itself to the point of producing a new paternity of subversion. It is indeed a matter of getting away from a ready-to-use oedipal figure. But much more it is a matter of getting away from the semantic point of view. L’étourdit turns around the turn (tour) and the said (dit) where meaning lapses into foolishness (l’étourderie). How can we construct the psychoanalytic discourse starting from the signifying relationship defined in function of this auto-differentiation, starting from l’étourdi/dit in its turning movement? It seems indeed that there is still a relationship which would be created of itself, within the trait, and a single letter suffices to create the difference. Spelling tests prove it. In the agreement of the past participle for example: ‘Tu ne sauras jamais combien je t’ai aimé.’ Addressed to a woman, that may stir things up, but that is not what is important. The forgotten ‘e’, the silent ‘e’ begins to speak of itself and it is love which speaks itself and of itself, the love letter, without appealing to the documentation of some diagnostic or police-style suspicion. A single letter. L’étourdit offers us its silent ‘t’. It is enough to make l’étourdi and the unconscious speak.

The difference advances, not at all in that it would be limited from the outset to the signifying stumble of a lapsus linguæ, understood in the said and
ready to be understood. *Dit or di*: the written is not understood. So then a *lapsus calami*?

The slip (*lapsus*) falls by itself and it is only secondarily that it is specified by the tongue or the pen. The trait falls first of all by itself. First of all something: it’s that (*c’est ça*). And then, at the same place, at the same trait, something a little different: it’s no longer quite that. The presence of the trait is hollowed out by absence (*se creuse d’absence*) in this little difference.

Is there the slightest relationship between a presence and an absence? I can encounter it locally. Is it a matter of presence or of absence? Absence in any case. Where grasp it? How preserve the movement of presence-absence?

Anywhere at all.

It is traditional to define psychoanalysis by its only medium, ‘speech’. It is supposed to be defined by abstaining from any other recourse and abstaining from any *passage à l’acte*. Speech is nevertheless much too large and too loose. What multiple meanings under speech!

The field of psychoanalysis ought to be defined by the simple *differance*, a diachronic difference before any linguistic explanation, for it is the *differance* that opens the door of the signifier before any semantic flocculence. It is played out in time, not so much in the centuries in which there can be read the evolution of a tongue, but in the unary instant of a laugh, of a dream or of a mistake. And psychoanalysis can very well, by going back to its principles, address itself to an autistic person without speech and without writing, to the heavy silence bearing a moment of failure which incarnates itself in its own way.

I will nevertheless unfold the psychoanalytic discourse *starting from speech*, starting from the said (*du dit*), for reasons of presentation. The *differance* \(S_1 - S_2\) borrows its sigla from the signifier; but the *differance* exists even before it is said or written. Already in silence. And it is crucial to recognise that even if it is deprived of the materiality of speech and of writing, the listener can be integrally supported by the psychoanalytic discourse provided he starts from any unary trait whatsoever that carries *differance*.

This infra-linguistic *differance* opens up the space of equivocation which will weave together everything that follows. At the risk and peril of the one who, speaking or not, produces it, and of the one who hears it.
Is there someone to put order on it?
The roles of the analyst

It is the practice of differance that lends to the analyst different imaginary functions. And whoever takes the place of ‘analyst’ will inevitably assume each of the roles of the analyst in turn.

No doubt one or other of these roles can be more or less accentuated depending on times and temperaments. They do not cease to be inscribed in the very course of the differential practice of the signifier.

One may well deny, reject, ignore them. They must be recognised in order to question and transform them and thus to allow oneself to be operated on by the practice of the signifier.

THE ANALYST WHO KNOWS. THE DOGMATIC ANALYST

The signifier must be taken literally (à la lettre). The differance must be grasped where it is found in the treatment, in what the analyser brings, in the speech of the analyser. This is how I want to comprehend ‘the psychoanalyst has only a single medium: the speech of the analyser’ (Ecrits, p.247). But what is meant by ‘medium’? Is it the means used to treat the symptom? Is it the binding material by which the mayonnaise of pigments take on their colour? Is it the angel of computer processing or neuropsychology which is supposed to set up a communication between the World of the spirit with the World of corporeal materiality? Or is it rather the structure? I can only answer for it by following speech itself.

Speech presents itself already in the form of statements (énoncés). But also silences: ‘See, I am silent’, ‘See, he is silent’. Starting from statements (and silence is a potential statement, in all its potency) there is presented a first acceptation of the discourse of the analyst. Speech, what the analyser contributes, is supposed to give a place to the analyst: he is the one who is supposed to be capable of comprehending and of judging what is presented.

First role of the analyst: the analyst should produce one or many statements (including his silence) taking up in a broader context the conscious and unconscious statements of the analyser.
In this sense, the *discourse of the analyst* would be the discourse that orders and rearranges into proper reasonableness the statements of the patient (including the silences). He interprets, not without the support of a rational idea that supposedly directs him. This kind of interpretation is precisely at stake in the delusion of interpretation. Therefore let us frankly call it *the delusional interpretation* whatever may be its exactness and its effects. In it the analyst plays the role of the one who knows. The discourse of the analyst puts forward his interpretation as the truth founded on the statements of the patient. It is in principle dogmatic.

That can work, that can produce delusions and other general, generic and generative ‘interpretations’. I can allow the engine of statements and their delusional interpretations to run. And there you are.

I can also go a little bit further. On condition of having already myself assumed this dogmatic role, I want to pose the fundamental question of the function of such a ‘discourse of the analyst’ in which I would give hermeneutic (delusional) interpretations. Of course, I accord myself the benefit of a favourable presupposition. In order to be able to appropriately sustain this role of dogmatic analyst I will be careful to form myself for it by general culture and by an analytic curriculum which would synthesise practically and theoretically the contributions of psychoanalysis. In addition, I will be careful to listen attentively, to reflect, to weigh the pros and cons, to go for supervision, etc. It is not without prudence that the dogmatic analyst puts forward his interpretations, which are not all that foolish. Also is it not a matter of returning to the particular statements which preceded such and such an interpretation. The conscientious analyst should already have done so. It is a matter of questioning the very principle of such a discourse in which I find myself already engaged.

Discourse is made up of statements. The statements are composed of ordinary words. And these words designate universals.

The statement which expresses the form of pure predication is thus composed of a universal in the role of function (of predicate) and of a universal in the role of argument (of grammatical subject). For example ‘the square root of 2 is an irrational number’ or ‘*humilitas virtus*’ (cf J. Vuillemin, *Nécessité ou contingence*, p.276). Such is the necessary minimum for there to be a statement. Even if there is only one square root of 2 and one humility, the grammatical subject
remains universal: it is the matter of the square root of 2 and of humility in general.

But in the concrete treatment, is it not above all a question of particular propositions and singular propositions, where the grammatical subject is taken in a singular, that is to say subjective sense, or in a particular sense, that is to say subjectively indefinite? These propositions would not respond to any universal aim. And, what is more, this kind of statement avoiding the universal form would be privileged in the psychoanalytic discourse. ‘Not all’, ‘not at all’, ‘no universal proposition’, such will be the instruction. Starting from there, could we not quite simply remove the dogmatism of the analyst as a philosophical position that does not fundamentally concern us?

It is a matter of analysing what these particular and singular propositions are to show how the dogmatic position of the analyst is inevitable. Starting from there to answer the question as to how it can be gone beyond.

The grammatical form of these ‘subjective’ (singular versus particular) propositions does not invalidate the fact that their argument is well and truly aimed at a universal.

Singular proposition. The patient has just said ‘I suffer’: ‘I’ is the universal of what is indicated by the ‘I’, to be sure it is supposed to be ‘one’, ‘unique’, that makes it all the more apt to be ‘uni-versal’, not in the sense that others could have the same experience as him and say in their turn ‘I suffer’. The patient does not like the sympathy of someone who testifies that he has also suffered. As the universal of ‘I suffer’, is the universal of ‘I’ which invades his whole universe. ‘I’, is the one who speaks and everything that speaks (body and spirit, sensibility, affect, intelligence, etc.) presents itself as ‘I’. Nothing can be said to be ‘I’ if it does not refer to him, subject of speech.

Particular proposition. ‘Some parts are suffering (en souffrance).’ To be sure, it is not said that ‘everything is suffering’. The question remains vague. It nevertheless remains that ‘I’ is aimed at ‘all’ of these ‘some’ parts of which I am speaking even if I am not in a position to develop the (universal) set under which they would be ranged. By the very fact of saying ‘some’, I am already aiming at all the parts that are suffering, even if I cannot explicate. Some? Whatever they may be. Namely, all. ‘In whatever place there is’ in every place. With this ‘some’, the universal proposition is always ideally aimed at even if it is not explicated. The universal has remained implicit, that is its particularity. And the indefinite
pronoun (‘there are some of them which...’) always attempts to define itself (and to universalise itself), even and especially if it fails. By failing to become a definite pronoun, it infinitises itself as indefinite; that is its particularity.

And starting from the universality of each statement, it is therefore quite natural to universalise a little bit more again, namely, to attempt to enter into a universalising interpretation, into a delusional interpretation.

Can one escape from the universality inherent in every statement? Does there exist a discourse of the analyst which is not dogmatic? The analyst, believing that he is becoming a pure practitioner, can lull himself with illusions as regards subjective singular or particular propositions. This is only a procedural alibi to defend himself against an inevitable dogmatism.

The promotion of the singular is imagined to be able to avoid conceptualisation and to find itself in direct contact with the singular subjective thing; it only rears up proudly, but despairingly, against a conceptualisation which sticks to its skin. Far from being purely ‘existential’, purely ‘experienced’ or purely ‘felt’, singular subjective statements remain universals and inevitably lead to the taking up of positions on existence, on life or the experience of the suffering of the patient. And the latter is caught in the pincers of a know-how, which surreptitiously implies the universalising recapitulation of a diagnosis.

As regards the systematic promotion of the particular, it leaves every proposition in the indefinite. And this systematised indefiniteness leaves no other way out than the sceptical expectation of the study of an unforeseeable ‘case by case’: ‘On the one hand to be sure yes, on the other hand no doubt no’, ‘perhaps indeed yes, perhaps indeed no’. Let whatever happen while awaiting the universal.

Not without concrete consequences for the ethics of the work: one lets the work go towards some outcome or other (whatsoever...) which is only the systematised prolongation of a suspension of judgement, of a rejection of the dogmatic position that one wants to know nothing about.

Whatever may be the camouflage of the partisans of the singular and the particular, we carry the charge of universal statements; whatever one says, we start from what is said and understood which always present themselves at first as universals.

Hence the well-known critique by the analyst: ‘It’s an intellectualisation’, ‘it is all in his head’ quite distant from concrete, affective, effective, reality etc.

The method of psychoanalysis does not decide. With the speech of the analyst we are in conceptualisation, in the universal, etc. And the appeal to the
testimony of analysers who have experienced the treatment will not invalidate the objection. We already bathe in universalisation if not in generalities.

Of course the question is not to promote universalisation, to make the patient enter willingly or by force into the universality of social standards or the standards of the analyst (which are supposedly better), to frame his acts and his phantasies in the iron collar of delusional interpretation, to push him towards it, with tact and psychology if possible. He’s already there, this indeed is his fortune and his misfortune.

Nor is the question pull him by a forceps starting from the outside, as if with the help of the analyst midwife bearer of good words even though she is silent, could decently pretend to be outside of the word of statements and of their universalisation.

The question is that he should be able to accept to find himself there. The universal opens up in this way a coming and going of a questioning, provided the patient imagines he is ‘emerging’ from it or ‘entering’ it. It is from the universal position that there begins the putting in question that is too easily set aside. How rediscover the forgotten ventilation?

THE ANALYST WHO DOES NOT KNOW. THE SCEPTICAL ANALYST.

The statement is there. Objectively it can be written or simply registered in a corner of the brain. It doesn’t matter. But what is its value?

It is not without a process which fashioned it.

‘Every statement implies its conditions of stating.’ Here indeed is still another universal. It remains most often hidden, For it would allow the value of the explicit said to be put in doubt.

One prefers to forget the process, the saying. Not to explicitate the process of stating. One always avoids it. One always forgets it. To forget. Here is another new universal which redoubles that of stating. ‘That one might be saying remains forgotten behind what is said in what is understood’ (AE, 449).

Who is this responsible for stating who would prefer to be forgotten? For want of wanting to or of being able to find him, he will be called ‘one, on’. Can we define this ‘one’ at the origin of saying? Can we circumscribe this ‘that one, qu’on’ who might be saying?
The indefinite character of the ‘one’ refers us to the indefinite of a non-personalised sayer; in this sense, he indeed acts as a particular: ‘An X which is whatever it might be saying’. But this particularity only eludes the necessary and universal tendency to find the one responsible for the saying.

‘I’ can take the responsibility of saying on my own account. As a sayer, ‘I’ engage myself to answer for the process producing statements. The engagement is ill considered since, in my haste, I remove myself from what is stated; it is surely dangerous since it escapes any mastery.

The always presumptuous engagement can be made starting from any statement whatsoever. One can choose. In choosing, one becomes ‘I’. Ethically.

The one responsible for stating is not a specimen of the universal, it demonstrates itself in act, by advancing. With the one responsible who engages itself, the statement takes the value, no longer simply of a proposition, but of a judgement. The judgement of the rights and wrongs of the statement. Always rightly and wrongly (à tort et à travers). To twist (tordre) and to traverse.

In the classical particular, the indefiniteness of the statement in its universal aim is expressed (dit) by particularising; not being able to embrace the all, I grasp it by one part, by a particular. Though universal, it only holds together in parts.

But here, once I speak about the stating, it appears to be something quite different to a part of the universal. The particular proper to stating does not form part of the initial universal. It does not enter into the initial said or understood statement; it is not inscribed under the banner of the universal proper to the initial proposition (cf. the propositional logic of Aristotle where A, the universal affirmative implies I, the particular affirmative). If it must nevertheless depend on the statement as such, and if every statement is by definition potentially universal, how define this particular of saying, of stating? In what universal might it participate?

By responding to the saying (to the ‘that one might be saying’ which is not said), the particular of saying (of the stating) would be defined as not verifying the initial universal. A completely negative definition which leaves precisely only one particular such that it is not..., that it is not,... a particular from then on condemned to remain particular. The particular ‘that one might be saying’ takes the place of what is forgotten; it remains completely forgotten in the logic of statements and of their delusional interpretation.
The discourse of the analyst who knows, the discourse of the dogmatic analyst would contain something hidden, a sayer who would in no way correspond to statements and to their delusional interpretation. Every statement and every universal hide in themselves something forgotten. There is no way of producing a (universal) statement without forgetting this something which depends on the process of stating.

It is in the putting in question of the universal and of its process that there appears the particular of stating. The particular in question is irremediably particular since it only approaches its pretension to universality by default, only by what it cannot be.

Far from opposing the universal and the particular in order finally to prefer the second, it is a matter of highlighting the apparition of the statement with its two universals (function and argument, predicate and grammatical subject) and, starting from there, advancing to the questioning of the process of stating and of this quite particular particular which only exists outside the initial universal. One must have a consistent universal to make it emerge.

We have the trace of this process of stating in the modalities which modulate the universal of the statement. Modality seems at first to be purely grammatical. But I can highlight it in any statement whatsoever, including and most particularly all the statements produced in analysis. In any case, we are dealing with the apparition of a universal assertion and, starting from there, in every case, we can pose the question of the process of stating, therefore this particular irreducible to an effectively realised universal, this particular particular which is only defined by the fact of not being able to be brought back to a well defined universal.

For each statement that I highlight, that I show, I can pose the question of its formation, of what formed it. That is what makes it modal.

All that is not very reassuring for the question of truth.

*What is truth?*

Once we speak, we are plunged into the power of the inevitable concept, into the World of ideas. And the statement affirms an accepted or pretended truth. Once we speak, we tend towards the truth. Even when we pose questions. Even when we lie. The question of the truth is always invoked as that of an accord: does the
first universal (that of the argument, that of the grammatical subject) correspond to
the second (that of the function, that of the predicate), yes or no?

A first approach would consist in verifying if it is possible that these two universals
are in accord. The approach is cathartic, purifying: one sets aside all the
statements which contradict one another. The principle of non-contradiction of
purely formal logic states clearly a major danger that must in any case be avoided
in the search for truth. But it in no way allows the truth to be generated. It does
not speak at all of the process which would lead the truth to be produced positively.
Syllogistics is only the art of rearranging truths of statements already proposed.

So then, how make the truth? I turn towards what I perceive. I must verify
whether there is an equivalence between the statement and a certain reality insofar
as it is perceived. Does my statement participate in the reality of the World? Or is
it only a delusion? I will thus have found a positive criterion for the truth.

Perception. With perception, I am already entering into the experimentation of
scientists.

Perception, even if it is situated in principle on the side of reality (which is only
there because it is perceived), is always governed by the pleasure principle and
pain. Not only is no one ever protected from hallucination (taking one’s desires for
realities). Much more it is ‘my’ good pleasure and ‘my’ pain which direct and
condition my attention and what I can perceive. To capture what interests me, in
the chaotic hotchpotch of what surrounds me, a sifting is required. In order to per-
ceive, namely,, the better to fix myself on what strikes me or pleases me, it is
necessary that I should hallucinate negatively, namely,, that I set to one side what
does not interest me. Always selective, perception is always hallucination. And
the scientist, since he is selective always sets aside what is not appropriate for the
object of his science.

My interest of pleasure and of pain, my always partisan, always particular
interest decisively disqualifies the truth which would want to be all, universal truth.

What is truth? remains a question without a definitive answer: the truth of
the statement is at best only half-said, a said which would claim to be universalised
but which remains partial, partisan and particular, the half-said of my interest, of
my field of vision. Who is this ‘I’, this ‘my’, this ‘mine’? Always undetermined,
is it my conscious project, my unconscious tendencies, my acquired habits,
education, learning? It excepts itself from the statement the better to focus the
universal of which something is said, but notall.
If the truth is always reduced to a half-said, all that remains is to adopt a radically sceptical position. And the confidence in the half-said which appears in truth is only the reverse of a distrust justified by all that I set aside in the very process of stating. A radical not-knowing accompanies every approach towards the truth.

_Second role of the psychoanalyst: the analyst does not know and respects this non-knowing in principle by allowing to the analyser his own field in which he cannot intervene. He contents himself with accompanying him sceptically even if he claims to be benevolent in principle._

The role of the sceptical analyst is obvious. He does not know. In principle at least, for he is never, for all that, rid of the dogmatism inherent in speech. Every analysis knows the degree to which the spitefulness of the supposedly sceptic analyst is awoken when the analyser diverges a little too much from commonly accepted standards! The analyst who would maintain a sceptical role surreptitiously prefers analysers well educated by their neuroses.

THE ANALYST WHO HUNTS DOWN THE STATING. THE DYNAMIC ANALYST.

The universal fails to say the truth. And nevertheless the universal persists, statements follow one another. The pretension to the universal subsists and the universal depends on the process producing the statement, on stating.

If the truth is always half-said, it is because there is a process of stating which modulates the statement. Not simply because the speaker is not clear and because he could or ought to put a bit of order in his life or in his ideas. But indeed because the grammatical subject of the statement is modulated by very reason of the production of the truth which implies perception, which is always modulated by the pleasure or the pain of the perceiver. The scientist, in principle, thinks he is able to put his specific interest in parenthesis. He randomises. But the sifting is always there. The subject is effaced, is hidden, is forgotten, it is always there. The selection of the hypothesis is always there.

The sayer – the process of saying – thus manifests itself in the choice which is posed in saying, and this from perception on. Depending on this choice, the universal is simply aimed at, possible, without ever being fully realised. The
particular inherent in the universal, has introduced the always partial mode of the
grasp of the universal by reason of the process of stating. The always universal
statement hides the always present modulation of the grammatical subject itself,
the a priori modulation, before any examination of the predicate.

The grammatical subject of any statement is always modulated by a
subjunctive, relative to the very process that makes the statement. Or again it is
the opposition between universality and the impossibility to qualify this
universality (‘what universal’?) that makes the process appear, and therefore
the stating of the grammatical subject (what one is talking about). It is therefore
justifiable to speak about a speaker – conscious or unconscious – when the
statement with universal pretensions is produced. The speaker indicates a locus.

In avoiding the universal in order to promote the person responsible for
the stating, for the engagement, we might have the impression of touching this
‘speaker’, this particular subject, this ‘subject of stating’. The statement which is
found to be based on the particular experience (ultimately on perception) does
not come from nowhere: we keep an eye on the suspect. And clinical
observation very early on gave itself scientific airs, namely,, by setting aside the
question of the subject. But this is only to makes the modulation on which there
depends the pretension to the universal disappear.

In psychoanalysis it is a matter of sustaining the question of the subject.
Nevertheless no one fully grasps the subject of stating. By lending to the person
the consistency necessary to clarify the whole truth, one plays ‘the forced card of
the clinic’ in order to eliminate not the true question – how could a question be
ture? – but the right question: from where is the statement enunciated? People
believe that it is a matter of such and such a personage, Mr So-and-so or Madam
So-and-so or of their unconscious depths. From what place do you speak, you
whom I do not know, you of the unconscious who has perhaps scarcely any
consistency?

The ‘I’ which is engaged at this place of the correct question only does so
at the risk of being right or wrong. It only highlights the question of the subject of
the stating.

There is a something (‘the subject of stating’) which is situated outside the
universal proposition proper to the statement, a something that does not enter
into the universality of the grammatical subject (and especially not as the banal particular, an indefinite form of the universal), a something which constitutes the negation of universality, a something which for its part ex-sists and thus contains the universal: ‘There is no universal that must not be contained by an existence that denies it.’ (AE, 451)

No formula (always stated, always universal), including ‘every man is mortal’ or again ‘the signifier is what represents the subject for another signifier’, is stated from nowhere.

One can only feign nullubiquity in order to elude the question of the subject of stating: this again is to engage a locus of stating.

By speaking in the name of an objective knowledge, the academic discourse feigns nullubiquity, it is well designed to be married to ‘science’, to supposedly purely objective knowledge because it has eliminated the question of saying.

The analyser – or the enrolled analyst, it doesn’t matter – is not unscathed by this discourse – he is even fully in it – when he affirms supposedly established positions: ‘All the same that’s not done’, ‘It’s not normal’, but also ‘It is a fact that...’, indeed ‘we have discovered that...’, ‘I understood that my symptom is...’, or even ‘you have taught me that...’. All positions in which the putting in question of the locus of stating is rejected to a completed past.

The first two positions of the analytic discourse (the position of the dogmatic analyst and the position of the sceptical analyst) depend on this academic setting aside of the question of stating: from where are you speaking?

It is characteristic of the statement to fall into the academic discourse by forgetting saying. With the necessary forgetting of saying, the universal of every statement becomes academic.

How deal with this remainder of forgetting?

I can pose the question of saying, of the process, of the locus of stating. I will head off in a search for this forgotten which constitutes the origin of the said. But what is an origin if not the trace already there now and that is referred back to a completed unattainable, forgotten past?
Where are you speaking from, D'où parles-tu?

To the question ‘where are you speaking from’ a first answer was already given in terms of nullubiquity (of the academic discourse): ‘I speak from the neutral locus of knowledge’, in other words the subject of stating hides himself behind the pretended objectivity of knowledge. This way of speaking about the neutral locus of knowledge, is the scientific position insofar as it is already established; and it only asks for the consensus which would concretise the nullubiquity of the subject of stating. That’s how it is.

A second response: ‘I speak from a locus in which I efface myself’, this is the discourse which reveals the inverse of the academic discourse) in order to better question the signifier of the Other and show its unsatisfactory knowledge. It is still a scientific position, the other side of the scientific position, the scientific position in the process of producing, of fabricating science, and most often as a counter-current precisely of what the other well-balanced scientists think of it. It is the discourse of the hysteric.

A third response states: ‘I speak from the locus of the master signifier, which I have chosen of my own accord and which allows me to govern my life or that of others at my risk and peril.’

Can one speak about the subject of stating for the psychoanalyst himself? ‘Where do you speak from, psychoanalyst or you who holds that role (if it is possible)?’ In other words, is there a discourse of the analyst, maintained by the analyst qua analyst? Can one give the formula: I speak from the place of the semblance of the o-object? But what does that mean, if not that I speak as a waste product which radically does not speak and no longer says anything at all? Unless he takes himself for another, a waste product does not speak and it is impossible to formulate a discourse of the analyst starting from the question ‘from where do you speak?’

Are there therefore only three discourses which can properly respond to the question ‘from where do you speak?’ In responding, they can perfectly well
be stabilised, occupy a whole life and more. They inhabit this habitat which is language. In each of these three ‘stabitats’, it is always from a stable place that one speaks, even if the statements can vary in an infinite way. It is always the same type of sayer that one rediscovers. They lend themselves perfectly to diagnosis: discourse of the hysteric, of the master, of the obsessional, etc.

To find his stability, the analyst would really like to have his own diagnosis: ‘I am an analyst.’

Since the question ‘where are you speaking from?’ remains impossible for him, one can invent procedures of reassurance and of comfort: associations, groups, multiple arrangements. It proves in any case that the question of the discourse of the analyst only appears fleetingly (a spark from time to time): the discourse of the analyst, if it exists, is particularly labile, a ‘habitat’ which is effaced, which flies off carried by the slightest puff of wind, because no one is found to maintain it firmly. And if it happens that the waste product takes on some consistency, we will see our ‘analyst’ falling again, re-becoming a hysteric, a master, an academic. Indeed a capitalist.

More cunningly, by failing to reply to ‘where are you speaking from?’ the analyst could put forward the lability of discourse in general.

**Third role of the psychoanalyst (‘the spirit blows where it will’):** the analyst will strive tirelessly to uncover the locus of saying in others: ‘where are you speaking from?’, ‘where are you speaking from?’, ‘where are you speaking from?’. A repetitive diagnosis and a diagnosis which aims at as much change as possible. Why? In the hope of making the speaker shift, not in order to make him produce always more statements, but to make the place of saying, the type of discourse, shift. The subject, under the pressure of this incessant denunciating (enunciating – denunciating), is chased from one corner to the other of the ring of discourse. The analyst as a driving force for re-launching.

It is easy to say then that the unconscious is precisely the dynamic which maintains the continual destabilisation of discourses (stabilised in themselves). The analytic discourse would be labile to the point of escaping all consciousness. And in that way, it can enter into resonance with the analysing unconscious and
thus act as a driving force, as a mobilisation of other discourses in the beautiful roundabout of discourses. That always presupposes the previous step of ‘suspending what is truthful in the said’, suspending the truth of the said. First of all because it is a matter of posing the question of stating ‘where are you speaking from?’; but also because the analytic discourse does not admit of a definitive response for any established discourse and especially not for itself. ‘Suspending what is truthful in what is said...clarifies the tangential light that the analytic discourse contributes to the others, by revealing in them the modal loci by which their roundabout is accomplished.’ (AE, p.453)

The psychoanalyst in the guise of guru would thus lead the dionysiac dance of the discourses. We would thus discover the truth of the discourses no longer in the said (always half-said), but above all in the enthusiasm of this question ‘where are you speaking from?’ infinitely repeated, to the point of ecstasy if necessary, and in the dynamic roundabout that it would engender.

(31) THE ANALYST WHO SAYS WHAT THERE IS. THE ANALYST AS WITNESS

To say what there is, Dire ce qu’il y a.

The roundabout of discourses, by definition, turns round and round. The spinning track implies nevertheless the loci of each one of the established discourses. In that way, we can cherish the hope of being able to corner the truth of the real of each discourse insofar as it reverses into another. Even if we cannot catch the speaker, it would be possible to affirm saying and then produce its statement: ‘It’s a hysterical discourse’, ‘it’s a master discourse’, ‘it’s an academic discourse’.

The establishment of a stating, of a prior saying, is the statement of a stating. The truth stated in connection with a real stating.

‘I would metaphorise for the moment as incest the relationship that the truth maintains with the real’ (AE, p.453). Incest is always a short-circuit in the structure.
It is a short-circuit to believe oneself able in this way to affirm the saying as a point of origin of the said. ‘Saying comes from where it [the real] determines it [the truth]’, the question of saying only comes starting from the point where it is what determines the truth. In other words, it never allows itself to be caught in truth, by the truth. Never. Never.

The one who thinks he is able to catch the responsible process in order to manipulate it, is first of all the doctor. The doctor pronounces on the real of vital and mortal processes: ‘You have such and such an illness’, ‘you are going to die’ and ‘I give you another three more months’. It’s a judgement.

To make a pronouncement on society or on the suffering person, is this not always what is curiously demanded of the ‘psychoanalyst’? To make a pronouncement on new forms of society, of subjectivity, of a new psychic economy and other presentations of mutation in the history of humanity. Sometimes against medicine (which has become scientific and inhuman), to make a judgement on medicine, to diagnose it. But it is always from the very point of view of the medical schema: ‘Tell me, doctor, what I am suffering from’, ‘Tell me what our World is suffering from.’

To say what there is as regards saying, as if one could deal with saying itself, with stating as a fact reducible to a statement, is again to short-circuit saying by making it become the truth, namely, of the order of the said (half-said), as if one could express saying by a statement.

If the doctor ‘says what there is’, if the doctor gives his diagnosis, it is indeed to give an adequate response. He is the right person at the right place at the right moment (‘Is there a doctor on the plane?’). And that can work as long as the process of the illness is not understood as a signifying process implying the subject. Medical science functions by setting aside the subject of stating.

‘To say what there is’ in the framework of psychoanalysis is much more serious. Saying is not simply set aside in it, it is degraded into statements ready for all sorts of manipulations perhaps benevolent, often suspect and always mistreating saying which remains all the more forgotten in that it is made into a said. Naturally, all that gives directives, guidelines where the practitioner will find references points for analysis. That such an analysis ‘tempts you, is understandable’, remarks Lacan.
How deal with this temptation to reduce saying to a said, stating to a statement?

‘Know nevertheless!’

What is meant by this imperative to know: ‘Get an experience of knowledge’? Or else: ‘I am going to teach you what must be known, what I bear witness to’?

The reader can of course get an experience of knowledge (do an analysis). That depends on him.

Nevertheless that does not suppress the other element of the alternative: ‘Know, follow what I am bearing witness to.’ Here Lacan himself presents his testimony. And the value of his testimony is valid more precisely by the (unconscious?) equivocation of what he contributes: ‘There is not the slightest access to Freud’s saying which is not foreclosed – and with no return in this case – by the choice of one or other analyst, Il n’y a pas le moindre accès au dire de Freud qui ne soit forclus – et sans retour dans ce cas par le choix de tel analyste’ (AE, p.454).

Are we to understand the context (the text always remains a little con, forgetting the ‘that one might be saying, qu’on dise’): access to Freud’s saying is impossible with such an incestuous analyst (in the sense of ‘saying what there is’)? The situation is hopeless.

Or indeed are we to understand it literally (à la lettre): access to Freud’s saying is never foreclosed by such an analyst? The situation is full of possibilities, since there is absolutely no door closed.

A lapsus calami by Lacan no doubt.

Nevertheless it tells us clearly the equivocal value of the foreclosure; ‘There is not the slightest access which is not foreclosed...’ means: over against what it proposes, every so-called foreclosure leaves open a multitude of entry points. A whole work remains to be carried out starting from this ‘To say what there is’ which concerns at the same time dogmatic, sceptical, dynamic analysts, in short, the incestuous analysts who confuse saying and said, those who believe
they are able to account for the objectivity of their patient (by a diagnosis for example). A domestic scene where saying of the partner (of the adversary?) becomes an argument and goes on to the ‘said and understood’.

This testimony (‘To say what there is’) also concerns Freud himself who situated psychoanalytic societies by relevant saids, by a master discourse (or an academic, even a hysterical one), by veiling in this way the saying proper to the discourse of the analyst. The testimony of Lacan himself falls into the same trap at the very moment that he denounces the Freudian procedure.

And here am I not myself in the process of testifying to ‘what there is’? Is it not again an attempt to make saying into a statement? Is it not again making the forgotten unknown and unsaid to the level of what can be known, remembered and said?

*Fourth role of the psychoanalyst: the analyst in the passe as testimony (namely,, as the statement of a saying) of the experience of saying. The analyst as witness.*

A whole conception of the transmission of psychoanalysis – or of filiation – is determined by testimony. A passage from saying to said is supposed to be a ‘passe’. How could the passe not fail if saying transforms itself simply into saids? The passe can only remain equivocal (at the same time allowing something of the saying to pass and notallowing it to pass), if it operates on ‘testimony’, even if it is indirect. Because it is the ‘testimony’ (‘what I bear witness to from the start’) which includes in itself the incest of saying and of said: ‘to say what there is’.

To attempt to render the testimony of a saying, is this not the test of the historian? There is nothing specific to analysis in this recognition of different discourses. Nothing specific to analysis either in the roundabout of discourses; it simply revisits Hegelian philosophy and the cycle of history. To say that psychoanalysis has the monopoly of illuminating the other discourses and their changes depends no doubt on a well- blinkered self-satisfaction. That can give pleasure. In this testimony, saying remains reduced in the said.

It would be painful to remain there. We ought and we wish to keep open the question of saying. ‘No formation of the analyst outside the maintenance of this
saying’, namely, of saying inaugurated by Freud and the men (and women) who came to speak to him.
The impossibility of the psychoanalytic discourse

Over against the approach of witnessing which transforms the supposedly established act of saying into the statement of a said and understood, it is a matter of starting from the said to rediscover a saying which on the one hand is forgotten and which on the other hand cannot be expressed in the form of a said. The task seems hopeless: we have saying and the said–understood in their opposition, the first is completely forgotten, we can only start from the second and, what is more, we cannot exhibit saying in terms of saids, or again in terms of truth, since the truth is always of the domain of the said, more precisely of the half-said. In truth there is no saying.

Nevertheless it is indeed by restoring saying that the discourse of analysis would be constituted (AE, p.454). Not the discourse of the analyst: starting from the personage of the analyst, it is rather established discourses which take on the consistency of saids. But the discourse of analysis starts from the neutral speech which does not allow itself to be determined either by a precise stating subject, nor by a fixed object of which one might speak. Saying without saying who and without saying what. Neutrality is a fundamental principle.

Does freedom of speech follow?

‘This saying (of analysis) is not free.’ Despite the neutrality of speech, saying does not go without a said, the saying aimed at in analysis relays other saids (hysterical, master, academic) in the great roundabout of discourses. Through this roundabout and through specific saids that are produced in it one can hope to rediscover the saying proper to psychoanalytic discourse, but one cannot isolate the discourse of analysis from the other discourses from which it cannot free itself.
The roundabout of discourses ‘adds’ no doubt a structure which articulates the discourses with one another. But, by going around in circles, it does not cease to return sooner or later to the established discourse which it has left and which, by force of repetition, acts as an immovable ballast. This roundabout only ‘situates the loci by which saying is ringed’, it imprints the loci without for all that touching directly on saying. The cartography of discourses re-passes byways to make of them paths, roads and motorways. By turning around in circles, the paths of discourse produce, to be sure, still more numerous saids. These paths hollowing out their grooves lead nowhere (Holzwege), they only serve to spout out their saids, to cut up the wood of the tongue of each of these discourses, to produce saids and understoods always more or less similar.

How can we get out of this great interchange which, far from changing, risks being sucked down?

In the roundabout of discourses, we think that we are properly encircling saying. But this encircling of saying only counts one repetition as a multiplication of saids, in which there is lost the sap of saying. Each time, an extra turn. Again and again, the analyser has taken up his symptom, his way of speaking or of not speaking. It is always possible to add on another layer to it.

From turn to turn, from year to year, the tree of analysis can grow indefinitely. A new ring is always possible.

It is not the accumulation of saids and understoods which are always possible that will bring us close to saying. Saying itself is impossible. The repetition fails from the first time.

To say it plainly, it is a matter of excluding from the start what presents itself already as a possibility. In two senses: saying as what is supposed to be the power to produce statements and saying as what can be said, which one could testify to (‘To say what there is’). On the one hand, saying is reduced to saids insofar as it is what produces them. On the other hand, the saids reduce saying insofar as they establish it. In both cases, I believed I was encircling saying, all I did was to delimit the rings of a dead tree. These two possibilities of ‘saying’ are indeed there; they insist while at the same time perverting from the start the question of saying into saids. One must get rid of them. One must give saying its place in a different way.
Logic infers saying starting from the saids of the unconscious (AE, p.452 and p.454).

We only have saids at our disposal. It is only those which concern the unconscious that can help us. In saying that I only brought the question back to the ‘unconscious’ and I make it carry the whole weight of the aporia without explanation.

But what logic is at stake? And what inference?

Not classical or formal logic, which is fundamentally reductionist as simply being the putting into form and the recognition of forms of saids. It is a matter of finding a logic as a work of thought such that it will be able to make saying return.

Is there another logic, a new logic announced by Lacan?

And inference? Not inference as ‘an intellectual operation by which one goes from one truth to another truth, judged such because of its link with the first’ (Larousse). In that way, I fall again into a perspective centred on the truth and the truth is always on the side of what is said (‘to say what there is’).

Whether it is in the deductive method or in the inductive method, whether it is in rational, analytic, mathematical inference or in experimental, scientific, physical, inference I remain in the perspective of the truth, of the said. Neither one nor the other is appropriate.

Is there another inference, a new ‘inference’ announced by Lacan?

The method of deploying this new logic and this new type of inference is announced as ‘that with which I occupy myself, since, even though without resources, it depends on my resilience, c’est de mon ressort’. (AE, p.457)

How occupy oneself with something when one does not have the resources?

The lack of resource constitutes the first condition for deploying this new logic and this new type of inference that saying would allow you.

Resilience (Le ressort) constitutes the second condition. One must have resilience (du ressort), put ‘something of oneself’ into it in order that the new logic and the new inference can be produced. The question of saying will find two paths to respond, one negative (one must be without resources), the other
positive (one must tackle it with one’s own resilience, ressort). These two responses refer to one another as two aspects of one and the same Moebian surface.

The first path is ‘clinical’. It is a clinic of failure. But not at all a clinic of the failure of mental health that one finds in the shop window of clinical vignettes in others, in the patients who serve as guinea pigs. On the contrary, an omnipresent failure, namely, the radical absence that is always there and nevertheless always latent. It is the absence hollowed out at the heart of the signifier which does not even correspond to itself, at the heart of the differance. It is no longer a matter in clinical work of differentiating some psycho-pathological frameworks and of ranking individuals in them as elements like collections of potatoes. On the contrary, it is each point of the history, of the person, of the narration which explodes in differance: it is that and it is not that. The differance starting from the same. Clinical work does not consist in focussing on sick people with the help of a nosography, but in focusing on a unary trait in the process of being always written anew without help and without exterior resources (notably without the help of a descriptive pathology or some explanatory schema or other).

The second response is ‘mathematical’. The motive (ressort) is to be found in what is doable by oneself, in the matheme, not in the sense of abstract beings which would serve as a propaedeutics for physical science or in the sense of more or less bizarre writings found in certain schemas. The ‘matheme’ is not initially the smallest unit of the technical language of mathematics, that one can find in manuals (including the seminars of Lacan). It is what is doable by oneself. It is a matter of having enough resilience to do the exercise by oneself.

It will be a matter of showing how the ‘without resources’ and the ‘with resilience’ join together to form one and the same logic, one and the same inference.

WITHOUT RESOURCES

Freud puts us on the path of the inference of saying, not so much through the totality of a corpus centred on the Oedipus complex and its phantasies, but by ‘castration’ or, more generally, if one wants to disregard the classical Oedipal
semantics, by the cut. It is the clinic of a failure which is decisive for psychoanalysis.

This cut, in other words sex, gives us the ‘logic by which castration and the Oedipus complex are articulated in analysis (AE, p.452). The Oedipus complex is the sufficient matter which allows the cut of sense to be highlighted.

Many sensible things can be said about the Oedipus complex. It is stated in saids, it finishes by a stated declaration. The incest of Oedipus does not consist first of all in the realisation of incestuous phantasies of which there are scarcely any traces except in the after-math of the act. The accursed incest is not so much a passage à l’acte, a passage of the aforesaid phantasies into action. Well before any incest with the mother, Oedipus is the personified figure of the incest of the saying and the said. It is saying-said couple which is initially at stake and the mother-son couple is only the imaginary of it. And this ever since the Delphic oracle which was taken for a said. With his good sense, Laïus thought he could convert the saying implied in the oracle into a said, programming the separation with his murderous offspring. And it is the transformation of the saying of the Sphinx into a ‘satisfactory’ said stated by Oedipus, it is the incest of saying and of said which leads him into the bed of Jocasta. The saying of the Oracle or of the Sphinx involved a whole history. Reduced to a previsionary said, it closes itself into formulae, or recipes to get around the prevision and close down the enigma.

The threat of castration does something quite different than announcing to us some misfortune that must be avoided by an adequate action where everything will return back to good sense. The threat of castration radically cuts this growing good sense in which saying and the said couple with one another.

Sex presents itself in all its rawness, not initially as an imaginary obscenity, but as a cutting of sense. The outside-sense of the oracle.

Classically, the boy responds to it by repressing sex: he precipitates himself onto what supplies for it by remaining in sense, in the sensible, he enters into sense-absex (le sens-absex), he enters into the latency period. Whatever may be the sexual return of adolescence, the sense-absex has started and it will condition the little man up to and beyond his death, whatever may be the safety valves of work, of enjoyment, of groups. Unless the question of saying is put to work at further expense by another cut, a cut irreducible to any phantasy. The girl is perhaps more radically without resources. From this point of view she is
privileged as compared to the boy. Sex as cut is more accessible for her than the phantasy, and the question of saying is closer to her than the dimensions of the said. But ‘boys’ and ‘girls’ are only there as unwarranted schematisations of the complex knot that one imagines as castration (one encounters just as many boys sensitive to saying as girls caught up in the said).

In the exercise of the clinic of failure, of the ‘without resources’ or again in the approach of the logic of castration, *Freud puts us on the track* (AE, p.452) not so much by the imaginary aspect of Oedipal phantasies as by the cut itself. By ‘castration’ rather than by the Oedipus complex one might say if the expression ‘castration’ was not precisely connected to the Oedipus complex as a phantastical material of the cut and of the aforesaid ‘castration’. What Freud said and the phantasies of the boy pass to the side of this phantastical material. They forget the question of saying itself inasmuch as it is neither the programming of a said nor reducible to a said.

Rather than approaching the cut of certain saids, according to the model of Oedipal phantasies, it is rather a matter of starting from the radical breakdown which is produced in sense in general. This breakdown of sense in general, is regularly found not simply in what Freud said, but in Freud’s saying. Freud’s saying is strewn with embarrassment where for him sense fails. And this breakdown of sense always leaves the way clear for sex. One can find it in the typical dreams of the *Traumdeutung*, where free associations do not manage to find the sense of the dream (cf. *my book* *La relance du phallus*).

Sense avoids sex and sex has no sense.

‘Ab-sense designates sex’ and ‘sense-absex is inflated’. These two faces of the same surface are perhaps only one (the Moebius strip), but they must precisely not be confused under pain of annihilating the journey that they require. ‘Freud puts us on the track of the fact that ab-sense designates sex: it is by the inflation of this sense-absex that a topology is unfolded where it is the word that decides.’ Badiou, commenting on this passage considers that ‘sexe ab-sens’ and ‘sens-absexe’ are ‘synonyms’ (*Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel, deux lecons sur L’étourdit de Lacan*, p.111). The demonstrative ‘ce, this’ (‘ce sens ab-sexe’) might make one believe it. Nevertheless the demonstrative leads towards its own difference in the very perspectives of the Lacanian signifier. The equality formulated by the philosopher obliterates the *signifying process* at stake in
L’étourdit and, in that way, blunts the cutting edge of ‘there is no sexual relationship’, as we will see.

On the one hand, what is separated off from sense designates sex. Sex is not presented in a statement.

On the other hand, what is separated off from sex designates sense.

In this business of the differentiation or distancing of sex and sense, the phallus plays a decisive role. It makes the difference. Far from being simply the sexual organ (le sexe), the phallic trait extracts a sense from it, it veils the organ the better to find sense. It presents itself at full sail to inflate sense. It is not equal to the organ and the Freudian formula ‘All sexuality is phallic’, far from being tautological, implies on the contrary the whole work of breakdown and of articulation of sex and of the phallus, in other words of sex and of its sense. When one hears ‘castration’ as what decides sex, one pulls back to find oneself, with the philosopher, in sense and its phantasy; the cut still operates at the level of sense (of sense-absex); one cuts the words, one splits hairs in four. But the crucial moment of the stoppage of sense, sex, is avoided and the question of the properly psychoanalytic discourse is eluded.

The breakdown of sense, the encounter with sex and their phallic articulation do not operate simply in Freud’s saying. The experience of analysing anyone at all can produce it. For the analyser and for the analyst it is a matter of meeting this ‘without resources’.

The stoppage of sense is presented in a treatment in the form of a stoppage of associations (The dynamics of transference). We know the importance of this moment of stoppage in which there appears the feeling of the presence of the analyst and the question of transference. But it would not be right to fill up as quickly as possible this ‘ab-sense’, this breakdown of sense, by an auxiliary sense or to explain this transference by a repetition. Freud’s perspicacity was well able to hear at the basis of this silence a flood of thoughts about the analyst himself; ‘You are surely thinking about me’; this was only an attempt to fill the void by one or other role of the analyst, always ready to reanimate sense (dogmatic, sceptical, dynamic, witnessing).
Transference ought rather lead to this place where every role of the analyst collapses, to this place where the analyst cannot propose a substitutive sense for the breakdown of sense. If the presence of the analyst insists, it is indeed to support the ab-sense.

This key moment is only there to open up a broader field, on which depends the discourse of analysis, the psychoanalytic discourse and not the discourse of the psychoanalyst.

The stoppage of sense (ab-sense) is much broader than this privileged moment (at the level of saids) in which associations stop. It is above all the forgetting of everything that can carry sense. We know the importance of forgetting (a stoppage) for the interpretation of dreams and for the whole of meta-psychology (chapter VII of the *Traumdeutung*).

Let us call the moment of this cut ‘sex’. It is enough to take your breath away, the breath of sense.

To cut, you must have breath. You can’t have one without the other. No saying without said, no said without saying (even if one forgets it). No sex without sense, no sense without sex (even if one represses it).

On the side of sex (sex-absence), an appeal is made not to such and such a said, but to the stoppage of what makes sense, to the stoppage of associations, to the stoppage of the production of statements.

On the side of the phallus (sense-absex), an appeal is made to the re-launching of sense.

We have the ‘couple’ saying/said. But not just in any way. Saying is coupled to the said ‘by ex-sisting it, in other words by not being of the *dit-mension* of the truth.’ (*AE*, p.452). In the breakdown of sense, in castration, saying and said no longer constitute incest, they form a very special couple. *Living apart together. With-out*, say the English. Saying without the said, the said without saying. We must show how saying ex-sits the said, is in a radically different ‘locus’. Between the two there is barely a coastline (*littoral*) which only exists because one attempts to write it as literal. In other words, there is no question of a simple line of demarcation between two countries, between Mars and Venus or
again between land and sea. Saying and the real do not allow themselves to be demarcated. And that is why the real is without a locus. Escaping from any and every topology.

If there is a function that the analyst should be able to fulfil, it is indeed to make saying exsist, to make it exsist outside the said, starting from the said. But how can he do it when he has only the resources he has given himself, speech and the statements of the patient? Impossible. And these resources fail precisely at the moment of the breakdown of sense. The analyst is dismissed. It is not possible for him to play any role whatsoever. The dogmatic analyst, the sceptical analyst, the dynamic analyst, the analyst witness end up with the same breakdown of sense.

The discourse of the analyst collapses on the désir of the analyst. There is no one (personne) who can hold the role of a psychoanalyst equal to a true discourse of analysis. No one (in Greek métis) is his name. Whoever names himself ‘psychoanalyst’ must clearly grasp the ruse (in Greek also métis) by which he has chosen to name himself as such. It’s the least that can be expected. From the start and up to the end of the analysis. In the aftermath of analysis, can one nevertheless not recognise the person who made it possible: the analyst? It is still purely impudent boastfulness to call him analyst. He is still only a ruse and he is no one. The one who named himself Ulysses at the moment of escaping the Cyclops encounters the rage of Polyphemus and Poseidon and a new Odysseus. May the nomination or the renown of the analyst lead him into an outburst of the wandering of the signifier, of difference. Passe.

The analyst passes, he does not have the right card. It is the downfall of the personage of the analyst which leaves an empty place to where saying can come.

We speak about the ‘psychoanalytic discourse’ and no longer of the ‘discourse of the psychoanalyst’.

How infer saying positively? How make it sensible?
WITH RESILIENCE (Avec ressort)

‘It is easy to make this sensible in the discourse of mathematics where the said is constantly renewed by taking its subject from a saying rather than from any reality, provided this saying is summoned from the properly logical sequence that it implies as said’ (AE, p.452)

Easy. That means doable. How dare say that the mathematical discourse is easy?

One has to tackle it. With resilience (du ressort). And there is no need for outside material to have the experience of the matheme. All the material is already at one’s disposal. The discourse of mathematics proceeds without recourse to external reality. That is why it is essentially easy, doable.

This easiness is also that of the psychoanalytic discourse folded back on the intimacy-extimacy of its own functioning. Without being encumbered by giving an account of social reality, of diagnosis, of therapeutics, of the couch or of the armchair, of university degree or of contract.

Without recourse, without resource, it is at the locus of this radical lack that one can find the only source, the only resource.

Mathematics functions, according to Kant, as a ‘synthetic a priori judgement’. It is a synthesis without appealing to experience, a synthesis without appealing to one or other clinical case.

It is precisely by withdrawing from recourse, from the resources of one or other anecdotal experience (including clinical anecdotes), that allows one to appeal to the sensible as such, to appeal to the primordial sensibility of every phenomenon (Kant discovers it as ‘transcendental aesthetics’). This sensibilising stripped of any pre-existing sensible, of any prejudiced sense, of any sentiment, is what will be conceived of by Lacan as ‘topology’. It will allow us to come back to outside experience quite differently. It is saying purified of any experience which furnishes the development of mathematical discourse. Thus, if ‘I’ – to be understood as the something which... – define, on ‘my’ sole authority, the triangle as a figure with three sides, ‘I’ can fully deduce from it every demonstration about it, it is enough to do the exercise. Or better, it is enough for the exercise to be done in itself and of itself (it is enough to write). Easily. I only suppose at the
start a priori sensibility and the starting axioms which are given. Since the process is limited by definition to that without outside interference, the deduction which follows can be full. Particular clinical experience whatever it may be does not put any brake on it.

The matheme is thus defined as what depends on saying alone without reference to such and such an outside reality. Thus the Socratic approach constantly appeals to the matheme: it is a matter of making the speaker discover the knowledge that he possesses in himself. Thus, the slave of *Meno* can calculate the diagonal of the square (√2).

But what is the specific matheme of psychoanalysis?

We have already evoked it in connection with the always universal and nevertheless always to be questioned statement, which is not without appealing to saying and to stating.

In the experience of the statement which is presented as an ‘it’s that’, we can have the full experience of ‘it’s not that’. Provided we can first of all take it as it is presented, from the side of a universal, there where there is affirmed its aim ‘it’s that’. It is the universal which opens the door of the impossible.

I fight with the ‘it’s not that’. It’s not that because it is contradictory or inconsistent, the predicate cannot agree with the subject. It’s not that because it is incomplete, it therefore cannot be universal. It’s not that because I cannot demonstrate what I am putting forward as an attempt that is not realised. It is not that because I cannot decide on anything.

These forms of the impossible are in no way static, they push towards a process (or a regression, depending on the point of view), to a ‘saying’, more precisely to a ‘nay saying’ (‘dire que non’, quite different to ‘saying what there is’.

First passage: From contradiction to incompleteness.

It is not admissible for a judgement to include a contradiction in itself: I cannot say everything at the same time and in the same sense: ‘this person is my mother’ and ‘it is not my mother’. Must I then choose between ‘it’s my mother’ and ‘it’s not my mother’, as a certain reading of the Freudian *Verneinung* would encourage us to.? It is one or the other? The third is supposed to be radically excluded in it. No way out, it would seem. And since the ‘subject’, always prey to
repression, defends himself and denies by saying ‘It’s not my mother’, then it is therefore well and truly his mother. QED.

On the contrary it is a matter of not remaining at a logic of the excluded third. For we do not have either the reality ‘it’s my mother’ (a very problematic sentence when it is a matter of a dream or of a phantasy lost in the World of fictions), nor the reality ‘it’s not my mother’, still less ‘The Mother’ or ‘The Non-Mother’. The impossibility seems to be stuck to the problematic mother.

But it further operates with respect to a grammatical subject, an always problematic universal – this ‘this’, this ‘person’ of the dream – which precisely escapes us. This ‘demonstrative’, this singular subject is clearly indefinite; it is the whole question of the dream. Who is it? Can one hold it in one’s hand to manipulate it? And this ‘one’, what is it? Is it the subject of saying? ‘That one might be saying...’. That rather tends to the side of stupidity: the containing in preference to maintaining. Let us lay hold of it therefore by the ‘that one might be...’, qu’on...’ and its ‘connerie’. One can imagine many things for oneself (a certain rule of free association would push towards it). And then reconstruct whatever one wishes.

Thus, the proof by the diagonal of the power of the continuum (Cantor) presupposes that we should start from a well ordered sequence of numbers, that we can thus order all the numbers comprised between 0 and 1 (of the type 0.7956358471268845962154...). Starting from there, it is easy to construct a number which is not in this sequence: I construct it decimal by decimal, the first decimal will not be the decimal of the first number of my ordered sequence, the second decimal will not be the second decimal of the second number of my sequence, the third will not be the third decimal of the third number of my sequence, the nth decimal will not be the nth decimal of the nth number (whatever n may be). I have thus assured myself decimal by decimal that the (48) number thus constructed is not any of the numbers of the sequence. I will therefore have constructed a number which is outside the numerable (outside the starting all). Therefore I will have proved the power of the continuum which goes beyond the numerable infinite, the one which can be ordered according to the sequence of natural numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. Very good, but we do not have to hand the required starting point, we do not have the ordered sequence (the
starting *all*); and, what is more, starting from an *infinite* number of decimals, we don’t even have any method of producing this necessarily incomplete list.

If we do not have it in our grasp, it goes off at full blast. It is precisely the same in analysis: we never have in our grasp the ordered sequence of the analyser’s associations, we always lose in it not alone the inflections, the slight stumbles which pass unnoticed, but above all the infinite ramifications of what has not been said, of what has remained outside-sense, ab-sense.

The intuitionist logician already refused to reason starting from what he did not have in his grasp, neither in the form of something already present, nor in the form of a procedure, of a method of formation of the object in question.

We have indeed in our grasp in psychoanalysis some fragments of saids, of free associations. But nothing obliges us to remain there, to remain with the exigencies of intuitionist logic. What we have in our grasp (the maintenance) remains incomplete and, in that way, opens out the whole field of *connerie* (the containing). We cannot be content either with ‘it’s not my mother’, or ‘it’s my mother’, nor the maintaining of all possible and imaginable reasonings that could lead us to a sensible hermeneutics of the case. There remain all the stupidities that will be said in the open field of incompleteness.

Then it would be necessary to push further: from incompleteness to undemonstrability. And for that we must first of all pass by way of the act of wanting to demonstrate, as it is already engaged in the demonstrative ‘this’ (this is not my mother).

And more again: from the undemonstrable to the undecideable. Nothing allows me to decide.

From contradiction, from incompleteness, from the undemonstrable and the undecideable, the general formula is given by ‘it’s not that’ (‘I ask you to refuse what I am offering you because it’s not that’); this is the matheme of psychoanalysis; it is played out in the passage from the Oedipus complex to castration: the oedipal statements, it’s not that...and therefore castration. Sense, it’s not that and therefore sex (transference, silence, forgetting etc.).

But who is this ‘I’ which fights against the windmills of the impossible? It is valid only as no one (*personne*) where the wind blows. No one, behind which there is never anything but another mask, another no one. The discourse of the
matheme is no longer the discourse of some ‘one’. Of some ‘thing’? On condition that the thing does not exist. A locus without existence. A purified locus.

*First proposition of the psychoanalytic discourse: the one that constructs by itself the matheme of the impossible, which hugs the wall of the impossible in its different forms (contradiction, incompleteness, indemonstrable). Analysis as impossible. Which leads nowhere?*

The wall of the impossible, of what is it the surrounding wall (*l’enceinte*)? What birth does it announce?

‘THERE IS NO SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP’ OR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MATHEME OF THE IMPOSSIBLE

The impossible ‘announces itself’. It is not a simple statement. It is not the production of a statement by some stating or other. The announcement of the impossible is designed to have its effects. How can the impossible have effects? And who is the announcer?

A nebulous messenger, an angel, a signifier advances in a dark cloud so that some effect is produced from nothing. A classified ad (*petite annonce*) which is as minimalist as you wish, how can it lead to a life, to a creation?

Lacan states the announcement of the impossible more precisely: ‘There is no sexual relationship’ (*AE*, p.455). The formula emerges as the growling of somebody incapable, the wailing of someone impotent calling for the real before the radical absence of a way out: ‘It’s not working at all’, ‘it’s not that’, ‘it will fail’.

Chronicle of a failure indefinitely announced, indefinitely repeated.

But how can one announce something that is not, that has never happened, which does not come and which will never come? I announce to you the non-arrival of an event. Or the arrival of a non-event.

But what event?

The event must at least be expected. The sexual relationship, that sense can couple with sex is expected and it never happens. There is no event. An endless expectation, with no outcome.
And nevertheless, could one not fill the void, start up again, repair it?
Tell me a story, say something. A little free association, please.
Something I can hear. A little bit of suspense to support the expectation. A story from Scheherazade. A narrative to ward off mortal boredom.
It is said and understood.
It is designed to disguise the impossible.
‘A narrative? No, no narrative, never again’ (Blanchot, La folie du jour, the last line of the last page), if I want to take seriously the announcement of the impossible.

Must one take the impossible by way of sexuality?
Man is a sexual animal. The masculine expects the feminine. The feminine expects the masculine. The expectation is not fulfilled: ‘There is no sexual relationship’ in the usual sense of the term. There is generally a poor understanding and miscomprehension between woman and man. It is impossible that there should be true understanding and comprehension between a woman and a man.
This relative and contestable impossibility colours all social bonds, whether in the discourse of the hysteric, in the discourse of the master or in the discourse of the academic.

In the psychoanalytic discourse sex has, nevertheless, a quite different place; sex emerges at the moment of the stoppage of sense. It is even the characteristic of Freud’s saying and of the psychoanalytic discourse.
The aforesaid sexual relationship is not initially the relationship between two people woman/man, but indeed the relationship sex/sense, which only takes up again the saying/said relationship. And it is only starting from the impossibility of the sex/sense relationship that we can find ourselves in the incomprehension or the misunderstanding between two persons woman/man. This acts as an indication of method; rather than sticking to experimental saids, it would be better to seek to infer the underlying saying which is the problem; rather than seeking an always soliciting sense, it is better to leave the place for an always disconcerting sex.
‘There is no sexual relationship’ explicitates the interdiction of incest between saying and said. Each time saying/said relationship is made directly (in incest) saying quite simply disappears. The coupling of the said and saying short-circuits the whole structure: there is no ‘relationship that the truth entertains with the real’, or again a relationship which would be established between the said (of truth) and saying (always real) [AE, p.453] in the incest between saying and the said, saying collapses, implodes.

How think about this specification of ‘it’s not that’ announced in the ‘There is no sexual – relationship’?

It is not that in the sense that there is no (il n’y a pas).

It is not that, in the sense that the relationship is a problem, the relationship inherent to the statement (a relationship of two universals).

It is not that, in the sexual sense, of ab-sense, of the sense that absents itself.

We can cut up the sentence into three pieces: ‘there is no’, ‘sexual’, ‘relationship’.

1. Sex is defined initially as starting from sense, as ab-sense; that is the Freudian discovery: when the statement and its sense come to a stop, it is a matter of sex and of transference.

2. Of relationship, ‘There is only a statement’ (AE, p.455). And there is no statement except in the relationship between two universals. A putting in suspense of every statement and of its meaning. If there is not such a relationship, a relationship cannot be established between the first and the second signifier. Without relationship, have we not fallen outside the signifier?

3. ‘There is no’ is a ‘saying that no’. A radical cut.

First way of reading (first cutting up: there is no sexual/relationship): the sexual as it is discovered by Freud as ab-sense. Sex appears where sense disappears and sense appears where sex is not yet there. We would therefore have the reciprocal eclipse of sense and of sex. We could therefore read the formula: ‘there where there is no relationship possible’ (therefore no statement)
there is something of the sexual; there where the relationship fails, it is a matter of sex. We have the choice: sense or sex. If one chooses sense which develops according to the model of the classic Aristotelian logic, one loses sex. If one chooses sex which develops according to the model of the cut proper to psychoanalysis (Lacan), one loses the sense. One would thus oppose two conceptions, that of sense (Aristotle) and that of sex or of the cut (Lacan and psychoanalysis). This last conception could go back to the nothing (mèden: ‘Nothing’ in a proposition in the subjunctive) to the foundational nothing in Democritus (cf. Barbara Cassin in Badiou, Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel). By cutting this nothing, this mèden into mê/den, one would have on the one hand the movement of negation (mê) and on the other hand the little something (den) sufficient to carry negation. It is a ‘false cut’, a cut that is not conformed to the Greek tongue. The trait of the mê/den cut nevertheless suffices to bring into play the diﬀerence.

Second way of reading (second cutting up: there is no/sexual/relationship: starting from relationship in general, from the relationship of meaning. If we put in relationship two x’s (10 and 3 for example, 10/3), the real of the relationship (of the fraction for example) ‘is only assured by being conﬁrmed by the limit which is demonstrated from the logical consequences of the statement’. The relationship — the ratio, it is indeed a matter of a rational — is going to show its limit starting from the logical consequences of the statement; thus, we cannot express 10/3 in the decimal system within the limits of a ﬁnite writing: 3.3 is only an approach to 10/3. In the same way, if we relate the woman (10) to the man (3), we limit ourselves automatically to certain ways of writing which specify the meaning of the feminine and of the masculine, to such and such deﬁnitions of the woman and the man, for example some Freudian conceptualisation or other of the phallus; but the relationship is only assured by being confronted to a limit ‘which is demonstrated from the logical consequences of the statement’. And, in the same way, we can try to relate the saying to the said. These deﬁnitions and these conceptualisations are always approximate (namely,, imaginary), therefore always limited.

This last reading starts from the meaning relationship and shows its limits. It is such a reading which is at stake in the roundabout of discourses, as we have
seen. But what must be set en route, is not simply the approximation and the lack inherent in saids and understoods. It is a matter on the contrary of assuring the real of saying not in relationship to the said, but on the hither side of any said and understood.

**Third way of reading** (third cutting up: there is no/sexual relationship):

starting from saying no.

The irrational. Not possible to find a reason. The ‘without-reason’ further explicates the announcement ‘there is no sexual relationship’.

The real evoked is announced by this formula ‘there is no’, by the impossibility. But to say that reason encounters impossibility at a certain moment is not enough. It is a matter of following the wall of the impossible and of going from contradiction, to completeness, to the undemonstrable, to the undecideable. The ‘nay saying’ is only assured by doing this work.

First stage: the sexual relationship is contradictory in its terms (like a square circle). It is man or it is woman. People stop most often at this convenient stage. The logic of foreclosure advances categorically: it is white or it is black, it is true or it is false, it is him or her, it is man or woman. The fact is that we situate ourselves easily in a purely formalistic logic which excludes a priori the excluded third: either there would be a sexual relationship, or indeed there would not be. The critique of the universal was already enough to undo this impossible.

From contradiction to the _contien_.

Second stage: in an intuitionist perspective one should say on the contrary that we do not know what the sexual relationship is (unless we understand it as a medically established coitus...and then there can well and truly be a sexual relationship). We ought therefore say that we do not understand, that it exceeds what we can master and maintain. Once it is a matter of this complex ‘sexual relationship’ we are in something that we cannot embrace, comprehend; we are in _connerie_ (that one...holds, _qu’on tient [contien]_). Grasp all, lose all? It is the incomplete. Simple certification? Not all?

From the reprise in negation to the response.

Third stage: here we are summoned into the act, the sexual act insofar as it exceeds every statement, every simple assertion. You have to tackle it on your own. The educational system believed that it could open the path and the
method for an infantile sexuality that would lead to a flowering, to a liberation for example. Well then no! The path of education is always lacking for the child and sex. There remains the path to be invented and it is presented under the double face (which is only one) of the stoppage of sense, of the stoppage of saids and understoods (this is sex) and of what one must do by oneself (this is the matheme). There is nothing to teach him. The matheme is the demonstration that can be done by oneself. The answer, it is a matter of making it oneself and it radically corrects all the saids and understoods which may have preceded in education and in all the other kinds of formation.

From correction to rejection.

Fourth stage: impossible to demonstrate, sexuality is not fully transmissible, all the methods for deciding about it fail. We are involved in the undecidable, an absence of sense, which is articulated to a whole logical journey, an absence which is not simply established. The sexual is no longer simply ab-sense as Freud had defined it (the stoppage of associations), it is on the path of decision where contradiction, incompleteness and indemonstrability meet.

THE UNDECIDABLE

Everything starts from ‘there is no’. But not simply from an ‘there is no consistency’, proper to contradiction (first stage) nor from a ‘there is no completeness’ proper to incompleteness (second stage), nor again ‘there is no demonstration’ proper to the undemonstrable (third stage).

The undecidable ‘there is no’ is not reduced to any determinate logic. Consequently, it is not deniable. Not that it is a matter here of an incontestable affirmation. Every said, every understood is deniable, even if it is a matter of a fact avowed and recognised by everyone. What is not deniable, is necessarily what cannot be put in the form of a statement; it is a matter of the absence always forgotten and always underlying every said. Absence – the empty place of ‘there is no’ – cannot be a negation; it is not reducible either to contradiction, or to incompleteness, or to undemonstrability. It is no more in consistency, completeness or demonstration.
The ‘there is no’ is not reducible to any system of negation. The ‘expletive’ ‘ne’, outside meaning, bears witness to it; the degree zero of meaning indicates just a saying.

We spend our time in finding a substitute for it in the exercise of different forms of denying, denying consistency, denying completeness, denying the power of doing it (of demonstrating). But from the point of view of the undecidable these events are already in the past or overtaken; they always risk forgetting the void itself. The undecidable cannot be reduced to any negation, neither to contradiction, nor to incompleteness, nor to undemonstrability.

The undecidable will be introduced by the third formula of sexuation, as we will later see. Since it is the step which introduces the undecidable, this formula remains the forgotten, unloved one; it remains the least commented on, because it disqualifies precisely everything that could give reference points for a decision. No locatable statement or stating which might qualify the decision.

What to do before such a void of statement and the determination of stating?

The void, the nothing, the radical absence. The locus of this void, of this nothing only subsists in the equivocation of what might attempt to fill it. The undecidable only subsists in the decisive suspension of the decision. The ‘nya’ only exists in the difference which is established at the very heart of every trait of negation (it ‘nia’s). With the undecidable, one will not be fixed either in contradiction or in non-contradiction. I know that ‘it’s my mother’ is contradictory to ‘it’s not my mother’ and I allow the contradiction that is productive of new consistencies to waver. With the undecidable, one will focus neither on incompleteness, nor on completeness. I know that the universe is an illusion and I allow the illusion of the all to the notall and of the notall to the all to waver. With the undecidable, we will not stop either at the undemonstrable, nor at the demonstrable and I allow my knowledge which will come up against the impossible to waver without ceasing nevertheless to exercise myself at it.

Every time ‘neither...nor...’. This ‘neither...nor...’ is a foundational equivocation since negation is each time only a way of exercising the locus of the void of the nothing, the undecidable. The ‘neither...nor...’ of each of these three impossibilities is not simply a double exclusion, it is initially the putting into resonance of the ‘nya’ of the undecidable. Each time the double meaning does not simply connect the two terms in a double exclusion (neither...nor...), it combines more fundamentally each one of the impossibles (contradictory, incomplete, undemonstrable) with the suspension of ‘nya’, it combines the meaning of the double exclusion (neither...nor...; it denies doubly) with the meaning of the ‘nya’ or again with the degree zero of meaning.
The void ‘n’ya’ is homophonous with ‘nia’, the past tense of the verb to deny (nier). ‘He denied’, he went beyond contradiction, went beyond incompleteness, went beyond any impossibility of demonstration.

But what is meant by this going beyond? And who might be its author?

The actor. But he is always only there as an already past actor, an actor who has denied the different forms of contradiction.

But no present actor; in the present, there is no actor. The actor, the one who works in the theatre, does not forget it. ‘He’ effaces himself from the ‘there is no’ in order to effectively leave only the ‘nya’. There is no actor. He can only do so by denying himself to allow the empty locus carrying the text, the texture, the structure to speak.

To be sure, he has played the role of the speaker, of the enunciator. And in this capacity, he denied the statement reduced to the assertion in which there are united two universals. He has positioned himself as anterior to any proposition in order to pretend to have posed it. He has made himself God, the principle of every said. By thus denying any contingent place, he placed himself, in the simple past, in a position of ununderstood of, necessary, pretension. But he is a Nothing- God. The God of negative theology, the one who denied all imaginary qualifications that could be anthropomorphically attributed to him. The unpronounceable.

Of his past pretension, no present trace is marked. The God of our Fathers no longer exists except in the saids and understoods collected in memory. Of his saying itself, there is no current trace. And that indeed is why the pretension (that of the actor, that of God) is always gone beyond. And that ‘nya’, ‘nya la trace’.

There are many saids and understoods, they cannot serve as the current trace of the first saying. No trace of the saying which authorised the ‘nia’.

But besides, ‘nya’, the undecidable only appears because there is the protective wall, the wall of the impossible, which hides and brings to birth the question of the ‘nya’.

The formula ‘nia’ in the past perfect remains a pretension and is only valid as a formula. But ‘nya’ is still only another formula which the deceit of the ‘nia’ has formulated. And the two formulae refer to one another one not being able to exist (not to exist) without the presence-absence of the other.

How understand the relationship versus the non-relationship between these two formulae? At first sight, two solutions present themselves:

1. It is the fundamental ‘nya’ which would have provoked the birth of language and of negation (‘nia’). The absence or the radical void would have as a consequence exiling these humans in this habitat which is language as ‘stabitat’ in which there could be exercised the different forms of negation. Starting from this complete void (‘nya’), man and woman would find a way to stabilise themselves thanks to language and notably by taking distance from this impossible which is the undecidable and by producing statements, saids with all the possible positions of
negation (‘nia’). Easy not to say, but to be said. But where does the saying stand? Disappeared.

2. It is by inhabiting language with its power of negation ‘nia’ that will make the inter-dit (prohibition) appear, the void between the saids, the undecidable ‘nya’. Since language is labile, in the exercise of negation, it will allow between the ephemeral saids an inter-dit relationship, namely,, a radical absence (‘nya’). But here also where does saying stand?

How choose?

It is not a matter of choosing one solution or the other. With the undecidable of the ‘nya’, it is not a matter either of remaining indecisive.

The undecidable is on the contrary the locus where there is decided not one or other solution, but indeed the decisive and engaged path of the response which stimulates the question; the undecidable is the locus of the response as response, the locus of responsibility, or again the oscillation between the response and the question, between clearly perceptible saids (including the negation which carried them, ‘il nia’, including the two excluded terms) and the pure idea of saying, which remains empty (the ‘nya’).

‘Nya/nia’

‘Let us admit it (the real): where it is there’. Namely, in the very movement of responding which includes a ‘nya’ and an act of speech implying the negation ‘nia’. Let us generate the ‘nya’ by passing to the act which the exception (‘nia’) poses. And reciprocally let us dare the exception by making a radical absence fundamental (God has always been dead).

Starting from this equivocal exercise of the ‘nya/nia’, we no longer have to want to go back to a completed past, to want to ‘go back to the flood’ (AE, p.455), or to seek the origin of one or other symptom, of one or other pathology, of one or other said. It is a matter of finding the undecidable ‘nya’ not in the completed past, but in the present research on the occasion of what presented itself already as the original ‘nia’.

To want to find and fix the origin of... always corresponds to wanting to transform the question of saying into a statement; it is precisely the gravest original sin, the incestuous relationship of the saying and the said.

In Genesis (V, 1-8), the daughters of men are taken by the rebellious angels from whom are born the heroes of ancient times. The women represent sex, saying in the pure state; and the angels, the messengers, are the bearers of the saids and understands exchanged between God and men. The downfall of the rebel angels is accomplishing the copulation of saids with saying, with the daughters of men.

To couple saying and the said is incest.
An original sin provoking the flood, it is at the very origin of psychoanalysis; the incest of saying and the said is not simply the sin of Freud; it is committed again by the lapsus calami of Lacan, the failure of the passe, and all the rest.

Instead of seeking the origin, it would be worth our while to unfold in a satisfying fashion the response, the response which stimulates, namely,, the one that re-launches (by dropping the question of the original sin).

It is starting from the non-existence of the sexual relationship (‘nya’) and of the pretended existence which denied the statement in order to pose it (‘nia’) that the question of saying must be understood. And it will produce the response whatever one says.

The response is always situated at the level of statements (therefore of universals). It can be double: on the one hand, the statements can present themselves as normative and it is to this normativity that there responds the psychology (included in the affirmative theology on which it depends); on the other hand, on the side of the undecidable of ‘nya’, statements can present themselves as non-normative, outside the norm (where theology becomes negative). It is the unconscious and the primary processes which do not respond to any norm, not even the norm of pleasure (which is contested by the enigmatic Thing). It is of course this second aspect of the response that constitutes its stimulating character. It is in the form of ‘in other words’ (‘autrement-dit’) that the unconscious ex-sists (AE, p.456).

Instead of opposing the universal and the particular, as a simplistic grammar might suggest, it is a matter of opposing ‘two universals, two alls sufficiently consistent to separate among speaking beings...two moities’. The (universal) normative statements, can be attributed to ‘men’. Can the other (equally universal) non-normatives, be attributed to ‘women’? How find the consistency of these two ‘alls’, of these ‘women’ and of these ‘men’? How create the consistency of sexuation, not as established stabilisation, but as a process that is becoming?

This opposition of two ‘alls’ is played out by being posed outside the influence of two universals, in other words starting from the question of the equivocation of ‘nya/nia’ (the radical absence ‘nya’ versus the pretension of the exception ‘nia’). The two ‘alls’, which presents themselves as saids, as statements, imply here much more than pure statement; they are put into perspective from a position of saying. In other words, they are fundamentally and decidedly problematised under the undecidable. The universal sustaining itself from the ‘nia’, from negation, from the putting in perspective of an enunciator (‘nia’) is of course always possible; it makes room for an ‘all’ of contingency, without having any recourse to an enunciator consistent of itself, but much more rather to the void (‘nya’). These two ‘alls’ (possible and contingent) will be explicitated as the first (‘for all x...’) and the fourth formula of sexuation (‘notall...’ where we must understand the all goes).

The question is of knowing how the act of producing these two ‘alls’, both polarised towards the ‘One’, operates from the universal, on the one hand it pretends to succeed in it, on the other it refuses.
The universal is said in concepts. In what concerns psychoanalysis and the Freudian way, the universal touches on sexuality and on its sense ‘all sexuality is phallic...’ We would thus have determined ‘all’ in function of semantics (here the phallic meaning). We would thus have fallen again into the sequence of statements which could function as an organic whole. According to the Aristotelian principle which regulates statements (always universals) by the principle of contradiction.

But sex is not a concept, much more rather the stopping of concept, the stopping of associations, the breakdown of the system of saids and of sense.

Lacan also proposes a quite different solution which implies the primordial cut, ‘before’ any concept. And with the cut, it is a whole other principle which appears. But is it still a matter of principle?

For the question is not so much to find another principle, another flood, another origin or another foundational catastrophe. The cut, is the undecidable, the impossibility of any principle whatsoever. And this undecidable reverberates on all the forms of negation: consistency is of no use as a principle, completeness is of no use as a principle, demonstration is of no use as a principle. The undecidable effaces for us every pretension to the principle, the original, originality.

Instead of pretending to find a principle and an origin, we will start from a simple cut, nothing more than a local cut, present in a unary trait and its primordial differance. ‘The body of speakers is subject to being divided by its organs, enough to have to find them a function’ (AE, p.456). Initially with a cut. Decisive even though undecidable. Then thanks to the cut, a new function appears.

The undecidable is the locus of the radical cut.

We have of course a whole body of organised statements with their meanings. But the undecidable creates the locus of the cut: an organ is sufficiently cut off from the corpus in order to find it a new function.

The corpus, is everything that holds together, the psychoanalytic corpus or the human body.

The radical cut of the corpus, is that it is of no use. Freud encounters it at the same time as his psychoanalytic method: free association delivers nothing. The failure of analysis. Cut: it is the place for a new function. Let us put into it what comes to hand. Let us invent an auxiliary method, he says to himself in the Traumdeutung (in connection with the ‘presentation’, Darstellung). His tinkering rediscovers then the old method of symbolic interpretation. Not without giving it a new function: he makes it turn around the phallus. That is the whole differance. In what way might the phallus promise the renewal of psychoanalysis?
By the cut precisely at the place of the undecidable.

The phallus is essentially what is separated from the human body and notably from its function of fecundation. It has nothing more to do with it. The phallus is there, in the bag, as an object torn from this physiological function of the body. It no longer works properly. It is a matter of finding a new function for it.

But what function?

This cut reproduces exactly the matheme of psychoanalysis: it is that, as a first approximation, it functioned, it is what could serve par excellence, something useful; but it is not that. It is a breakdown. The wall of the impossible. The phallus is the signifier of the psychoanalytic discourse, one could understand it as the product of this discourse, namely, a broken-down signifier, a signifier which does not even reach its definition of being ‘for another signifier’, a signifier such that it does not find any knowledge (which remains stuck in the position of truth). The psychoanalytic discourse is in this sense the failure inherent to the signifier, there where significance fails. The discourse of psychoanalysis begins where it misses the goal that it had set itself. It is the cut, the broken, definitively broken signifier, without hope of putting the pieces together again.

It is a matter of describing the new function of this signifier ‘phallus’, which does not manage to be a signifier.

Firstly, the phallus ought to be ‘a phanerogam’, namely, a detachable piece in the order of appearance. It is therefore in no way a purely formalistic construction which would escape concrete manipulation (like Cantor’s power of the continuum). It responds from this point of view to an intuitionist logic. It’s that.

Secondly, it’s not that; for it remains in sense and sex remains invisible. The phallus hides sex; it designates it by dissimulating it. It is in this way that it can be a trap, a bait, a lure, a summons; in other words, it ought to trap the energy liberated in this empty zone of ‘there is no sexual relationship’; it has a function of re-launching ‘in the diverse catches (pêches) that make discourses of the voracities by which the inexistence of the sexual relationship is plugged.’ (AE, p.456).

The phallus must be described not in function of a semantic, but indeed in function of the undecidable. The new function is explicitated by something
explicit (phanerogam) and by its insertion in the nyā which has fundamentally no logical consequence. Such a function does not correspond in any way to the classical function which puts the elements of two given sets into correspondence. It is the ‘function’ itself which changes sense.

It is the very functioning of response 1 which visibly stimulates (it’s that) and 2 which is situated in the perspective of nyā that we do not know and which, as act, ends up with nothing other than stimulating the question to repeat itself (the principle of repetition) [it’s not that].

(64) The phallus is a re-launching, starting from the real of psychoanalysis, which is only circled by the wall of the impossible (and which announces itself as: ‘There is no sexual relationship’).

Conclusion

1. Freud’s saying is found starting from his saids; from this saying one can deduce what Lacan says: ‘There is no sexual relationship.’
2. Because of having ignored this saying (insofar as it is never reducible to a said), because of having committed incest between the saying and the said (saying what there is), analytic experience stagnates; this is what Lacan busied himself with. *Situation of psychoanalysis in 1956, Proposition of 1967* etc.

None of this is to be accounted for by any kind of sociology. Everything that approaches the question of saying inevitably falls into *the incest of saying and said*. The danger is part of the structure. Is analytic experience condemned to stagnate?

3. It is a matter of developing ‘the mainspring of the psychoanalytic discourse’ (second condition of the psychoanalytic discourse) starting from the stagnation of analytic experience, from its failure, from its absence of resources (first condition of the psychoanalytic discourse). ‘It falls under my jurisdiction’, provided I can leave open the locus without resources of the undecidable.

What are the next steps?
First stage (chapter 3): Develop the phallic logic (the real function of the phallus and not simply the signifier statued as The Phallus); it is a matter of giving to ‘logic’ a new value of creation; the third (‘nya’) of the four formulae, indicates the value of the logic at the same time as any ‘formula’ and in that way introduces the fourth ‘formula’ (‘notall’).

Second stage (chapters IV, V and VI: the new logic and the fourth formula (notall) imply a completely new reading of the psychoanalytic discourse, a second turn starting from the phallus which functions as a re-launch.
The logics of sexuation

For classical logic, the real is approached in the order of truth: in principle it would be a matter of finding, of producing, of guaranteeing the truth of propositions, namely, the equivalence between what is said and the real to which the said is referred. It is a logic of *said*.

The discourse of analysis brings out what is forgotten in the *said*, namely, the *saying*. Freud’s saying re-centres psychoanalysis on the phallus not as the meaning of a pivotal said or of a general statufied symbol, but in the sense of a re-launching saying. If Freud saw in the Oedipus complex the shibboleth of psychoanalysis and if the phallus is what is at stake in the Oedipus complex, it is not to produce *said* that are true and applicable to all, men and women, it is in the experience of the re-launching of saying of the treatment for the analyser and for the analyst.

The logic of the psychoanalytic discourse is distinguished from any other by its specific ‘reference’ to the *phallic*. One speaks of nothing but that. On condition of clearly understanding that the sense of the psychoanalytic ‘reference’ is not to refer a said to a real thing, but to refer the said to the unconscious saying that remains forgotten in the said. The specific reference of the psychoanalytic discourse is classically named ‘phallic’, it is fundamentally a re-launch starting from the unconscious. The phallus is not sex or the cut, but the re-launch of sense starting from the cut or from sex, or again the sense-ab-sex.

It matters little in psychoanalysis whether a said is ‘true’ or not. A said is correct (*juste*) in psychoanalysis if it refers to the phallic re-launch. The decisive question is then: how can such and such a said be referred to the movement of phallic re-launching? How bring out the sense of saying starting from sex and from transference?
The ‘masculine phallic formulae’

Posing the question is already a re-launch. One must want to understand every trait and every difference, all speech and all silence as a possible point of re-launch. Let us call this trait which can serve as difference, \( x \), and the function of re-launch, ‘\( \phi \)’. One can say: ‘For every trait, for every difference, there is a possible re-launch’ or ‘for all \( x \), phi of \( x \)’. Such is the first formula of sexuation, that is to say the first putting in form of sense with respect to the encounter with sex, the first putting into shape of the sense-ab-sex. Such is the practice of the psychoanalytic discourse: at the start of any difference whatsoever, ‘to make sense’ (AE, p.458) or find the re-launch.

The re-launch is brought about starting from the unconscious, namely, in a movement whose starting point I am radically ignorant of, and it goes towards a future that I do not know. Every pretension to know the unconscious is left in suspense just as much as every project of being able to announce or predict the future. The re-launching starting from the unconscious prevents the semblance of ‘psychoanalyst’ from ever being a specialist dogmatic teacher (‘the trainer’ of beginners), the dynamic magician practitioner (the promising ‘therapist’) or the master bearing witness to a proper diagnosis (‘the clinician’ recognised by his confreres).

The logic of phallic re-launching is not reduced for all that to a sceptical reserve. The openness to an undecided future starting from the undecidable unconscious is not reduced to an insufficient acquaintance with the past. It is not constructed on the imperfection of the said. Or again, the half-said of the truth does not depend on a simple incompleteness of saids (the trivial sense of the notall). To be sure, the truth depends on an always selective perception, it is limited and what flows from it in the future remains limited. That is not enough. It is not a matter simply of establishing the limits and of leaving open the eventualities to come (wait and see).

It is a matter of finding the consistency of a veritable ‘making’ (‘faire’) for this practice of a radical unconscious and of making sense of it towards a completely unknown future. It is a matter of ‘making’ limits rather than simply noting them. To what should we refer this ‘making’? To a desire rooted in the past which should be accomplished in the future or in the actuality of a saying
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(schema of the accomplishment of desire as it inaugurates psychoanalysis in the Freudian *Traumdeutung*)? Saying would then only be the promotion of a sayer, of an enunciator starting from a programmed past. Saying is not the accomplishment of a past. Nor is it the present action which precedes the said.

Programming is precisely what veils the ‘making’ and the ‘saying’ in their nudity; programming veils the empty locus, the locus where the facts and the saids fail to answer the call. This locus appears in the stoppage of associations, in the transference. Making and saying are inferred from the impossibility of facts and of saids.

This making in its nudity can be rendered sensible by the ‘matheme’ (not to be confused with mathematics). It is a matter of rendering ‘saying sensible’; and to render it sensible, one must first of all not confuse it with the said, not to have it occupied by the said or again not to practice the incest of the saying and the said. The practice of making sense is a *praxis* in view of itself and not a *poiesis* oriented towards some goal determined by a said. The practice in question presupposes the stoppage of the flood of saids; it presupposes the taking into account of the ‘nya’, of this empty space located as *the transference* by Freud, of the sex ab-sense as Lacan would say.

But what to do with this void if it is not to be filled with saids? No doubt the psychoanalytic practice of making sense cannot avoid warding off the absence of the sexual relationship, it protects itself from it and passes inevitably into the embellishments that fill the absence.

And nevertheless, it is a matter of supporting the re-launching internal to the signifier. The signifier creates a new subject which is not a said without for all that being a saying. The subject is not the person who speaks and who might produce his discourse, neither is it the person informed by the aforesaid signifiers. It is above all the mysterious individual inaugurated by the nudity of saying or of the making that have just been produced. And it is only starting from this empty place that the subject can be charged with the embellishments of the signifier and that it can even pinpoint them, forgetting by that the absence which makes it exist. The subject-effect is twin-faced, absence-presence, radical absence (sex) and complement of absence (sense): sex-ab-sense and sense-ab-sex.
One can then specify the sense of the first formula of sexuation ‘for all x phi of sex’ by a new meaning of the formula: for every subject (x), it is a question of a re-launching (phi); no subject without a phallic re-launching.

The confusion of the ‘subject’ as effect of the signifier with the person would lead us to apply, erroneously, the first formula to all humans: for every person, women, men, children, old and dying people, ‘for all, for all x phi of x’. The re-launch of the ‘subject’ through the question of the phallus would thus be universal adolescence offered to all. It’s possible: everyone can find his adolescent re-launch. A nice programme considered confusedly as possible.

That never functions effectively. The person is not the subject. And the subject itself is never realised personally, since it is only in the ephemeral becoming of a well localised significance. This possible of an optimised re-launch will never be realised for a personage; his re-launch is aborted in the egg. The appeal to personal substance is what causes the trace of the subject to be lost. The substantial must fall in order for there to be a re-launch.

At the same time, no re-launch without a minimum of substance to carry it.

We should combine the re-launch of the phallus (the subject) with the substance which suspends the re-launch (the person). A purely subjective re-launch without a person to carry it is suppressed of itself. A re-launch purely objectified in a personage only leaves us with the caricature of a re-launch, a schema, a programmed re-launch, already dead. The psychoanalytic rule concerns the subject with its rule of re-launching (the sense ab-sex); but it is individuals in person who come to analysis. To be sure, they hope to be re-launched in the course of their lives and they are also quite ready to resist this re-launch.

Where find the supporting point to anchor the lever of the phallic re-launch? There must ‘exist an x not-phi of x’, an exception, a fixed point that does not enter into the phallic re-launch and which, in that way, can serve as a supporting point. Such is the second formula of sexuation, the second putting in form of the re-launch: the sense-ab-sex presupposes a fastening point.
The person initially seemed to be able to serve as the exception and the supporting point for the phallic re-launch. ‘The exception proves the rule.’ For the proper functioning of the phallic re-launch, the law would have foreseen that the personage would be the exception which fulfils the function of the supporting point. The well-established individual would thus be the stable point, not falling under the effect of the re-launch; he would be what carries it. This putting in place indeed risks formally contradicting the phallic re-launch: it no longer starts from an inaccessible unconscious for an unknown future, it simply mobilises untamed energies to the advantage of the person. It turns around the unshakeable respect for the person. The exception or the fixed point in which there is confirmed the rule of the phallic re-launch gives the framework for the application of the phallic function, which is no longer anything but a secondary programme, relative to the conscious or preconscious aims of the personage. The two first ‘phallic’ formulae would thus be completely contradictory: either everything is phallic re-launch, or there is at least one fixed point without re-launch.

The two formulae on the contrary both converge towards a putting in form of the sense-ab-sexe. In the second formula, it is a matter of finding the point that the rule, functioning by itself (for all x phi of x), fails to define and this point serves as a supporting point for the phallic re-launch. This point is a point of failure and of absence, rather than of success and of presence. It is the achievement (fait) of the subject.

By being the fixed point where the re-launch is exercised, the subject itself ex-cepts itself, takes itself up outside, out of synch with everything that was foreseen. It was starting from the radical empty locus (‘nya’), pure differance-effect, but it captures itself by excepting itself: ‘It ‘nia’s’ To sustain, to furnish a sufficient support for the moment of re-launching, it must dispute the validity of the phallic function. Falsus, is the false, the fall and the faux pas which allow us to advance. The fall of the subject which is individualised for barely the time of a song, the time of a re-launch.

The subject can only be inscribed of itself, even if only in the form of a question remaining without response: ‘From where are you speaking?’; indeed ‘from where am I speaking?’ The subject advances not insofar as it is in
conformity with the law, but in the movement which is correct of the signifier itself (starting from itself). Just about. It is correct to write ‘there exists an x non-phi of x’ (second formula of sexuation).

In classical logic, this last proposition, bearing on the same subject, is contradictory to the proposition ‘for all x phi of x’. The false is contradictory to the truth. Negation of the true, it would be enough to correct the false to rediscover the true (‘it’s not my mother’, is false, ‘yes, yes, it is indeed your mother’). By the trickery of negation, the false itself thus designates the true.

Here nothing of the kind. Only the juridical void, the void where every law fails. How can such a subject of syncope sustain itself? It can only do so by ‘making sensible’ what it can of itself. It can do so by the matheme: starting from its absence, starting from its primordial void (‘nya’), it finds its consistency by precipitating itself onto the exception (‘il nia’). It precipitates itself onto the semblance of law, an imaged desire. S’emblant in some verisimilitude, appearance of truth, the subject appears as a personage.

In that way, the subject of exception does not inaugurate any veritable sexual relationship. To be sure, it was indeed born at the point of suspension of the phallic function. But the personified subject is a runt. It can only be born as a semblance starting from the phallic function itself. The father of the primitive horde is not the author of the law, and he can only exist as such by precipitating himself into the caricature of his sexuality, possessive and seemingly established; he is already there for the phallic law on which his exactions depend. He has been installed there by the myth and we repeat the myth. And God himself can only be sustained by precipitating himself as the interlocutor of those who pray to him in their precarious insistence.

The subject of exception serves to give a consistency to what supplies for the absence of the sexual relationship; it finds this ephemeral consistency by precipitating itself, by s’emblant itself outside the phallic law; to define it, he puts a limit to it.

There is the sense. Full stop. That is enough like that. And then armed with this bit of sense, with this dialectical arrangement, one can let the sense drop. The subject has produced its effect and it can disappear, we have enough of
it; de-sense (dé-sens), as one says de-ception and dé-barras (riddance). Decency obliges us to efface this supporting point of the phallic re-launch and with it the phallic re-launch itself.

Everything starts of course from says, from statements. They are carried by the signifier. Starting from sex, sense is forged. And sense is fixed in decency the better to plug sex, the ab-sense. The sense ab-sex has plugged up the haemorrhage of the void which flows from ‘nya’. As long as we remain in sense (ab-sex) and its plugging function, nothing further appears of sex and of its void. It is so easy to choke up the void, the sex-ab-sense. It is precisely at the point where sense fails, namely, at the level of the subject – always a semblance starting from the signifier – that the haemorrhage of sex, of the ‘nya’, of the void must be plugged.

One can well call this blocking up of the hole the symbolic and account for it by castration. One would say: the loss is there, it can be filled. The fortunate work of mourning will avoid a complete loss. The always imaginary sense will of course be lacking; this lack will appear as symbolic, namely, recoverable; finally, everything will be arranged for the best of Worlds starting from the lack. The agent who arranges all of this can indeed be called ‘real’; it is in the sense of proper functioning which will always end by reassuring and proposing a parade to paradise.

A plug! Things are stopped, sense has done its work, the haemorrhage is blocked up in all decency. It is the appropriate moment to flee from the psychoanalytic discourse properly so called. The right-thinking and benevolent psychoanalyst hopes for this moment of decency to end his analysis. Not ‘too long’, if you please, that would not be appropriate, it would be indecent. And one asks the patient to take his flies with him. ‘The analyst’ has held his role and it is believed that that is enough.

THE QUESTION OF THE SUBJECT

The subject poses a completely different question to that of decency in which it is simply necessary that it should stop in order to be inserted into normality. That is why one will better grasp the subject outside of decency,
namely, in the context of ‘psychosis’ rather than in the context of ‘neurosis’.
From the neurotic point of view, the subject, in all decency, tries to adapt; and if he fails, it will be with respect to the norm. The neurotic comes to ‘the analyst’ in order to adapt better. The psychoanalytic discourse will lead him elsewhere.

From the psychotic point of view, sense is in no way determined by adaptive and normative decency and it pushes to the point of being worn out in delusion, to the point of exhaustion. It is in starting from Schreber the psychotic that Freud first articulated repression. And it is starting from the same Schreber that Lacan articulates the subject.

How define the subject?

It is impossible to give it decent limits, it is impossible to ‘define’ it. There only remains for us the movement of posing the question of the subject; there only remains for us the question preliminary to any treatment (as it is presented in Lacan’s schema L). One continually turns around this same question, which itself is posed starting from the little difference whatever it may be. This turning around attempts to define without ever managing to do so; by its turns, returns and detours, it surveys, it tries to pose unmovable beacons, it tries to geometrise.

In the tradition, the task of geometrising this question and of surveying it is entrusted to the Name-the-Father. It surveys the length and breadth of the indefinite beach where sense flows in order to make of it a locus, the locus of the subject. It thus gives an imaginary representation of the locus. But this is only the visible result of an approach made up of a process marked by stoppages and restarts, in other words of the real and the symbolic.

It matters little who or what holds the place of the Name-of-the-Father. In any case, the function must be held and it is held. There is no indefinite beach of (symbolic) sense without there already being hooked onto it (imaginary) meanings, but also (the real) of the sex-ab-sense.

In every mobilisation of speech or more generally in every (symbolic) difference, the (imaginary) power of the (real) act is summoned up and with it paternity, of which the Father is a name. Impossible to make (to make the word, make the limit, make the difference) without bringing into play the ‘paternity’ of one’s own act; this indeed was the purpose of Schreber as subject, in his writing, if not in his flesh.
Starting from the signifier or more generally from the differance, there is always room for a subject-effect and an articulation of the subject.

One may not perceive it, not develop it, close one’s eyes to the subject-effect. It is the daily bread of saids and understoods. To these saids and understoods in which the question of the subject is forgotten, the term of ‘foreclosure of the function of the Name-of-the-Father’ is perfectly suited. The question of the subject is forgotten behind the personage supposed producer and bearer of these petrified saids and understoods. The particular person that one calls ‘the psychotic’ is indeed caught – qua personage – in the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, but it is a fact for every personage and every agency stuck in saids and understoods. The scientific conception is defined by the search for truth in the saids and understoods to the exclusion of the subject and of saying. To pose the question of the subject, is to reintroduce the Name-of-the-Father into scientific consideration (Ecrits, p.874-875). Whatever may be the saids and understoods, one can bring into play again the first differance and understand it as a re-launch. With the phallic function there is required the place of the subject as exception.

The function of the Name-of-the-Father is thus altogether necessary from the point of view of the logical structure of speech, which is always potentially there for every human being, from before his birth and beyond all his mutism. In the purely fictitious case where every kind of Name-of-the-Father would come to be radically absent, the void created will necessarily find a deputy (seminar on the Ethics of psychoanalysis, p.80) by very reason of the structure. The void is there necessarily, but it is also necessarily an appeal to what fills it. To the ‘nya’ of the void there necessarily responds the ‘nia’ which geometrises the locus and renders it tangible. The Name-of-the-Father is an attempt to geometrise the always Other locus, it is the attempt to define what goes beyond every possible definition, it attempts to inscribe radical absence (‘nya’) in function of sense and of it negations (‘nia’). Always constructed on absence (the symbolic father is the radically dead father), it carries with it the question of the radical void; it is of its essence to be fundamentally holed.

Schema I gives an illustration of it at the same time as it carries the schema of the question of the subject to its infinite development. Schema I shows how the Other locus of the Name-of-the-Father is present, how it remains an
empty locus in the very function of the structural impossibility of the function of the Name-of-the-Father, how everything is put to work to get around this void and this impossibility.

Henceforth the Name-of-the-Father indicates not the beach in which the subject would be installed, but much more rather the impossibility of such a normalising installation, in other words the real of a beach, defined as a pure (empty) locus by the fact that the subject lands (échoue) there. Starting from the void there does not cease to be posed the question of the subject as an individual irreducible to its saids. The subject ‘realises’ the relationship between saying (stating) and the said (the statement). But he radically fails (échoue) there since he fills the hole of saying by the said. There remains indeed the absence of sexual relationship (the subject is not sex).

The question of the subject is always there, present-absent in the representation. The representation of the subject by the signifier (the subject-effect proper to the signifier) is read in the objectivity of the saids and the understands, namely, of the reality of our World. By this there is necessarily fixed a certain relationship between the subject and the object. This relationship, in what it traces out positively, is called phantasy. ‘All our reality’ is sustained by phantasy, in other words all our reality is represented by this double subjective and objective aspect. There is no concrete reality which can exist for us independently of representation. The Thing in itself is not there. The Thing, das Ding, is only the impossible vanishing point of this general schema which structures all our reality.

‘All our reality’, insofar as it is necessarily represented, is sustained by phantasy. But the World of representations is not all. And the phantasy is not the only condition of the question of the subject. Our sensibility in act is there as the prior condition on which depends any phantastical structuring. Operating intentionality (Merleau-Ponty), the a priori sensibility in no way being reduced to this schema of representation. In other words, there is well and truly a presentation on the hither side of every representation. This question is habitually treated under the term of topology, but one might also name it ‘transcendental aesthetics’, ‘phenomenology of perception’ or ‘sensibilising’, on condition of understanding here the structural condition of possibility.
The subject as signifier-effect in representation (in the phantasy) is thus carried by the question of presentation. In each of the discourses of the subject, one be able to read these two dimensions of presentation and representation that one must necessarily get across as ‘said’, as *dit-mensions*: the said of the statement or of the representation and the said of the stating or of the presentation. Each discourse comprises in itself these two ‘masculine’ (namely, relative to the two formulae described as ‘masculine’) *dit-mensions*. *Firstly*, the subject, described as that of stating, takes the place of the semblance of the agent discourse; it is he who holds himself in a meta position, off side, which disposes him quite naturally to be taken as a personage; ‘this man (*cet homme*) is cut off or ‘*se thomme*’ from ‘his’ own discourse just as much as from the other discourses; in a meta position, he precipitates himself as an exceptional essential and existential being...and he collapses because of that into the banality of the said and of the object. *Secondly*, the object, the said of the statement, is content with the universality that has been inscribed in every statement as a possibility of (phallic) re-launching. Between these two dimensions there can be established a relationship. And why not call it sexual, since it implies sex? But the aforesaid relationship is only established precisely in the field of saids and their sense. The condition of this pretentious montage, constructor of sense, is precisely to ignore sex, sex-ab-sense.

The analytic discourse is inspired by Freud’s saying, which is situated precisely starting from the stoppage of sense. But the stoppage of sense can be comprehended sometimes as decency (a little sense, not too much sense) where things are stabilised in an appropriate imaginary meaning, sometimes as the real of sex, as sex-ab-sense, as pure stoppage, catastrophe, cut.

Where is the subject? In the first case it risks confusing itself with the person, in the second case it risks being radically barred.

By posing the question ‘from where are you speaking?’ the dynamic ‘analyst’ seems to be putting forward the question of the subject. But the response indeed risks giving consistency to an unbarred subject, to a subject confused with the person. This response would allow us to map out how one makes sense (it is indeed the practice of psychoanalysis): the semblance of
subject could make the discourse function and make it produce what it should produce.

It is this passage precisely which aggravates its case, its fall. Constructed on the illusion of something substantial which might hold up, that one could master and maintain as one sustains a said, such a personified subject is only the trace of incest of saying and the said, it redoubles its sin. Claiming to be correct, it is doubly incorrect; it cannot sustain the questioning that ought to be proper to the subject. By wanting to promote it into happiness, one promotes its unhappiness, malediction.

The hubris of the subject is turned against itself and it ends in tragedy. There remains only its redoubled fall.

This redoubled fall of the substantial subject is produced in any case, because the intimacy of the subject and of the personal is inevitable. And this whatever may be the position taken with respect to the exception which grounds the subject, an active position or a passive position.

To take up the active position of exception, to choose to be outside the saying of one’s parents, is to cut oneself off from a whole World; one creates a personage there. The passive position does no better. The boy before the threat of castration renounces a whole phantastical World which announced itself for him in the Oedipus complex, he enters into sense and its decency. For the girl classically subjected to the passive position, it can be worse. By wanting to insert herself into this logic where the male makes the law, she loses the trace of her own saying in order to entrust it to the said of another. And when she functions as model (always in the register of the said and of the understood, ‘of course’), here the figure of the mother is ravaging, and this all the more that she gives proof of intelligence, of seduction and of so-called ‘feminine’ perfection.

Should we therefore avoid the position of exception, leave it to the care of a God who does not exist, and stick to the first formula, for all x phi of x? With the phallus, we will have found the putting into question again of the subject that it would be enough to universalise (for example in a general formula like the ‘re-launch of the phallus’, valid for all, in every place and at all times). We would have found The Formula.
It appears that such a phallic formula does not allow itself to be manipulated in any of the three established discourses. One can attempt to master, to hystericise or to universalise it. But the phallus resists every reduction since the phallic re-launch operates starting from an unconscious which cannot think of itself as a determined origin and for a future that does not sketch out any determined finality. It escapes both from the side of the past and from the side of the future.

What escapes in the phallic re-launch is precisely outside phantasy. On the hither side of the phantasy, the phallic re-launch is irreducible to some said just as much as to some subject hypostasised in a personage. This phallic re-launch starting from sex makes a cut in sense. This cut can be imaged by the cut in the foreskin or the sexual organ; but that would again make us fall back into the mechanics of sense. What underlies any practice ‘is not learned from practice, which explains for those who know it that it has only recently become known’ (AE, p.461).

This is not learned starting from an already constituted sense (notably not starting from the ‘clinic’ which comforts itself at the expense of patients). The practice of the psychoanalytic discourse is to make sense. Analysis is a sense factory; one has to know how. The phallus and its meaning seem to give the way for the psychoanalytic discourse. But psychoanalysis is always at a disadvantage in the comprehension of the phallus: on the one hand, it’s that, one retains in it the thing which attracts and which would justify desire with what it can signify, on the other hand, it’s not that, the phallus is freed to signify anything at all.

The psychoanalytic discourse seems to be determined by an ‘it’s that’ which defines psychoanalysis and which is mastered by those who know, by the father-masters of this discipline. In this sense, the Oedipus complex consists in being inscribed in a familial dynamic under the law that is already there, represented by the Father (the wise side of the Oedipus complex that is being extinguished). But the Oedipus complex is much more rather than to permit oneself against these father-masters; it is indeed a matter of ‘nay saying’ in act, of leaving no priority to any routine user of the road, whether it is Laïus or Lacan. The fire of the Oedipus complex is not extinguished.
Freud could not avoid stifling the analytic discourse behind the universality of the phallic function and the sobriety of the Oedipus complex. People think they have to contest this universality by other saids. But that is not the question. It would be better to give it its true import, which is precisely outside meaning, outside semantics. The phallus, in its imaginary, semantic production, has a blanket function with respect to its true function. What can one find in this universal? Freud’s ‘allmanity, touthommie’ avows its truth’ (AE, p.462). Because it is indeed truth that is at stake, namely, a statement, a said, a half-said; saying is forgotten behind the Freudian said in what is understood.

Should one conclude from this that the ‘allmanity’ (the universality) is always dependent on the particular saying that has stated it, in other words on the subject of the locus from which it speaks, on the exception which is finally only a semblance? This would lead us back to the sceptical position of the ‘psychoanalyst’. As a consequence of which we would only have to deal with universality, which would always prove to be contingent and always particular.

Universality would depend on singularity and on the particular discourse which fabricates it. To every discourse its truth, one might say. To every discourse its own racisms. Universality would only be the consequence of ‘subjective’ modulations proper to the discourse which fashion it. Every discourse involves two races, the race which corresponds to the semblance and the race which is put to work: the race of masters and the race of slaves (for the master discourse), the races of boring hysterics and the race of shits (for the discourse of the hysteric), the race of pedantic academics and the race of student faggots (for the academic discourse). Each universal could thus be framed in the racist discourse which composed it. The sceptical critique follows.

What counts, is the production of the universal, the discourse in action, the act of the discourse in question. The established discourses are well made to generate and to purify themselves: the master generates the master, the hysteric generates the hysteric, the academic generates the academic. Just like in the formation of races of animals or of flowers. It is the repetitive act in the fecondating of generations which purifies the genome.
Is it the same for the psychoanalytic discourse? Is there a purification of the race of analysts from generation to generation? Is it by repeating the psychoanalytic discourse that one purifies the race of analysts and of analysers, as one selects tomatoes or cattle, slaves or academics? The psychoanalytic discourse ‘foralls that by a reverse slope’. There is absolutely no question of an action which would be repeated in its automatism and would thus be refined. Contrary to an action stretched between a past which determines and an aim which directs it, analytic practice implies an act which has no other motive than itself, an always new, revolutionary, to be invented ‘practice’, and not an adapted ‘pragmatism’ refining the raw product inherited from our ancestors (cf. Kant’s *Critique of practical reason*).

Henceforth, the universality, the ‘allmanity’ proposed by Freud (‘for all x phi of x’), cannot be ranked at the level of a product dependent on the particularities and the racisms of an established discourse. That does not in any way express its effective value.

Where find the value of phallic universality (and not only of one or other universality dependent on an established discourse), if we are already plunged into the different human discourses with the place that they assign us from before our birth?

These discourses fail, come up against an impossible, whose formula would be ‘there is no sexual relationship’. It is only this impossible, tangible in each discourse, which allows there to be glimpsed the real of the act which consists in changing discourse.

The analyst is initially an analyser. The analyser is not the one who situates himself right away in the analytic discourse. He is preferentially the one who ought to rise up against each of the established discourses, ‘to say no’. That is where his ‘formation’ lies. Is it simply a formation of displacement, of relaunching, or again the reversal of the universality of standards proper to each of the three established discourses?
The IMPASSE

The first part of the logic of the analytic discourse is formulated by the universality of standards and of theory coupled with ‘nay saying’, contestation, the putting in question again by a subject. The articulation corresponds to an Oedipal schema.

One can very easily project this logical measuring apparatus, meaning these universal rules with their questioning, onto the whole formation of the psychoanalyst. This is to refer the masculine dit-mensions proper to the oedipal schema onto the totality of the psychoanalytic corpus. It also presupposes that one becomes an analyst by passing through the Oedipus complex and castration. The ‘trainers’ would be the fathers of the beginning analyst. And the latter ought to separate himself off from them by indexing what was transmitted to him by his personal ‘saying’, which ought to present itself necessarily as a ‘nay saying’.

By this practice of ‘nay saying’, one mobilises, to be sure, the principle ‘there is no sexual relationship’ and we can detect it starting from each discourse. Nevertheless this principle of transmission which articulates something received with its taking up again in negation does not develop the ‘nya’, the undecidable, the ab-sense. And the personal saying of the analyst in formation has everything to reduce itself to a statement and to go on to being something like a said. It is the incest proper to the history of psychoanalysis.

It is ‘the scandal of psychoanalytic discourse, and it says enough about the way things are at in the Society that supports it, that this scandal is only expressed by being stifled, as one might say, at birth’. (AE, p.463). Psychoanalytic societies in general effectively support the psychoanalytic discourse; but the way in which they support it is scandalous in that it operates in incest, in the incest where the psychoanalytic discourse is transmitted in the said. The statements which serve as substitutes for saying ineluctably veil the latter. Freud’s saids have replaced Freud’s saying.

In the logic of psychoanalytic discourse, type one, there is well and truly the ‘nay saying’, the movement of reversal, of overthrowing which makes standards collapse or at least puts them to the test of a unique experience (the passe), which each one can and must do in one way or another. But the passe still only plays the role of a fugitive hinge between two types of saids.
To find what was supposed to be found: saids.

Before this analytic discourse thus constituted in type one, the question of the subject insists. In the form of the feminine for example. The ‘feminine’ makes an appeal. On the one hand (past), it calls on the unconscious to come and to take its full place in the psychoanalytic discourse. On the other hand (future), the feminine demands, requires the revision of the Freudian judgement which would apply the masculine schema of the Oedipus complex onto the totality of the psychoanalytic corpus and future.

It would be a matter of making the unconscious return. Where find the door for the unconscious? In the voice of the body, which seems to give access to the unconscious? Naturally, the – enigmatic - body only finds its voice through the unconscious. To appeal to the voice of the body to rediscover the trace of the unconscious, is quite coherent. And we effectively rediscover the trace of the unconscious in the body. But the trace, qua trace, or the writing of the symptom are quickly reduced to simple saids, to simple statements which prove quite lightweight with regard to the authority of a saying attributed to the feminine mystery.

One might expect a lot from the appeal of the feminine to open up a new type of psychoanalytic discourse. One might expect a lot from the feminine to dynamise the becoming of psychoanalytic discourse. One might expect a lot from the feminine to bear witness to analysis. But the psychoanalytic discourse will not be re-launched by following the vein of the body and of everything that initially acts as saids.

Feminist analysts were well able to contest Freud’s judgement on sexuality around 1930. All they did was to stitch some trimmings onto the starched bodice that was still perfectly phallic in the Freudian style. And contenting themselves with promoting the feminine moiety of the Lacanian table of sexuation (page 73 of the seminar Encore) often only adds a burdensome layer to it. The sewing thimble (the ‘charming finger-stall’) is indeed necessary to get the needle through and thus force despite everything the montage of the sexual relationship. It was already fundamentally Freud’s project. Nothing new in that. And still today. The Women! They can be incensed or covered with sense. And here the Jones’, the sheep of psychoanalysis may well exercise themselves in
logical subtlety, namely, bend their necks under the universal of the possible saids of Freud and today of Lacan (it is ‘the angle of service, cervice’, AE, p.463).

Exercises of conformism despite the timid modulations of small differences. One remains here in the first masculine formula (the universal of possibles). One does not even develop the totality of the masculine logic, since the second formula is masked, that of the power of saying (‘nay saying’) which constituted the practice of Freud and of Lacan. To say while bending the neck under the names of Freud or of Lacan, is here ‘to say exactly the contrary of Freud’ (AE, p.464)...and of Lacan.

This logical subtlety – logic leads to everything – does not rule out mental deficiency. On the contrary: mental deficiency ‘results from the parental saying rather an inborn obtuseness’, it supports itself on the lost saying of the fathers in order to dispense itself from engaging in the movement of saying. This indeed is what all followers do, weakened by their genuflections and their references rather than strengthened by them.

As we have seen, the very saying of Freud and of Lacan had already fallen into the original sin of psychoanalysis, the incest of saying and the said. Not astonishing that the Jones’ should be taxed with deficiency. And all followers follow.

The knot of the question is indeed to know what to do with the unconscious insofar as it presents itself as ab-sense and without relationship (‘there is no sexual relationship’). The renewal of principle is not comprehended starting from Freud’s saids collected in his ‘complete works’, but starting from saying, starting from Freud’s saying, not from Freud’s saying as it took place at a particular moment of history, but the saying at stake on the side of sex as ab-sense, on the side of the stoppage of associations and of sense.

What relationship have we with this primordial discovery of Freud, this discovery that can be called ‘transference’, not at all of course as the referring of certain sentiments onto another person (in this, Freud invented nothing), but as the phenomenon of a pure saying that emerges when the chattering of the said is interrupted?

What can be the relationship to sex thus defined (sex-ab-sense)? And what can be, besides, the relationship to the phallus (sense-ab-sex)?
Let us start from the second question, that of the phallus and notably from the angle of meaning. Easy to say here: there are those (ceux) who have it and those (celles) who do not have it. The sexual genders would thus be divided according to a binary logic (having it or not having it) corresponding to the principle of non-contradiction and of the excluded third. By enlarging the principle of some organ or other raised to the dignity of a signifier, one could, it seems, give a better place to the woman, one could distribute the organs: the penis for him, the breast for her, and share out the merits of one and the other. One would magnify, for example, in her the function of nourishing. It is not difficult to symbolically raise it to a cultural function (including the culture of cereals or of vegetables and of everything that healthily nourishes humans).

What is important is not that titillations start from here or from there, from such and such organs of the body, from such and such cultures. What counts, is the way in which the phallic function makes its entrance. Let us imagine it on one side or on the other (penis, breast and whatever you wish), its entrance is played out in the same way, ‘quite simply...’, in the man or in the woman and in anyone whatsoever. The phallic function takes the stage as an empress, as press (presse), as unique master signifier. Inflexible imperative which is not justified by any organ or by any previous origin. Whatever may be the diversity of imaginary symbols, everything proceeds therefore from a unique phanerogam, which would claim to be unique, from a unique semblance, from a unary trait which has come to lodge itself as a supplement in the void of ‘there is no sexual relationship’.

There would therefore be an advantage in never presenting the phallus in function of such and such an anatomy, but rather in function of the function that it has to fulfil (make no mistake): it is the void of non-relationship which motivates the conspicuousness of its appearance, rather than the imaginary organ which veils the same void; it is in the void and not in the organ that it finds its function of re-launching.

Here Lacan differs from Freud only by the fact that he does not oblige women to rank themselves within the logic of masculine castration. Not just simply that it is not obligatory to pass necessarily by way of the symbolism of the male apparatus. That would be all we’d need! It is a matter of lifting the external obligation, the diktat, the dictatorial imperative, the parental superego, which
forces this function to be fulfilled, to saturate it by some previously determined signifier *whatever it may be*.

Should the ‘charming sheath’ not serve as a signifier to express the void of the ‘there is no sexual relationship’? What is insinuated by that is still an obligation, an obligation to complete the picture, to rank each and every one without being unfair to one or the other. The ‘signifier’ becomes a catalogue, one signifier for the man, another for the woman. The obligation to be ranked kills the signifier. No doubt men may feel themselves held by the obligation of passing through the phallic said. To now oblige women to pass by way of the same formulae or by another formula that the ‘charming sheath’ for example indicates is still to oblige, to bind by a logical engagement. The ‘void’ is not a said, not a statement (this would be the incest of saying and the said). ‘To raise’ the charming sheath ‘to the level of the signifier’ would only reduce the signifier to a catalogue and ratify the incest of saying and the said.

Would a woman henceforth be right away in the ‘*nya*’, in the undecidable of sexual non-relationship?

This is what Freud says: the woman is already castrated. Which the feminists modulate. Ah! The woman! You cannot imagine. This Freudian elaboration ‘woefully contrasts with the fact of the devastation that is, for the most part, in the case of the woman, the relationship to her mother’, inasmuch precisely as she expects from her ‘more substance than from her father’ (*AE*, p.465). She expects her own substance to be transmitted to her by her mother. The substance of being from the outset in the ‘*nya*’ or being already castrated. Of course, this idea of feminine substance in no way cuts off the dependence on a mother apparently well provided and overflowing with feminine substance. There is no substance of the feminine, not even the void of an already completed castration.

Not even the substance of a foundational void.

We are at an impasse.

We must not force must not oblige anyone to enter into the castro-phallic mould. Nor must we promote the substantial void that would consecrate femininity.

The same impasses are required for the psychoanalytic discourse: it is impossible to oblige the candidate to follow the logic of castration (of the two
masculine formulae), impossible also to promote a substantial void that the ‘analyst’ by essence (promoting the lack!) is supposed to be.

The ‘feminine phallic formulae’

The ‘nay saying’ to each of the two ‘masculine’ formulae allows us to write the ‘feminine’ formulae: ‘there does not exist an x non-phi of x’ and ‘not for all x phi of x’.

The import of these formulae is in no way to tell us the positive substance or the essence of the woman or again what a feminine subject should be. They function as ‘nay saying’ and it is in this sense that they interest the psychoanalytic discourse.

Mathematics scarcely ever employs this type of formula. Logico-mathematical language would propose preferentially to simplify and to replace the formula ‘there does not exist an x not-phi of x’ by the equivalent formula ‘for all x phi of x’ and the formula ‘not for all x phi of x’ by the equivalent formula ‘there exists an x not-phi of x’. One would thus return quite simply to the two masculine formulae. If Freud’s saying was able to be rendered tangible by mathematical discourse, it is not in relation to a certain technicality of mathematical writing, but to introduce the matheme, to express the experience of the knowledge which counts only on itself.

The two feminine formulae, scarcely promoted by mathematics, renew the ‘matheme’ in the sense of psychoanalysis, by their ‘nay saying’, by the introduction of a specific usage of negation, which does not depend on the technical language of classical mathematics. The second masculine formula hastens to say ‘it’s that, there exists an x not-phi of x’; the first feminine formula is eager to respond to it ‘it’s not that, there does not exist an x not-phi of x’. In the same way, the first masculine formula affirms ‘it’s that, for all x phi of x’; the second feminine formula responds to it ‘it’s not that, not all x phi of x’.

It is the very exercise of ‘nay saying’ (which acts as a matheme of psychoanalysis) which produces the ‘feminine’ formulae.

‘It is here nevertheless that there is revealed the sense of saying’ (AE, p.465), Freud’s saying in that it makes sense on the hither side of and beyond its
said and understood (those which make up the classical doctrine of dogmatic psychoanalysis). It is starting from the act of denying the two quantifiers that we can advance into the question of psychoanalytic discourse. This act of denying is not a rejection; on the contrary, it is a matter of assimilating the two quantifiers, and of making them go through a questioning and thus of raising them up again (one might say an *Aufhebung*). The two ‘feminine’ formulae *take up again* and raise up the two ‘masculine’ formulae, to renew them in their own way. The two logical parts (‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’) of the psychoanalytic discourse are combined and the feminine includes the masculine. How is this inclusive combination carried out? How is there articulated each of the two couples of the opposed formulae, the all (first formula) and the notall (fourth formula), the exception (second formula) and the non-exception (third formula)?

What makes one go from the ‘masculine’ of the logic to the ‘feminine’ of the logic, is indeed the passage between the pretension to the exception and the dismissal of this same exception. This passage is expressed in the homophony ‘*nia nya*’: the exception denied (‘*nia*’) the universal, but there is no effective trace of such an exception, it is only a semblance of exception. And if this exception (‘there exists an x not-phi of x’) responsible for the universal (‘for all x phi of x’) is not valid (‘there does not exist an x not-phi of x’), it is the very value of the universal which is put in question (‘notall x phi of x’). All the homophonies in analysis presuppose this passage from ‘*nia*’ to ‘*nya*’, this passage from absence to presence and reciprocally: it is a matter of producing the value of the exception (second masculine formula) in order, at the same locus, to erase it (first feminine formula). The sense of feminine logic, which gives us the sense of saying or psychoanalytic discourse in act, is thus specified by way of the exception of the subject and the effacement of the subject which is barred.

The first ‘feminine’ formula (‘there does not exist an x not-phi of x’) is not a universal negative; it is not a radical and principled contestation to all phallic exception. On the contrary, the negation of the quantifier (‘there does not exist’) is brought to bear only on the act which was already affirmed in its singularity, namely, in the particular grasp of the stating on the statement of the universal. It is only valid as a punctual response and not at all as an established piece of negative theology, for example.
The second ‘feminine’ formula (the notall) is not a particular (not even a ‘maximal particular’, namely, a particular which would say that every universal, affirmative or negative is false). The notall is not the testimony of a person who says no to the phallic function. First of all because it is in no way reduced to a testimony, which always consists of changing a saying into a said (the incest of psychoanalysis). Then because it does not concern the person and its existence. These two reasons are moreover the same: the supposed existential, personal ‘subject’ is only ever sustained by the fundamental incest of saying and the said. To be sure, the ‘notall’ is a nay saying. But this nay saying is not borne by the decision of a personified subject. The phallic function does not characterise persons. Feminine logic questions the subject who is excepted and a fortiori the person who is counted or who believes he counts. To speak about ‘a phallic mother’, ‘a phallic man’, or of ‘a phallic woman’ bears witness to a complete ignorance of ab-sense, of the sex-ab-sense, of Freud’s saying, and one only retains the said and the understood of the imaginary phallic measuring apparatus of the same Freud. The expressions which qualify such and such a person as ‘phallic’ continue to attribute to the phallus the value of a semantics of imaginary power, absolutely contrary to the function of re-launch proper to the phallus in psychoanalysis.

The sexes in company (not the personages) only emit the existential noise ‘nyania’, which noise only acts by the operation of ‘negation’ which lends them existence and at the same time non-existence.

Let us specify positively the correct value of the third and fourth formulae of sexuation (the two feminine formulae).

‘There does not exist an x not-phi of x’. It was a matter already of the introduction of saying into the existential masculine formula ‘there exists an x not-phi of x’. It was already the question of the introduction of the psychoanalytic discourse.

What is the difference introduced by the supplementary ‘negation’ presented in the existential feminine formula? The second masculine formula was constructed on the universality of a function which appeared at first as a way of seeing things, a particular conceptualisation. For every function, ‘someone’ is necessary to make it function. Which gives the necessary consistency of a really
present subject, which the emergence of the person will necessarily contaminate. The existential ‘feminine’ formula does not start from a particular function but from the ‘phallic function’, a function of re-launching which has no term by definition; it starts from non-definition since the re-launch implies the undetermination of its end.

By denying the supporting point of the phallic function, does the non-existence of the subject not imply the disappearance of the phallic re-launch?

On the contrary. The stoppage of the re-launch is always the possibility of another re-launch despite appearances. Since the function of re-launching is not defined, ‘we can say anything about it here’. No reason is presupposed. Reason does indeed give a general line which is valid as a principle, except for the fact that it is a matter of precisely ridding oneself of principles. The re-launch, is precisely to despise the reasons that are invoked.

We can say anything about it, even and above all what comes from ‘without reason’. This is what is proposed to the analyser: the association described as free, saying liberated from too reasonable reasons. ‘To say everything, tout dire’ a nice programme. For the analyser. The rule seems to bring everything back to the first masculine formula. What ‘all’ is at stake? The fourth formula, which denies and raises up again the first formula specifies what the all is. The notall is not the maximal particular, as Lacan clearly explicitated (AE, p.465-466). Despite the negation, it is well and truly an all, a marked all. Marked by negation. And it is negation which gives us its true characteristic of ‘all’. The all is so much ‘all’ in it that it is impossible to unify it, since it is in no way reduced to a universalised all: ‘It’s an all outside the universe.’ It must be understood as the all in its greatest extension, namely, as what allows itself to be carried along by the said-outside, which leaves the place for saying. It is an all which can take on its veritable import not in suppressing, but in suspending the project of unifying, of universalising, of universality. In analysis, it is a matter of allowing this project to make a universe remain asleep.

‘To say everything’, where there is summoned the whole force of the ‘notall’, is to allow the voluntary accumulation of saids which would continue to want to make a universe remain asleep. ‘Miller you are sleeping’, ‘everything sleeps’, which would permit the mill of saying to turn quickly and emptily. The ‘all
outside the universe’ (the notall) can all the better turn in that the étourdi, étourdit subject, makes room there for the dream.

This second part of the logic of the psychoanalytic discourse can be explicitated in the clinic.

The privileged example in it, once again, is psychosis and notably Schreber. In the ‘masculine’ logic, Schreber served us to specify the function of the subject and that of the Name-of-the-Father. Here, in what concerns the feminine logic of the psychoanalytic discourse, it is the question of his transsexual phantasy, the question of his phantasy of being transformed into a woman which is being summoned up. How constitute oneself as a woman? The question is not a genetic affair which would lead us to go through the stages of becoming a woman and their repercussion on psychosis, for example. Before any application to psychosis, to women, to particular stages of development, the clinical question of the ‘feminine’ becoming is first of all an affair of the structure of discourse: how have access to the renewal or to the second part of the new logic as it is engaged in the psychoanalytic discourse?

Let us plunge again what is presented at the same time as the question of psychosis and the question of the woman into the framework of the feminine and of the methods proper to psychoanalytic discourse. ‘It is from the eruption of A-Father as without reason, that there is precipitated here the effect experienced as forcing, in the field of an Other in thinking of itself as most foreign to all sense’ (AE, p.466). ‘A-father without reason’ – in the form of Schreber’s father, of his brother, of the psychiatrist Flechsig, of God himself – is precipitated into the field of the Other to make sense, to structure sense in it. But the field of the Other is radically Other and, if that is how things are, it is most foreign to all sense. The precipitation into the search for a sense can only be experienced as a forcing. And the psychotic has particularly clearly experienced this forcing. It is the same forcing which equalled the sense-absence and the sex-absence. It is the same forcing which would oblige the woman to be inscribed in an anatomical formula (the phallic or the charming sheath).

The response to forcing is required, it is expressed in the first ‘feminine formula’. The ‘father without reason’ is a usurper. ‘There does not exist an x not-
phi of x’: it is the devaluation of the virile exception, of the powerful sex, imaged in its masculinity; it is the collapse and the foreclosure of the one who imposed himself as responsible for saying. To the imposture of a male sex outside reason and which nevertheless would want itself to be the origin of reason, there can only respond a denunciating laugh.

We do not encounter this denunciation only in psychosis. It is a matter more fundamentally for our purposes of putting it to work in the psychoanalytic discourse and to laugh at the roles of the psychoanalyst. What does ‘psychoanalyst’ mean? One must laugh at the psychoanalyst who thinks he is busying himself with saying while at the same time he transforms the latter into a said, laugh at the psychoanalyst who thinks he is working on the structure at the same time as the incest of saying and of said short-circuits it, laugh at the dogmatic psychoanalyst, laugh at the sceptical analyst, laugh at the dynamic analyst, laugh at the psychoanalyst as witness.

The denunciation of the exception can resonate to infinity; it is a hyperbolic function, just like the function of exception which goes to infinity to escape the universality of the phallic law. This infinite function allowed moreover to lend it the imaginary value of a God the Father. Not it is a matter of being more radical and to show what happens at the very locus of this exception. If this function of the exception is a pure semblance, ought one to say radically: ‘There is no x not-phi of x’? Full stop. Pure and simple exclusion of this function of exception-imposture?

For some, the psychotic would be defined by this foreclosure: the function of the Name-of-the-Father would be foreclosed at the root (latent psychosis) and this foreclosure would decline clinically after the ‘unleashing’ into a manifest psychosis, namely, starting from the trigger provoked by the arrival of A-Father without reason in the contingencies of life. Click-clack, will make the psychosis.

Foreclosure ought to be comprehended in a much more general and structural way. Which does not mean that foreclosure should be comprehended in the sense of a less extraordinary psychosis, in the sense of an ordinary psychosis. Foreclosure concerns the structure in general, it is the radical negation of saying; and this obstinate setting to one side permits one to remain at the level
of saids and understoods. It is to respond to this foreclosure of saying that one must say no to the function of exception-imposture. Thus one must say no to the psychoanalyst, to the discourse of the psychoanalyst as exception and to all his roles. But it is not a matter for all that of foreclosing the psychoanalyst. To give to the first ‘feminine formula’ the value of such a radical foreclosing negation, namely, corresponding to a logic of the excluded third (it’s a psychoanalyst or it’s not one, it’s one or the other, first form of the impossible, indeed there is no psychoanalyst at all), ‘that would throw us off the track’, that would make us miss the road on which there is traced out the psychoanalytic discourse.

Why?

The psychoanalytic discourse develops by the putting in question of the psychoanalyst. The discourse of the analyst is the discourse about the analyst which questions it. The analyst has presented himself as a personal subject, denying the universal (he ‘nia’), and it has been proved that there is no such subject (‘nya’). But ‘nya’ and ‘nia’ do not allow themselves to be understood as the two terms of a disjunction. It is a matter precisely of going decidedly from the one to the other and reciprocally. It is a matter of strictly correlative positions which form part of the structure itself: no ‘nya’ without the homophony of ‘nia’ and reciprocally. No way of separating the structure into different components, while it is starting from the structure that there appears not alone different saids, different dit-mensions, but again the question of saying.

The structure of the speaking being implies that the function of the Name-of-the-Father should be held in every way; something will always come to sustain its place (this is what the schema I showed). The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father can never be anything but a said of the truth from which saying has radically disappeared. If there is a disappearance of saying, one can to be sure put it down to the disappointment (décompte) of the patient. The contractual abatement (L’abattement forfaitaire) is not without the intervention of the psychiatrist himself and of his saying which is forgotten by targeting (en cliquant) his patient in foreclosure. It is from this side that work is to be done.

From a structural point of view, we cannot give to the first ‘feminine’ formula any authoritative, definitive value. And for the psychoanalytic discourse, nothing permits us to exclude the psychoanalyst and his roles, despite all the more than probable failures. The first ‘feminine’ formula, far from establishing...
things and defining them, has much more a function of displacement, of non-definition. Much more, the existential feminine formula gives no access to any singularity.

We will find singularity not in the first formula but in the second formula, in other words in the negation of the universal quantifier, in the ‘notall x phi of x’.

An objection presents itself right away. How can one find the singularity in a universal formula, like the notall?

The notall is only inhabited by the processes of the subject (existential ‘masculine’ formula: ‘there exists…’) which is emptied out (existential ‘feminine’ formula: ‘there does not exist…’). There is no way of inhabiting the ‘notall’ except by the process of attempting the exception in order to leave its place empty. The confin (‘that one might say...qu’on dise’) is not first of all the feminine sex (‘the charming sheath’), it is stated from pure logic, which logic is formed first of all in the daring of posing itself as a subject of stating (and therefore as an exceptional subject), then to wrongly acknowledge the receipt, the fall, and finally to be able in the void of the fall to introduce the promise which is the notall.

It is the movement that it is a matter of always resurrecting anew.

Not just as an amorous technique for the woman and for her enjoyment.

The movement of resurrecting concerns first of all the psychoanalytic discourse the daring of the one who advances as the solitary founder (the psychoanalyst in all his roles and in all his states, cf. my first chapter), then the collapse of the aforesaid founder (the disappointed and fallen psychoanalyst, cf. my second chapter), and especially the promise of a renewal.

The ‘logical power of the notall’ presupposes the past of the first three formulae as much as what it promises. It is a process. Here ‘logic’ is renewed; it is no longer reduced here to a putting in form, it is the opposite to the ‘power of extreme logic’ which aims at cornering things in the extreme position of a ‘yes or no’, established once and for all.

The consequence of the ‘logical power of the notall’ (and it is not a matter of ‘extreme logic’), is love. Let us begin again starting from sex as it is defined by Freud as ab-sense. Sex, is the radical other, not another said, but the stoppage of the said. It is the heteros, what is fundamentally heterogeneous to any said and
to any understood. The heteros poses the question of the absolutely other saying irreducible to saids and to visible statements.

This indeed is why we ought to talk about the Other with the help of a capital O. Sex thus defined is essentially Other, it is ‘heterosexual’. The expression would remain pleonastic if sex did not designate the simple absence of the said while the other already designates the logical process which, by means of saids, hugs the wall of the impossible separating saying from the said. The structure of sex is thus given by the Other, by the heteros.

Love is inscribed with its insatiable character in the impossible and in the Other as a logical process to treat this impossible. In this sense, one can understand the birth of love starting from narcissism put to the work from the Other. The great reserve from which love is supposed to start, narcissism, unfolds the impossibility of the ‘Ego’ and tries to develop it. The development of the ego in Freud, is the impossibility to love oneself, the contradiction (first form of the impossible) that makes there appear the incompleteness of the ‘Ego’ (second form of the impossible) and correlative the other to love. There then starts the attempt to articulate together the ‘Ego’ and the other in love, to demonstrate it. Undemonstrable (third form of the impossible), it opens up the field of a pure undecidable (fourth form). The birth of the two of love: it is the lover-loved, it is also the analyst-analyser or vice versa, it does not matter. And then the two of the master and the slave, the two of the hysteric and his dullard (scié), the two of the academic and his student. Starting from the One of narcissism, we would have the birth of the two of love.

Before the two of love, it is a matter of the One. But what is meant by this ‘Ego’ which ought to operate as One? It is in no way an ego, a little unified, imaginary personage, but of the One itself and of the question of the unary trait, of the question of the same signifier which is differentiated in itself. And primordial narcissism is not the narcissism of an ego as imaginary personage or the narcissism of small differences, but the narcissism of the signifier itself, the narcissism of the unary trait or of the difference which precedes any subject and a fortiori any personage. The unary trait or the difference situates at the same time the locus of the Other. The otherness which separates, namely, which engenders the well-separated two, is posed in its true Otherness as sex-ab-sense in opposition to sense-ab-sex. It is only then that we have an existing subject of
saying, clearly cut from saids and statements. It is only starting from this
Otherness which clearly cuts one from the other that there can subsequently be
generated the two of two personages, with the enumerable infinity that follows.

But this two of love or of a certain transference, this two that one can enumerate
is only there as a reduction of what is inaccessible, the impossible of the
primordial two (saying and said). There has well and truly been reduction,
passage to two saids, and this reduction permits there to be generated the
ordinal, the series of persons implicated in love.

This two of lovers is equivocal not because there are two personages, but
because it abbreviates the question of love by forgetting saying of the first trait.

By being presented in their similarity, the two lovers are only homosexual,
‘abbreviated men’, ‘prototypes of the semblable’ (AE, p.467) as univocal as you
wish. Man, abbreviated, the man of the logic of the psychoanalytic discourse of
the first kind, depends on the reduction to two, which permits the infinite and
enumerable order of generations. It is a reduction starting from the ‘notall’
which, even if it has remained unnoticed, was nonetheless an underpinning to the
creation of the Other.

This reduction can suffice it seems: ‘L’hommodit, themanofthesaid, was
able to make do with the run of the mill of the unconscious’. Themanothesaid
can only be sufficient for himself starting from a saying which was already well
advanced, but he forgot it.

How say this saying? We must ‘say it “structured like a language”’.

In what way does ‘the unconscious structured like a language’ whose
structure is not without saying it, how does the Lacanian formulation allow us to
go further than the Freudian saids? In what way might Lacan go further than
Freud? Or again, in what way is do the second type of psychoanalytic discourse,
the ‘feminine’ formulae go further than the first type or the ‘masculine’ formulae?

The two types concern the phallus, the four formulae are indeed phallic
formulae.

First type: to comprehend the phallus. The phallus is an emergence
among other possibles in the sea of signifiers. The phallus is then comprehended
as an ‘I’, ‘I am at the place where it is shouted that “the universe is a defect in the
purity of non-being”’ (Ecrits, p.819). it is the phallus which gives a certain
consistency, a support to the subject (cf. Lacan’s Schema R in which the phallus acts as an imaginary support of the subject). We hide behind this conception of the phallus which allows us to enjoy a certain power. But we have only been able to constitute this phallic power because we have retrenched a good part of the phallus, the essential part of its function (‘feminine’ logic). In this retrenching of understanding the phallus, Lacan has been little understood. All the better since, with the ‘notall’, it is a matter of highlighting what does not allow itself to be encircled by a comprehending (at the level of saids and of understoods). To comprehend the phallus as an imaginary meaning, is to still leave room for what exceeds it.

‘In short we float away from the islet phallus, to what is cut off from it because of what fortifies itself against it.’ (AE, p.468) We retrench into a first (‘masculine’) type of phallic logic, from which the second (‘feminine’) type has been subtracted. Of course, women can well take their place in this ‘masculine’ way of comprehending the phallus. And notably every time they take their place in a system of established discourses and they manoeuvre around the islet phallus.

The second type that must not be retrenched: the incomprehensible phallus. Here, the notall has just said that it does not recognise itself in these manoeuvres which think they can encircle and master what appeared as the ‘islet phallus’. The version of Autres écrits unfortunately corrects the original version and gives: ‘The notall does not recognise itself in this’, namely, in the phallic signifier. This interpretative correction is explicitly contradicted by the continuation of the same sentence; for the notall itself carries the ‘sublime phallus’.

We find the trace of it in what Lacan himself contributed: firstly, the four discourses insofar as their problematic may be explicitated by the question of the psychoanalytic discourse, secondly, the unfillable gap which shows the absence of the sexual relationship (the difference between sense-ab-sex and the sex-ab-sense), thirdly the return of the phallus which is no longer here an isolated islet but indeed the ‘sublime phallus which guides man towards his true bed, the one he has lost his way to’ (AE, p.468), the phallus beyond limit, as a structure irreducible to an imaged representation of sex. The Sphinx, the Sphinx as a mysterious speech in which saying is hidden, is nothing other than the sublime
phallus. Its function is precisely that of a re-launch for whoever accepts to lose his way: ‘You have satisfied me...’. Provided that Oedipus accepts to lose the way, the one notably on which he had killed his father.

It is the Lacanian Antigone disguised as the sublime phallus who guides the Freudian Oedipus complex. For the Freudian Oedipus complex has remained blind because of being content to float and to manoeuvre around the imaginary phallic islet.

But how make this ‘sublime’ function?

Firstly, one must highlight a ‘mathematical’ (in the sense of the matheme) size going beyond measure (the sense stops); and to do that, it is better to free oneself from all petty contingencies and from all chit-chat. It is a matter of comprehending not just anything at all, but what would be necessary (ce qu’il fallait). What is not without a flaw, the fall of falloir and of faillir, namely, how that is not comprehended. ‘There is not too much of’ this fall (which we have encountered in the fall of the subject with the existential feminine formula). We will never have dismissed the exception sufficiently. And for that, it is better that the exception should indeed be there with force, indeed with forcing. There is never enough of it for it to return not as a said, but as what comes after the said, after the half-said (après-midit) starting from its own exaggeration. It is indeed the movement of the phallic re-launching that is announced. After the half-said, after existence, you will even be able to make yourself the equal of Tiresias who was able to leave the place of the subject, to be more non-being (désêtre), to make himself Other, pure Other (the confine of the logic which is announced, (AE, p.466). It is the very structure of saying which is unfolded here. And it is already what was announced by the unconscious as ‘structured like a language’.

A nice programme. Could it serve as a superego? Not under just any form. To be sure, the table of logics present formulae (the four) which appear to be quite universal in that they are for all (men and women); it is free to each one to make something of them. But the universal does not allow itself to be caught so easily. Only in the exercise of saying which hugs the wall of the impossible. The superego of which the Other is the source is not a resource which can always be of use. Without resource, the source transmutes every narrative, every anecdote and every phantasy emerge from it, in its re-launching and in its
stoppage. This re-launch and its stoppage constitute a ‘logical chicane’, a scansion
where, turn by turn, it stops and is re-launched. It is scanned, it is the function of
scandal.

The re-launch was stalled in the multiplicity of saids forgetting saying. The
relationship to sex went astray ‘by wanting its paths to go to the other moiety’.
The symptoms which combine the absence of the sexual relationship are
constructed on the possibility of establishing a relationship just as much as
establishing a discourse which would hold up once and for all for everybody. And
this is where saying is buried in the multiplicity of saids.

How rediscover saying? Re-say (redire)? Such is the fundamental
question concerning the only function of ‘the analyst’. ‘Re-saying’, it is not a
matter of ‘remaking’ everything, of reproducing saying identically, this would be
unfailingly to mumble, imitate or parrot. Nor is ‘re-saying’ finding something to
blame in it, this would be to fall again into the first superego which imposes its
programme, always reducible to a said, even if it is inscribed in manuals of the
psychoanalytic doxa (including Lacanian ones).

‘Re-saying’, is to take up anew the question of saying, which remains
forgotten, which continues to escape us.

To plunge ‘the analyst’ into the spring (source) of the Other, into the
movement of saying, is the only ‘role’ that he can endorse. A funny role because
he is not made say anything. It would be rather a question of saying nothing,
‘nya’. The actor is no longer here the mouth from which there emerge the saids
of the film, of a theatrical play, of a dance or of a song. The actor does not know
the song; this is what he makes understood. Because everyone knows the song.
It is what is well said or well understood. It is a matter of the real on the hither
side of every said.

It is a matter of breaking in ‘the analyst’, of smashing the learned roles, all
the tables of the law of the good psychoanalyst, in order for ‘him’ to truly become
an actor in the real, in the impossible of the psychoanalytic discourse. This break
is the act of the question, the act of ‘it’s not that’ which makes one go through the
four formulae of sexuation to bring the notall into play. For the notall is not first
of all a restriction to the all, but the movement of re-launch which, starting from
any all, has posed the exception, goes on to the impossible of this exception to
open up the empty and undecidable field which goes well beyond the first all. The ‘notall’ is not without a movement of deflection, the bending of one formula into another and it is a movement which turns back on itself: it is a ‘reflection’.

Could the approach to the ‘notall’ not be more simple? It would be then a simple deflexion. All? No! Perhaps notall. ‘Aristotle tends towards it’ in this way.

Is it the same ‘notall’? The same, the unary trait, is not the identical, because it is carried by the difference of its amusement. Aristotle started from a classical logical deduction where the said reigned. The psychoanalytic discourse started from the amusement of sex and of transference, where the said is brought to a halt.

To comprehend the ‘notall’ as the negation of the universal of the World, is not to comprehend it as a particular. There we would remain at the approach of classical logical deduction. To deny the universality of the World is to take note of Kant’s *Antinomies of pure reason*. The World may well present itself in the categories of finite or infinite, of divisible or of indivisible, of liberty or of determinism, of necessity or of contingency. Despite everything, we do not have and we never will have the World. Instead of the World, there is nothing. To deny the universality of this illusion which the World is, is already to pose the existence of the nothing in all its forms. Lacan’s o-object takes the place of this nothing which is only reached by the multiple exercise of negation: the empty concept without an object (simple absence), privation (*nia*), the empty intuition without an object (*nya*), and all that not without the work of the impossible. It is the place of this multiple exercise of negation that the ‘psychoanalyst’ can take. And everything can recommence. It is the opening up of the liberty which does not allow itself to be caught in the nets of the said, proper to classical logic. To push logic beyond the said, is to give oneself a start which is doable.

This is what allows us to encounter the impossible and to follow its wall. And in that way, it is to extend the infinite and the impossible field of what does not allow itself to be reduced to the anecdote of saids and understoods. The act of nothing.

This act gives a completely dimension to existence.

Existence is now no longer tributary to a particularity which would highlight one part of the universal (Aristotle’s particular). It is the existence of ‘nothing’, it can be discerned at every point. In other words, the present
inexistence. The existence of the impossible by its practice. The ab-sense where
the universe is effaced. The all of the ‘notall’ appears then by removing the robe
of the universe which clothed it. The nudity of the ‘notall’ in its nothing, and one
laughs at what clothed it. ‘At his plan to empire over the universe’, Alexander the
master, the first, could have laughed.

He could have laughed before the philosopher who is not so foolish. Even
if he is there to allow the wind of the madness of the saying of the notall to pass,
he only plays on the air of the half-said and of the truth. Like the madman, he
knows that saying is doable and that existence is the field of the nothing to say it.
But he knows that he is subject to the condition of the said, which presupposes
the suture, the synthesis of statements which must be presented at one single
time, in one single theory.

It would be a matter now of showing how the ‘notall’ is only in the
continuous and endless movement of hugging the wall of the impossible.

To the ‘notsofoolish’ philosopher, who is not mad but who nonetheless
allows madness to get through, we must now respond by the folly of saying, of
saying the notall in its complete movement.

Notsofoolish, notall, passifou, pastout.

We find it in the discourse of the philosopher and of the master (first of
Aristotle and of Alexander) just as well as in the psychoanalytic discourse. This
notall is everywhere. Indeed it touches the universal, it is not reduced to it, it only
takes up the part that suits it. In this sense, it is indeed a participant in the
universal, an open way of taking part in the all.

But how? The formula of notall is far from being formalist. It is doable
and it must be shown. What is called topology.
4

The content of psychoanalytic discourse and its cut

THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE:  
THE SAME CONTENT

The philosopher can say the truth. He can speak about everything on 
condition of taking into account that he is speaking about it (Kojève). It’s his 
trade. He knows that it is doable, on condition of clearly knowing that the truth 
will remain a half-said. Not only will all never be said, the said will be never 
complete. But much more, even if he takes his own speech into account, the 
philosopher will always remain at the *dit*-mensions of the said, the truth does not 
get away from the said and does not touch saying; even if it [truth] takes it into 
account, saying remains outside. The said is constitutive of the approach of the 
philosopher. To be sure, the philosopher confronts chaos, the radical real, 
absence, the question of the void. He does so by fitting the saids together into a 
coherent discourse creating concepts and organised on a plane of imminence 
which acts as locus for these concepts (Deleuze, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?*). 
The chaos only appears under the species of *dit*-mensions.

At this level, the psychoanalytic discourse is perfectly well inscribed into 
the discourse of the philosopher, it organises chaos under the species of *dit-* 
mensons named imaginary, symbolic and real.

Provided that the one and the other do not go beyond the domain of the 
said always half-said, or more precisely that they do not imagine themselves to be 
able to go further than the always partial and partialising experience of *dit-* 
mensions. The truth of saids nevertheless inevitably pushes to transgress its own 
limits because it is always universalising.

The concept, the concept of concepts, the universal of universals push 
towards imagining the totality, at one single time (*semel* in Latin) and to 
organising, always logically, appearances. Speaking always aims at a certain 
generality and this universalising aim is the sole (*semelle*) of the progress of the
said. Psychoanalysis like philosophy practices *dit*-mensions and each one of them pushes towards being organised: the imaginary, the symbolic and the real which, with insistence, always return to the same place. Philosophy has lead to the illusions of the soul, the World and of God. The clinic of psychoanalysis leads for its part also inevitably, to these same illusions which are the substantified subject, the completeness of a universalised World, a divine ideal which would explain everything. Philosophy and psychoanalysis, in concert, present themselves as ‘dialectical’, they try to universalise and to organise appearances.

The shoemaker should stick to his last! *Sutor ne ultra crepidam!* It would be a matter of remaining at the sole of the movement (*march*) of the concept, which, far from having constituted the unity of a subject, of a World or of an ideal, is indefinitely in movement, displacing itself towards a hypothetical unity, towards the one of the always barred subject, towards the universe as universalising in its aims without ever being universalised in reality, towards the one of an ideal which can only disappoint. The concept, of the philosopher as of the psychoanalyst, is being re-launched without ever reaching, from near or from far, the subject as substance, the World in its completeness, the ideal of a realised structure.

These transcendental (metaphysical or meta-psychological) illusions go astray by riveting the movement to a Being which has become substantial, to ontology. The transcendental realism of ontology (‘things are what they are’, ‘a paranoiac is a paranoiac’, ‘a cat is a cat’) is an easy refuge to avoid posing the question of the movement itself, of the re-launch, of the act which always lapses, of what most intimately engages us. The movement itself could make me ashamed? Nothing easier than to recycle the shame (*honte*) of my act into ontology (‘*hontologie*’): Being is at fault.

Philosopher and psychoanalyst, side by side, situate themselves perfectly in the atmosphere of the half-said. They are inscribed in the discourse of the master on the side of truth. No doubt the psychoanalyst can take pride in not falling into the illusions of pure reason. He knows that the subject is fundamentally barred, he knows that the universe is only an illusion, he knows that God is only the projection of the ideal father of his childhood. And thus he protects himself against any confusion with the philosophical discourse: ‘I have nothing to do with the philosopher.’
The psychoanalyst should nevertheless clearly know that he is defending himself against a ‘philosophy’ that he has imagined for himself. He is defending himself from himself: ‘I do not want to be the philosopher that I imagine I could be.’ Well before the birth of the psychoanalyst, every self-respecting philosopher was able to free himself also from these same illusions, he went through the transcendental dialect (Critique of pure reason); he knows that these great ideas are at most valid as directive ideas for his action (Critique of practical reason). He for his part has also defended himself against the three great illusions which rivet the movement to ontology. He is fundamentally ‘post-modern’.

The haughty psychoanalyst does not want to be assimilated to the soles of the philosopher ‘No! I do not want to be a philosopher.’ ‘It is not a matter of philosophy’. What a nice denegation. Even if the Verneinung always finds its arguments reasonable (it is easy to reject philosophy under the pretext of ontology, Being or scholasticism). The shoemaker should stick to his last, says the analyst to the philosopher. And he who knows what he is talking about, would respond to him: Sutor ne ultra crepidam!

These illusions insist.

Despite all its efforts to let go of them, is the psychoanalytic discourse therefore condemned to stick to the Nikes of the philosopher? And all that to say the truth of the master discourse. The philosopher can perfectly well denounce the roles of the analyst, oscillate between the presence and absence, formulate the project of a psychoanalytic discourse and its subject, and even present the phallic logic in the perspective of the notall, do it and thus illuminate the magisterial discourse. The analyst will read with great interest the lessons of philosophers on Lacan’s L’étourdit, which is supposed to specify the psychoanalytic discourse.

One must take seriously at once the denegation which differentiates the psychoanalytic discourse and the philosophical discourse, and the power of the philosophical discourse which could very well explain the theoretical corpus of psychoanalysis.
Does the psychoanalytic discourse depend on a difference of formulation? Is it a question of formulae? And might it be reduced essentially to an enlightened philosophical practice?

Let us try to show the difference. Let us take a said, a statement. We have nothing else as a starting point. We have returned to the starting point which is valid for the philosopher as for the psychoanalyst. And let us begin again. In this second turn, in this reprise, I will perhaps see there being outlined a differance between the first and the second. What could make the differance between the psychoanalytic and the philosophical discourse.

The said presupposes the universal of the concept. I know that each universal already hides a stating, therefore a demand. A demand then again another demand. The chains of demands are repeated. We put them together, we synthesize, we interweave them. There are many common lines of force where on the one hand the goods relative to the diverse demands and on the other hand desire, the hidden creative force beyond and on the hither side of every good intersect. I construct this tissue of desire and of demands by interweaving and enchaining. And with it I can clothe the body, the individual. Inside there are the guts and outside the reality.

We must go through the guts, it is said, speak with the Triebe, with its drives. It is visceral for the philosopher as well as for the psychoanalyst, for Friedrich Nietzsche as for Melanie Klein. I can again help myself with additional helpful guts, remodel the containers, the goatskin bottles, the Bacchic pots or others. I trans-pot (transpote) and I transport, some call that transferring. I bring water, earth, air, fire. I bring milk, bread, air, wine and I evacuate. Digestion meantime. It all functions like an immense digestive tube with an entrance and an exit, an input and an output. At a higher level, each digestive tube can be organised into a person and must adapt itself within society, which has its profound desires and specific demands for the persons that it contains and for itself. Everything fits together.

If we talk about ‘demand’, ‘desire’, ‘subject’, ‘object’, we have not left the philosophical discourse by a sliver. The multiplicity of psychoanalytic concepts and their more or less scatological imagery only modulate the atmosphere of
philosophical concepts. The unconscious speaks the conscious in negation. Transference sings about the transport of feelings. The drive rhythms the tendency in life and death, etc. Everything circulates from one little conceptual box to another little conceptual box thanks to the guts and their peristaltisms.

To fit together (s’emboîter) is not to sin.

It is better to limp (boiter) to advance, to work on the trait, to hobble as you seek the difference.

What is amiss?

THE CUT-THE STITCH, THE EFFACEMENT OF PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE

I glimpsed it, I glimpse it, I am still searching for it: the new contribution of psychoanalysis is sex, the breakdown of the system, the breakdown of sense, ab-sense. Purely punctual, a trait and its stoppage. It is when it stops that it can finally commence. We start from the material of the said, woven from demands and desires. When does that come to a stop? When the material is of no further use? When the material loosens? As long as we can circle and determine demands and desires, we remain completely in the master discourse, the one that masters the entrances and exits, the alimentation of the system and the dustbins of the same.

It would now be a matter of producing ab-sense, the stoppage of the system. Not simply of noting it. When the ab-sense is not ‘deliberate’ or fabricated, the establishment of the stoppage still only opens up the hope of the system getting en route again (that is sometimes called ‘desire’). It is not simply a matter of accepting to be frustrated, of noting that things are not working out. It is a matter of actively refusing to remain with the satisfaction of the said. The Versagung in psychoanalysis is not the frustration of which one feels oneself a victim, it is the active production of ab-sense, of refusal.

Refusing to lose oneself in saids and understoods. How is that?

Let us sketch it out first by acknowledging something. The flood of associations which seemed to come from inside and ‘to express’ themselves comes to a halt. A disorder of the viscera. It no longer works. Or it’s squeezing too strongly. The flood of saids appears to me as external, constructed, artificial. I can no longer locate myself in it. Sometimes, chance, a slip hits me. From the
outside there emerges what is most intimate. That which, at the most intimate part of myself, thinks all by itself finds itself lost in the exteriority of a said which appeared flat. The zone of exchange between an inside and an outside is completely upset. And the outside, the strange, brings me this familiar unease, *unheimlich*. What comes from outside appears to me now as my repressed familiarity. And what I want to reject, to excrete, what is most painful for me, comes back to me as the most intimate, intimate to the power of two because of having been projected outside by me. I eat my own strangeness and I shit my own substance. Orality and anality, which mastered the frontiers between the inside and the outside, are dysfunctional.

Does that mean that we have gone beyond the mastery of these functions? That we have gone beyond the discourse of mastery, the master discourse? And going beyond the oral and anal stage would have given us access to another world where fitting together no longer takes place since the inside and the outside are no longer reference points?

This subversion, ‘is worth demonstrating in a less crude fashion’ (*AE*, p.469). We must demonstrate a ‘subversion’ which is not a simple artefact appearing unexpectedly in the rationality of the master discourse, which is not simply a little momentary indigestion quite quickly regularised and forgotten.

The disordered state of oral and anal functions which regulated the exchanges between the inside and the outside does not abolish the discourse of mastery. With the establishment of this disorder, the psychoanalyst has not ceased to hold his role of little master. And the transgressions of the frontiers which separate the inside and the outside, projection and introjection do not abolish in any way the substantial consistency of a well-separated inside and outside. On the contrary, the intro-projective coming and going affirms the frontier by transgressing it. At the very moment that I present the disorder of the oral and anal system, I accomplish its function (ingesting and assimilating).

I must take up again the function and the stoppage of the function ‘in a less crude fashion’.

First stage, I clearly distinguish the function of the stoppage from the function (the cut). On the one hand, the functioning, the speech which is eaten
and the speech which is excreted. ‘It’s that’, it is assimilable and it is excretable, it is possible to do, it is quite concrete and we must specify how. On the other hand, the stoppage of the functioning, ‘it’s not that’, it fails, it misses, and we must specify why it is not that, how it is the absence of sense.

On the one hand, the flood of associations full of a flourishing sense which brings together the inside and the outside, the id and reality; this is the function of the Freudian ego, it is also the infinite riches of the statements of one or other philosophical system. On the other, the stoppage of associations or again ‘I have nothing to say’, ‘nothing interesting to say’ ‘nothing new to say’, ‘it’s always the same thing’, it is also the contingency of one or other philosophical system reduced to its incidental banality.

The stoppage of associations as well as the systematic banalising often serve as an argument against psychoanalysis (or against philosophy): it’s not that. One will respond by reconciling the richness of sense: it’s that. The ingenuity of sense thus restores the blazon of the psychoanalyst and of the philosopher.

It is not enough to make a distinction between the two sides. The cut, which distinguishes ‘it’s that’ from ‘it’s not that’, is still exactly a said. It corresponds to the statement which distinguishes what is positively said from what is negatively said. In other word to the distinction of what must be incorporated and what must be rejected.

Second stage (the stitching), these two sides, functioning and the stoppage of functioning, must again be re-stitched to show how the functioning goes exactly in the same direction as the stoppage of functioning. Psychoanalysis knows that it is indeed at the very moment that ‘I have nothing to say’, ‘nothing interesting to say’, ‘nothing new to say’, or ‘it’s always the same thing’ that there can be presented what has most sense for psychoanalysis (not always). Inversely, it is at the very moment that the case appears interesting, new, exciting that it really risks of repeating something conventional with its deceitful seduction (not always). It is indeed the motif itself which pushes us to distrust what appears to be too interesting, a beautiful narrative. Never again the narrated narrative. For there to appear not the functioning, not the stoppage of functioning, but the identity of the functioning and its stoppage.
If the truth always presents itself through the sieve of the perception involved, it is a matter of emptying the truth of the said to question the process. The process of perception is referred to the thing positively perceived and also the thing that is being pushed to one side, to the stoppage, to the negative hallucination which permits me to perceive positively. But above all, much more radically, it must be seen how there arises the stoppage in which the perceived thing ‘is equal’ to the thing that has been set aside or is prolonged in it and reciprocally. It must be seen how the slip (but also any formation of the unconscious) realises not simply the disjunction between inside and the outside (a simple reversal), but the process itself, the guiding thread between the function and its stoppage. This white thread presupposes the cutting which separates out the functioning and its stoppage, but also the stitching which equals the same.

It is therefore necessary to abstract oneself from every said and from every narrative to grasp the essence of the psychoanalytic discourse as this process of cutting and of stitching of what appeared as inside and outside. To abstract oneself from all material, always imaginary and illustrated (and in the first place from the personage of the analyst).

What remains? A pure oscillating cut. What is called sex. There where the ab-sense has succeeded, there only remains sex as cut.

That, first and foremost, is what transference is: the ab-sense of associations in which sex is presented. In transference, sense can appear as what it is and be reduced of itself to the obscenity of a pure said. Transference presupposes in effect the content of sense that is always there, always presupposed even in the most radical autistic. Must there be added a stitch which would permit the fragments to be reconciled and to explain how what is played out with the analyst is only a repetition proving what is operating inside the analyser? One would plunge still more into the said which would make us believe now that there might indeed be a sexual relationship.

Transference implies much more rather a stitching inherent in the cut; for it is the stitching not of two saids, but of the function of the saids and of the stoppage of the function, which stoppage poses the question of saying. It is by a single gesture that the cut separates the two, the inside and the outside. And the two produced by the cut is only starting from the one which has allowed the cut.
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But what ‘one’? In the diversion, in the equivocation of the cut, we remain universed, turned towards the univocal of the cut, turned towards the only thing that can give consistency to the one that interests us here: saying. The ‘one’ lent to saying by the cut is the same as the ‘one’ of the radical cut. This is what operates in the difference of the trait, of the ‘unary trait’.

In that way I will have defined the psychoanalytic discourse in its purity: the mechanism of cut-stitch.

Displaying this was only able to be done by setting aside every said and every understood which are always cut and stitched in different phases. By setting aside every said and every understood, there remains strictly nothing more than the pure cut-stitch. By making the psychoanalytic discourse function in its purity, there only remains the purely imaginary thread of cutting-stitching, of a purified sex (therefore not even the phallus, which always makes sense). A pure sex-ab-sense, from which there disappears saying at the same time as every said. Stitched with white thread [which could not be more obvious?].

If the psychoanalytic discourse is purified of the said to find saying, even if it is of its absence, it does not correspond to anything new, ‘psychoanalytic discourse’ has become an expression without consistency, barely the unheard of pretension to the new, without a veritable foundation.

It appeared at first that the psychoanalytic discourse was of strictly the same content as the master discourse (more precisely sustained by philosophical truth).

If I now want to make the difference and to grasp the psychoanalytic discourse in the ab-sense that constitutes the moment of transference, its specificity is reduced to the pure cut-pure stitch and it quite simply disappears. In the first chapter, we have seen how the psychoanalyst who might support the psychoanalytic discourse loses his content, how he loses face. By wanting to make the difference and to grasp psychoanalytic discourse in its purity, it is no longer simply the psychoanalyst who loses face, it is psychoanalysis itself which is effaced.
THE NOVELTY OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE

The effacing of every said to find saying is not saying itself; it is indeed still a said. The pure said, the pure said of the cut proper to psychoanalytic discourse or again the effacing of the psychoanalytic discourse is not just any said whatsoever: it cuts off every attachment. It is only a line without any attachment, since it is at the source of detachment. An imaginary line to be sure because it is always a said, but without any imaginary point. Pure subversion of the subject.

The psychoanalytic discourse allows us to express the detachment by what remains: imaginary islets, saids, narratives, multiple understandings. From the point of view of the pure cut-stitch, these islets are only residual points. Points outside cutting, points outside the line which give the content of the psychoanalytic discourse by being radically other than the cut of the same discourse.

Henceforth, what can the psychoanalytic discourse have really changed in the magisterial discourse whose truth is held by the philosopher? For are not these remainders, these points precisely the very content of the discourse of the philosopher? And the line of losing face, the line of effacing is a very thin discourse.

Lacan’s purpose was indeed to contribute to the psychoanalytic discourse, to make it emerge from the mass of other discourses. By purifying it, we understand rather that the ‘psychoanalytic discourse’ no longer has consistency, unless we lend to it the consistency of the remainder, namely, of what still and always remains part of the domain of the said. It only has the consistency of what it is not. Either nothing at all, or the imaginary consistency of which the master discourse gives the framework.

What Lacan has contributed is topology, namely the cut, the pure effacing. And with respect to this effacing, what remains is only waste product.

On one side the pure line of cut, on the other the points that remain outside cutting. The line without points and the points outside the line.

A single one of these points will be enough if we do not wish them to be recomposed in a new clothing of philosophical appearance. It is the object o, the
small other if one really wants to reserve the big Other for the radical cut, which only ex-sists by functioning without any substantial existence.

There only remains to us, with the operation of the cut, the imaginary points of saids, of narratives, of multiple understandings which act as our object o, our o-object. It is the quite imaginary content of our discourse. There is nothing to make such a fuss about, if one wants indeed to recognise in it that the content in question is the very content of philosophical discourse, ever since the four elements of the pre-Socratic physicists. One could amuse oneself by mapping out the trace of them at every stage of philosophy.

But what counts for the psychoanalytic discourse, are not the objects, not even the o objects, it is what is ‘doable’. When it is radical, when it effaces the author of the discourse itself, the cut produces quite simply what remains, in other words the singular object o.

‘Let it be known that it was doable by a pure literal algebra, by having recourse to the vectors with which this topology is ordinarily developed from one end to the other.’ (AE, p.472). It is a question of vectors, namely of directed movement with a point of application. It’s doable. It is not a pure abstract formalism. Nor is it the case that this has already been done concretely. It is the possibility of doing it.

We can only start from the conditions of possibility of doing it without it having already been done. It is what Kant called the transcendental, and it begins with the transcendental aesthetic, the space of receptivity as it can be activated. It is to start from what is doable. With the matheme. ‘It’s that/it’s not that’. Is it that? Is it not that?

‘Is not topology this no space (n’espace) into which mathematical discourse leads us, and which necessitates a revision of Kant’s aesthetic? No other content to give it than this language of pure matheme, I mean by that what alone is able to be taught: this without having recourse to any experiment....’ (AE, p.472).

Mathematical discourse can save psychoanalytic discourse from its confusion with philosophical discourse. Not by furnishing it with the technical tool or the mathematical language which has already served to formalise physical experiments. Still less in hoping to apply mathematical language to external (or
objective) clinical experience as ultimate reference. As such, the objective reference is disqualified from the start, for it is always presented in an already established discourse, discourse of the master, of the hyster or the academic, and the recourse to this clinic only ratifies such and such a discourse, no matter what the status of the object or the material of the established discourse, an empirical phenomenon or a mathematical object. Each time, the object is presented as ‘object’, namely as external. The matheme of that ‘it’s that/it’s not that’ precisely puts again in question this external reference (it does not matter whether it is mathematical, clinical, cultural, etc.). One can only refer oneself to the pure matheme.

With the question of the matheme, is psychoanalytic discourse not henceforth condemned to be the mathematical discourse of the other discourses? One can find in mathematics a lot to think about, as Lavendhomme would say in Lieux du sujet. Recreation of psychoanalysis by mathematics. Lacan admits that the psychoanalytic discourse can be ‘enriched’ by the new fields of mathematics. But it is in no way a matter of transport, of metaphor, indeed of ‘transference’ of one field to another, of the mathematical discourse into psychoanalytic discourse.

It is a matter of firmly maintaining oneself in the order of the psychoanalytic discourse, namely of following the singular experience of transference encountered in speech itself, not in its content, not in the said, but in the very structure of the said and of what it implies about saying. Any said whatsoever is a cut, namely separates what is that from what is not that. And any said whatsoever has a subject-effect. And any cut whatsoever is a said, including the pure cut that we have just spoken about.

What is the reason for us referring to this pure matheme ‘it’s that/it’s not that’?

One must first have an idea of it, namely know that it is doable, which is only learned from experience, not the multiple experiences had at the expense of clinical cases, but the singular experience that I can have and have again, now and any time in the future. I do not need the clinical cases of others; what I am always tripping over, my own case, amply suffices. Thus, to begin with, I can experience the fact that the said is always half-said, in other words that it is always ‘it’s that’ and ‘it’s not that’. Which leaves room not for another half-said which would
come to complete it, but for the enigmatic ‘saying’ opened up by the experience in question.

Saying is nothing but a pure idea; in other words, it is at first intangible, outside clinical material. Saying is nothing but ex-sistence to the said (the incest of the said and the saying reduces it to an insistence of the said turning round and round on itself).

Now this pure idea of saying is only mobilised on the occasion of the cut of any said whatsoever provided that it comprehends itself, engages itself, completes itself, that it is a closed cut. The closed cut is always a said which conceptualises. The functioning of the closed cut is to encircle a universal which clearly appears at first as a ‘being’.

‘The trouble is that being does not have of itself any kind of sense’ (AE, p.472, the italics are in Lacan’s text).

We have seen that the said is always in sense (the sense-ab-sex). And Being always makes sense, the being of an apple or a paper, the being of God or of the angels, the being of Dasein or of the philosopher, always the being of the particular being (étant). But it never has this sense except with reference to something other than itself (‘apple’, ‘paper’, ‘philosopher’...). Full of sense by the multiplicity of particular beings. But it has no sense of itself. And it is only by supporting itself on another that it can take on sense. Being gets its sense by referring itself to another discourse which apple, philosopher, paper, God, angel brings it. And there where being wants to be its own master (m’être) as in a certain philosophical discourse (the first philosophy), it can only redouble itself to infinity in the mirror.

It is indeed a matter of posing the question of a discourse which refers only to itself.

Psychoanalytic discourse, mathematical discourse, religious discourse have this in common that they do not refer to another discourse to be constituted. (cf. the first session of the seminar Les non-dupes errent. And we have seen that the philosophical discourse of first philosophy (radicalised in a Fichte, for example), could indeed claim the same property.
The novelty of the psychoanalytic discourse is supposed to be its self-reference. But the place is already taken. In self-reference, it is already preceded by mathematics, religion, first philosophy, etc. And if it ought to be sustained by itself, it cannot be supported on the reference to another discourse, even if it is self-referential.

Nevertheless it must ‘connect’ itself to it, but by a bond which is not one of filiation or of affiliation. This novelty claimed for psychoanalytic discourse cannot be in a new matter that is not in it, but in the work of the idea, the idea of the matheme ‘it’s that/it’s not that’. It does not matter if it was already there in its own way in the millennia of the history of mathematics, of religion and of first philosophy. The new, is the new of today, even if the said is not new.

**SAYING PRIVILEGED IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE**

Certain saids separate two parts: what is A and what is not A. Yes or no. It’s true or it’s false. The logic of the excluded third is inscribed in this separation by the said. ‘It’s my mother’ or ‘it is not my mother’. It’s that or it’s not that. No need to make saying intervene here.

But there are saids, statements which do not separate two parts, but rather unify them (which does not prevent them encircling being...in their specific way). One would say ‘it’s my mother’ and ‘it’s not my mother’. This said does indeed make a cut, but the cut here does not separate the two parts. ‘It’s that’ and ‘it’s not that’. There is indeed a solution of continuity between ‘it’s my mother’ and ‘it’s not my mother’. This nevertheless only makes a single fragment and, in that way a certain ‘being’ is well encircled.

Our matheme ‘it’s my mother’ and ‘it’s not my mother’ can teach us something which is fundamentally new, namely how one can go from ‘my mother’ to ‘not my mother’. There is no substitution of one feature by another, but a radical change at the level of the same trait, of the same person, namely ‘my mother’. This cut, which completely conserves the unity of the fragment, has an effect of ‘topological subversion’ (AE, p.473). The space of reception and of sensibility is modified since it is orientated no longer by a logic of the excluded third, but by the drift of language.
It is in this modification that we can find what is involved in the psychoanalytic discourse. And this presupposes the relationship of saying to said. Here, one must pay careful attention: there are two ways of specifying saying.

Firstly, saying can appear in the modality inherent to the statement. By journeying in the associations between ‘it’s that’ or ‘it’s not that’ on the one hand and ‘it’s that’ and ‘it’s not that’ on the other, the analyst and the analysed can experience certain effects. These different subjective effects, as much on the side of the analyst as on the side of the analysed, colour the said with different quite perceptible modalities in the demand and the offer (the erratic of transference). ‘It’s that, but I wish it were not that’ or inversely ‘it’s not that, but I wish it were that’. I demand it, I wish it. This is sensible in common conversation. The logical status of the saying of demand is modal, it adds to the said the modal taking into consideration of the reflection of the interlocutors on what has been said. Far from being a pure idea, it is a saying that one can establish grammatically and easily make pass to a said (according to the rules of grammar). This subjective modal colouration is quite predisposed to realising the incest of the saying and the said. ‘What a tone to speak to me in!’, what anger in what you said!’ indeed ‘what vital force in your stating!’ or again ‘I felt that you were angry’, or ‘that you love me’, etc.

One recognises here the caricature of certain domestic scenes or of certain interventions in a treatment. They must not be taken as ‘interpretations’.

A quite different saying ought to be privileged in psychoanalytic discourse.

The saying must be specified as an interpretation otherwise than as a modal saying.

Classical Aristotelian doctrine already presents interpretation as opposed to modal: alongside statements which express a wish, a prayer, a demand, etc., alongside these modal statements, there must be distinguished statements which can said to be true or false; these (true or false statements) are called ‘apophantic’. The examination of modal statements is, says Aristotle, the work of rhetoric or of poetics. The examination of true or false propositions is the work of interpretation. On what side must one put the psychoanalytic discourse? On the side of poetics or on the side of interpretation in the current (Aristotelian) sense.
of the term? The saying privileged in psychoanalytic discourse is not on the side of demand (rhetoric and poetics according to Aristotle). It is not a set of demands articulated, eventually reciprocally, between the analyser and the analyst. It does not have as goal to satisfy or to satiate such requests. It is not a matter either of decorticating the demands. It is a matter rather of ‘analysing’ them, namely of dissolving them. Saids in general and the saids at stake in psychoanalysis are moreover not all modal saids, are not all demands. This indeed is what is at stake in free association: to produce saids which are, insofar as it can be done, disengaged from the modalities of demand and of offer, more precisely produce saids whose modal character is put to one side, any saids whatsoever which are not directly the expression of a demand or of a ‘desire’.

By specifying the saying of analysis by the setting to one side of demand and of ‘desire’ insofar as it would summarise demands, are we not purely and simply returning to the other pole, to the sphere of saids and of statements, to the domain of truth? Are we not returning simply to ‘saying what there is’, namely furnishing a faithful copy of reality? This is effectively the sense of interpretation proposed by Aristotle’s logic, which distinguishes assertoric propositions (true or false) from modal saids like prayer and demand.

The psychoanalytic discourse is specified by a third saying, which is neither the production of a said truth, nor the modal production of demand. This saying implies a whole new sense of interpretation. It still does not exist except as an idea.

To be sure, demand envelops the totality of saids by the modal. Everything thus appears as modal. It is a matter of highlighting that the modal is only an appearance. Everything is not modal. Everything is not dependent on the omnipresent subjective colouration in demand. To be sure, the signifier is always already in play and to be sure the ‘subject’ is an effect of the signifier.

But precisely, it is not its cause. And with the modal, we only have the subjective colouration which has nothing primordial about it.

Properly psychoanalytic interpretation is brought to bear not on the demand, not on the desire which constitutes the warp and woof of demands, not on the subject and its modalities, but on the cause of desire.
The cause of desire remains indeed unsayable, enigmatic, impossible to put into the said and the understood. It is inasmuch as it can never be encircled by experience that we can call it ‘a pure idea’.

In order to function, the idea, the unpronounceable God, the cause of desire must nevertheless to be made tangible, must be incarnated. This incarnation borrows its content from the discourse of the philosopher or to what is akin to it.

Starting from the same content, how can the philosophical discourse and the psychoanalytic discourse be differentiated?

How can one take this content in order to see in it the saying in question? To do this, one must understand the cause of desire as the cause which goes amiss (cloche), as the cause which does not allow itself to be caught either as a truth or as a modality. Since it does not allow itself to be conceptualised in the four classical causes (the material and final on the side of truth, the formal and the efficient on the side of modalities), it only appears as random (tuché). The cause of desire is not reducible to any said. From this point of view of the said (and of the dit-mensions), it should be strictly nothing, namely pure idea. How render it tangible if not by a said? The o-object, in its singularity, is ‘said to be’ o. As a said, it is perfectly doable, pronounceable.

The cause of desire can only function in the processes of a said referred back to what would not be a said, to what would only be a dit-mension, of a said as compared to a ‘saying’ altogether heterogeneous to the said and to dit-mensions. It is therefore neither imaginary, nor symbolic, nor real.

Henceforth the o-object will be fundamentally equivocal, not equivocal as a said which might refer to two different things, but equivocal between a nothing of the said (which would be the saying) and an all to be said (which would be the condition of possibility of each said).

With this equivocal o-object, it is not astonishing that the saying should now be able to be imagined as being able to pass into the clarity of the said, since the o-object is the condition of possibility of every object and of every reality and that it is at the same time the question of saying and that of its impossibility.

The o-object is at the root of the incest of saying and said.
In this way, the saying of the psychoanalytic discourse can be inflated by every possible phantasy. But this inflation of saids only clothes, gives a content to what is nonetheless a radical absence of saids. This inflation of saids can serve as material to practice the impossibility inherent in every universality, the impossible of the universe. For it is only in exercising universality that we can hug the wall of the impossible! The impossibility is inherent to the said found in the universal saids; it is everywhere. It is in this impossibility alone that there is encountered the real of psychoanalytic discourse. ‘The universe is nowhere other than in the cause of desire, nor is the universal.’ (AE, p.474)

If the cause of desire is given as the content necessary to work on the impossibility and to make the saying return, with this same content, it also offers the material in order for there to be re-constituted the saids and understoods which forget the saying and its real.

The o-object thus presents on the same beach two antagonistic functions: to make the impossible work for the saying and to furnish the sufficient material for forgetting the saying behind the said in the understood. ‘It’s that’ and ‘it’s not that’ (in the two senses, moreover).

It is this same matheme – which is there even before it is exercised: ‘it’s that/it’s not that’ – which allows there to be given to each part of the body a new function (cf. the phallus). And to give it the value of a signifier or of a new said. By the exercise of the matheme, a particular part of the body can be stabilised in one of the three classically established discourses, hysterical discourse, magisterial discourse, academic discourse: the breast becomes the object of the unsatisfied desire of the hysteric, shit the object of the impossible desire of the master, the look the object of the unknown knowledge of the academic.

But how would this new function, this said, this o-object, operate in a discourse which is not established, in a labile discourse like the psychoanalytic discourse?

The o-object, the object described as o, relative to the psychoanalytic discourse, is cut off from any stabilisation; as voice, it flies away in the wind. Psychoanalysis has even shown it to us as cut, pure cut. Such a said is nothing other than the schizophrenic said and ‘it is specified by being caught without the help of any established discourse’. The saying privileged in psychoanalytic
Discourse leaves the absolutely schizophrenic said impossible to stabilise. The S1 cannot be stabilised in a knowledge S2. This schizophrenic said is thus the very consequence of the saying privileged in psychoanalytic discourse.

In the psychoanalytic discourse, it is the very principle of every stabilisation which is put in question. The operating cause, the cause of desire, is the murder of the Father or the death of God from all eternity. Through the multiplicity of saids and of understoods, there is ceaselessly reborn the colossal construction of the signifier. A colossus with feet of clay, because what is supposed to ground it collapses and is radically effaced by the very mechanism of the cut. The interpretation of dreams finds its paradigm in the interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar’s dream by Daniel. It is not a matter of explaining the construction of an anecdotal symbolic edifice, but indeed of producing the dream of the colossus with feet of clay who, in his said, already makes there appear the collapse of the said to the advantage of the only cut making the whole edifying edifice labile.

By this *labile* practice which saying and the practice of the idea of saying necessitates, the psychoanalytic discourse is differentiated not alone from the three classical discourses (hysterical, magisterial, and academic), but also from the three self-referencing discourses (mathematical, religious and philosophical).

In its lability, is it not condemned purely and simply to disappear?

If the organs from which bodies are separated to become signifiers remain schizophrenic saids, if the signifiers remain without the help of an established discourse, if the signifier only ever produces an ephemeral subject clearly distanced from the person, should one not conclude that the labile discourse par excellence can not constitute any social bond?

For want of establishing a consistent social bond, does not the impossibility of stabilising the said or again the lability of statements imply that what is called the psychoanalytic discourse is not a discourse at all?
The sense of the psychoanalytic discourse

THE COMFORT AND IMPOSSIBILITY
OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC GROUP

Each discourse brings into play a social bond without which it would not be a discourse.

What social bond for the psychoanalytic discourse?

It would be quite natural to define this social bond as a group, namely as a set of persons united around an object, an event or a project that brings them together. The social bond proper to psychoanalysis would define the place that the persons take up with respect to psychoanalysis and the question of the unconscious. The psychoanalytic discourse would thus regroup all the arrangements (arrangements for the treatment, for supervision, arrangements for theory and practice, intra and inter associative arrangements, etc.) which would give to each one his place in this group project.

A noble hope founded on the arrangement of the well established discourses. But for the psychoanalytic discourse, nothing of the sort. Because psychoanalysis and the question of the unconscious give no place for persons as such. Much more rather they are there to make them lose face, to efface them, and there only remain essentially schizophrenic saids (S1 separated from S2) which do not have the help of any pre-established arrangement.

Naturally, people form groups. But the regrouping is done very precisely in the measure that the psychoanalytic discourse is forgotten.

The task of founding the social bond of the psychoanalytic discourse as a group therefore appears hopeless: it is impossible for the personages interested by psychoanalysis to form a group; it is impossible for them to find themselves stabilised in a discourse that would give them a well established social place.
reason for this is not in the individualism imputed to ‘psychoanalysts’, but in the irreducible difference between the subject of the unconscious and the person.

One can attempt to mobilise ‘symbolically’ the imaginary which regroups ‘psychoanalysts’ and imagine all the mechanisms of possible permutations for the persons which form part of it. A circulation, a roundabout of places in each arrangement. The always possible permutations underline again the possible equivalence of similar people (semblables). They are the very symptom of the discontent of the supposedly psychoanalytic group which confuses the subject of the unconscious with the persons always ready to be regrouped. It may be useful here to detail the multiple attempts in the psychoanalytic movement of today and yesterday.

But should we not revise the notion of group?

To group, is to assemble, to put similar people together. Including the group in the mathematical sense of the term as a set of similar elements furnished with a law of internal, associative, composition admitting a neutral element and in which every element can be symmetrical. Thus the cartel could be modulated as a group: an associative composition of persons forming as it were a new moral person (the cartel), furnished with a ‘plus one’ as neutral element and with the symmetry between the formation and dissolution of the cartel. To make a group, one would have to deal with ‘persons’ as elements of the structure, with ‘members’. A member as an element forming part of a group and as similar to others is always caught up in an imaginary production; we must avoid confusing it with the ‘subject’.

In any case, men identify themselves to a group (cf. RSI, session of 15 April 1975), even if the group is not necessarily constructed on the model of the army or the Church. And despite the schizophrenic said and the cut proper to psychoanalytic discourse, the group seems indeed to reform necessarily.

‘The psychoanalytic discourse’ (this is Lacan clearing the way, cf. the Proposition of 1967) ‘is precisely the one that can establish a social bond cleansed of any group necessity’ (AE, p.474). It would perhaps be a matter of cleansing the social bond of quite a few of the group contingencies, horizontal or vertical group, pressure group or fighting group, ethnic group or blood group, but above all in no way to cleanse it of the necessity of the group as such. Now this necessity is
required starting from the impossibility of the sexual relationship. In other words, the psychoanalytic group must cleanse itself from the contingencies of a magisterial group, of an academic group, of a hysterical group, in order to make work all the better the impossibility of the sexual relationship and the subject-effect which determines any group formation.

The effect of a discourse is the subject, whatever the discourse may be. The psychoanalytic discourse, more than any other, has put the subject in question and to work, insofar as it is represented by the signifier, which does not allow itself to be ranked and rated with a group of ‘persons’. It is starting from the practice of the signifier that the subject can appear and be introduced into the dimension of the sex-ab-sense. But the comfort of the group reduces the subject to the imaginary obscenity of a person ‘member of the group’.

It is precisely the confusion of the subject as effect of a discourse and of the person as eventual member of a group which hides the radical impossibility of what ought to be the social bond at the level of the psychoanalytic discourse. Contradictory, such a ‘group’ gives place to the person by the saids and understoods of the group, as opposed to that which, as ‘psychoanalytic’, it pretends to efface to bring into play the saying and the question of the subject. Incomplete, such a group operates in the register of saids and understoods, whose truth is condemned to the half-said while at the same time forgetting the saying. Undemonstrable, such a group puts precisely in parenthesis the singular, even punctual practice of the matheme ‘it’s that’/’it’s not that’ which, alone, is valid as a demonstration in psychoanalysis; and it is this practice which invalidates the constituted group. Undecidable, the imaginary of such a group short-circuits in principle the moment in which the real decides.

The impossible of the psychoanalytic group nevertheless well and truly founds the real of the group. And not alone of the supposedly analytic group. The real of any group. The obscenity of the group lives on this real. The imaginary effects of the group are fed by this multiple impossibility. From the point of view of analysis, one protects itself from analysis itself by the group effects and the multiple possible roles for the analyst. By the group, one protects oneself from the effects of the psychoanalytic discourse.
But the real of the group is not simply the failure of the group, it is perhaps also the always new, always ephemeral encounter which leaves room for the subject-effect.

But then what can be the position of the person who, despite everything, attempts to situate himself with respect to the psychoanalytic discourse? Might it be the analyst?

THE REJECTED PSYCHOANALYST

The position of the analyst is defined as impossible. There is no role that holds up for ‘the analyst’. This indeed is why we cannot speak about the discourse of the analyst, but indeed about the psychoanalytic discourse.

If the psychoanalytic discourse is effacement, the aforesaid ‘analyst’, who seeks a consistency, can only lodge himself in the waste product of effacement, in the content that remains. Wanting to situate himself, all he can do is to precipitate himself to the place of semblance of the o-object. And there, he can be a member, but he is fundamentally dismembered from the discourse in question, while participating in the other discourses, in the hysterical, philosophical or academic discourse.

This place of waste product or of raw material can only provoke aversion as opposed to the positive place accorded to the person named in a classical group.

It is indeed the aversion of the o-object in the place of semblance which brings about, in a specific way, the insistent recourse to the classical group and its comfort. Equivocation subsists between a subject-effect which does not cease to inscribe the individual in a group and the regrouping of persons in classical groups. Michel de Wolf spoke in this connection of ‘solitarité’: Solitude in the desert of effacement of the psychoanalytic discourse can be sustained by the solidarity of your fellows experiencing the same désêtre and attempting to flee from it. But what is at stake? Is it solidarity or solitude?

Solidarity? But the psychoanalytic group is impossible.

Solitude? A social bond made up of solitude and not of group?
The solitude established could not be enough of course to create a social bond.

‘I have already lost quite a few people to it: with a light heart’. It is being ready to lose solidary companions which gives a light heart; it is to be ready to let go of the comfort of the classical group which situates us in the lability or effacement of the psychoanalytic discourse and in its renewal. A new saying, a re-saying.

It is the impossibility of the group which will precisely permit the decisive affirmation of the psychoanalytic discourse (and not of the discourse of the analyst).

The psychoanalytic discourse will overcome, Lacan announces (AE, p.475). Is this the warrior chant of an enthusiastic militia? Is it the obscene affirmation of the classical group relaying the announcement of ‘prodigious victories for psychoanalysis’? The equivocation leads us rather to express the why of this fundamental optimism concerning the psychoanalytic discourse. This optimism is not grounded on the sympathy of colleagues, of companions, of ‘socii’; this optimism is not social. It is founded much more rather on the impossible in the structure itself. For it is the impossible in all its forms that sustains the discourse from which there is created the new social bond.

We are linked to the impossible by means of the truth. The truth of each established discourse is always what is not said, what is not said in the discourse in question, what remains a dead letter at the level of this discourse. One can resurrect the dead letter. By standing back a little from the discourse in question, the truth can be said. One can then have the impression that the saying of the discourse in question can be said.

The truth presents itself then as the engagement of saying in the said, in incest. The truth of each discourse can be said, on the condition of incest, namely on condition of locating the saying of this discourse in the form of a said. Such a well said truth assures the discourse (and stabilises it).

The saying of the hysteric and of the scientist can be said and assured in the form of the said of the o-object, in the form of the content (namely what remains after the effacement), in the form of the dead remainder of the process, of the death assured as waste product of the process (the psychoanalyst is ready
to assure the truth of the o-object). The saying of the master can be said and assured in the form of risk, in the form of the assured death of the subject (the psychoanalyst is ready to assure the truth of the barred subject). The saying of the academic can be said and assured in the form of the signifier, in the form of the assured death which is the master (the psychoanalyst is ready to assure the truth of the signifier). And these assurances can find themselves stabilised in the classical groups, groups of masters and slaves, groups of hysterics and partners, groups of academics and students.

Every saying can be very well affirmed in its truth. And the ‘psychoanalyst’ can find in it some assurance himself.

These truths, these assurances of established discourses are contestable, since their assurance only holds up by the reduction of the saying to a said of truth.

Is not the noble assurance of the psychoanalytic discourse a fortiori contestable? Is its self-reference not suspect? And then above all how can the psychoanalytic discourse affirm its victory, when it is its own very essence to be effaced? When it only emerges at the very moment at which there die the associations which give pride of place to sense?

For Freud, ‘death is love’ (Æ, p.475). Love is blind. And still more when it emerges at the moment of the extinction of the very flow of associations, in transference. One can indeed say that it is there that the question of saying arises. But in that there is no assurance, since assurance, what is sure, should only be built on associations, on the says.

Love is never assured. And to want to assure it, to force it, is always already incest. The incest of the father or the mother who force their daughter or son to love them. More generally, incest is always there, when it is a matter of forcing (déforcer) the possible saying by forcing it to become a said: ‘Tell me that you love me, swear it to me’, etc. It is the short-circuit inside the same system, family, psychoanalytic discourse, love closed on itself which depends fundamentally on the short-circuit saying-said.

It is the assurance of the most radical hate in general. The hate of the recited narrative, of the learned anecdote, of the assigned meaning.
The psychoanalytic group ‘lives’ on this assured love which is automatically transformed into hate, it lives on the incest of saying and said. Face to face. The face of love which is reversed into the face of hate. At every locus of assured love...already assured hate. But is that really ‘living’?

One can only lose it in this assured love. It is hell. The hell of the imaginary and the obscenity of the classical group.

One imagines the effects of the assurance of the libidinal, namely of love, of loving transference and of the psychoanalytic group assured on these principles. Assured love only keeps silent about what is at stake. ‘Therefore already too much commentary can be imagery’ (AE, p.476) provoked by the psychoanalytic group.

Let us return to the saying. Is there a new social bond founded on saying itself?

THE GUIDING IDEA OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE

An analyser should understand that saying takes the place of the real, or again that saying is situated starting from the impossibility encountered in the search for meaning and in free associations. Saying is encountered starting from the sex-ab-sense. This encounter should be able to fully give itself. Which means negatively that it is not given by an external Other and positively that it is self-referential. It is a matheme. This is what is called structure. ‘Structure is the real that comes to light in language’ (AE, p.476).

Let us follow the birth of the real in language.

Let us begin with the apparition of language. The exercise of language is played out for the speaking being that man is in the ‘organ-relationship’. The imaginary body is separated from an ‘organ’ to allow it to have a new function. Whatever the organ may be, we will call it the phallus. The phallic function, necessary and transcendental condition of any re-launching and of any new sense, is the only reference of psychoanalytic discourse. With it, psychoanalytic discourse is essentially an affair of language. By this well-assured reference, the psychoanalytic discourse is still a stable system, a ‘stabitat’.
The exercise of language does much more than stabilise itself in self-reference. It encounters there the very impossibility of the re-launch as it has been described imaginarily. In other words, it is in as far as a labile inhabitant of language and of the phallic function tries to find the aforesaid impossible re-launch and encounter the real in it. ‘Structure is the real that comes to light in language.’

Is this thesis not a residue, a waste product of what is presented as the specific discourse of analysis? Is it not simply the ‘world view’ (conception du monde), proper to analysis?

Will the analyst thus find himself taken as a guardian or defender of a ‘world view’ proper to his domain and his ideology? Freud firmly refrained from introducing an analytic conception of the World, in order to limit himself to the scientific conception of the World. If we leave the classical scientific conception, will psychoanalysis not fall again into an ideological rearguard conception? Whether it is the religious conception, or once again the ‘psychoanalytic conception’ which would be expressed for example in the form of a thesis like ‘structure is the real that comes to light in language’?

Analysis necessarily produces some waste product. But what is it? The analyst (but should we not rather say the analyser) can only be saved from this place of guarding the psychoanalytic World view because it is he himself who is rejected from the discourse, he is the waste product, it is he who undergoes the experience of the impossible, it is he who undergoes the experience of the collapse of ideology. The analyst is impossible. There is no role for the analyst except that of losing it. The real. ‘The analyst’ is not the support of the psychoanalytic discourse; he is not the supporter of a so called psychoanalytic world view. He is the waste product, the semblance of the content rejected by the structure.

Nevertheless, ‘psychoanalysis is what one expects from a psychoanalyst’.

It only remains to be comprehended: psychoanalysis is not deduced from the psychoanalyst, but much more rather from his expectation (attente).

Everything is in the work of expectation and not in the role of psychoanalyst. For
to the expectation of the analyst, should respond not to its coming (‘the Divine child is born’, or ‘Zorro has arrived’), but the incongruity of any role.

One can only start from what is available; the psychoanalytic discourse can only start from what is already there in terms of symbolic functioning, the ideologies of our time, a set of world views, the products of multiple discourses. The thread of psychoanalytic discourse appears as the one which makes the different discourses, different ideologies hold together. The psychoanalytic discourse assures the roundabout of discourses.

Ought I to abandon this ideology of the roundabout, which acts as a conception of different discourses? Or ought I rather reject it in the name of impossibility of principle, and of a radical real?

But precisely, the impossibility of in principle does not exist in itself; it is drawn on the contrary from the content of any discourse whatsoever, it is demonstrated starting from any point whatsoever. If every free association is inscribed in one or other conception of the World, it is already prepared for the stoppage which will demonstrate the absence and the real of sex.

If ‘analysis is founded on the subject supposed to know’ (AE, p.477), it must find the matter of this knowledge where it can. The exercise of knowledge is already there in the different discourses. Analysis connects itself to this exercise of knowledge and the exercise of knowledge is enough for the subject-effect to appear. In that sense, the expression ‘subject supposed to know’ is tautological; the exercise of language implies it.

What analysis does ‘in addition’, is to suppose the putting in question of knowledge at the same time as of the subject, it is to carry the process by the idea which is explicitated as the unfolding of the matheme as far as the impossible. It is indeed the idea which gives to the process in question its whole place.

One supposes a subject, one supposes an object. ‘It’s that’. And then ‘it’s not that’. On one side and the other. The subject is that and it’s not that, which makes its division between a subject effect of the signifier and a mysterious, real, irreducible individual. The object is that and it’s not that, which makes it the o-object; the o-object is what gives the consistency in which every object, but also the nothing, disappears.

Science started from the fact of letting go of the natural supposition, the fiction of the real object, of the thing in itself, to give way to the literal supposition
of calculation alone. Which completely changes the conception of the real. The real is not the real of the object to which the said ought to be equivalent in order to be true; one remained there in the possibility of an entirely true said and not a half-said. The real is found by the impossible of saids. This impossible is encountered not in the positive half-said of the truth but in what escapes from this half-said, in what falls, in its collapse (chute), in the false, in the lie (the first lie of the hysteric), which indicates above all the collapse of every half-said and of every said.

To encounter the collapse of every said, to encounter the real, we must therefore start from the half-said which believes itself to be all, from every half-said, from the universe, from the universe of different discourses and their world view...in order to prove their defect. And in that way to introduce the subject.

‘I am at the place from which it is vociferated that “the universe is a defect in the purity of Non-Being”. And this not without reason, because by protecting itself, this place makes Being itself languish. It is called Enjoyment, and it is the defect of it that would render vain the universe’ (Ecrits, p.819).

I am charged with this place and this Enjoyment, joui-sens, to enjoy sense to the degree of making its ab-sense appear. The charge of protecting the empty place, namely of not supplying for the lack. Or again, I am charged with questioning this space. To protect this empty place and to question it, is to realise the locus, it is topology.

But to protect the empty place, I cannot fill it with sense whatever it may be. The matheme ‘it’s that’/’it’s not that’ constructs this ab-sense.

Might the matheme not find some support in mathematics? To find in it the real of mathematics, number, quite simply or again the figure which allows it to be written? The ciphering and deciphering of the dream might follow. We would therefore have access to the real by means of a figure, one, two, three, four, etc. Does not the reference to the dual of dialogue, to the Oedipal third, to the fourfoldness in the psychoanalytic discourse go in this direction?

Far from presenting itself as one, two, three, the real number is presented in mathematics as inaccessible (cf. the power of the continuum). And
enumeration, the numerable infinity only begins by the comparison of two, of two x’s, according to the criterion of the greater and smaller order for example.

Now the ‘comparison’ which allows us to count ‘two’ already implies the inaccessible, for the second is inaccessible through the simple first from which it is completely different, from which it is the difference in act. No way henceforth of basing oneself on the real of number to validly introduce the real, to give access to the real of which the psychoanalytic discourse has charge. Before the real of number there is the trait and the difference proper to the psychoanalytic discourse. S1 – S2.

It is indeed a matter of confirming the real of the psychoanalytic discourse starting from the psychoanalytic discourse. This discourse opens up the gap of each of the other discourses. The content of each one of the other discourses may prove to be impossible, open to another real. But the psychoanalytic discourse does not supply in any way for these discourses; it does not patch up the holed discourses.

Just the clear link which is supposed to stitch each discourse in the roundabout.

Just the thread of the impossible which makes the real ex-sist outside the content, outside the waste product, even if they are necessary.

The real of the psychoanalytic discourse has no substance. The psychoanalytic discourse is not a theory of beings, of substances or of some fixed point (including the phallus in the fixity of its schema of re-launching). It simply accounts for the fact that certain saids, insofar as they are welcomed by this discourse, modify the structure.

Can one give general characteristics, standards for these modifications of structure? Can one foresee the structures of modification in the psychoanalytic discourse?

These supposed standards are imagined to be able to concern what ‘the analyst’ should be, in his formation and in his specific roles. By their fixed programme, they contradict precisely the psychoanalytic discourse.

But could one not propose standards not for ‘the analyst’, but for the psychoanalytic discourse itself? Thus, we have separated out the ab-sense, the matheme ‘it’s that’/’it’s not that’, the modifications of structure, saying etc.
These standards would thus propose the method for analysis itself (and not for the analyst).

Such standards of analysis, of the psychoanalytic discourse would allow us in any case to judge an analysis: ‘It’s analysis’ or ‘it’s not analysis’. They lead us to say what the wisdom of analysis might be. And to conclude for the analyst who has properly followed a good analysis and who has well learned his matheme, in one way or another: ‘Off you go. Now you are a good child’ (*Ecrits*, p.619). He could then begin a good psychoanalytic practice, as ‘analyst’.

The standards thus proposed contradict precisely again the true ‘wisdom’ of the psychoanalytic discourse which has no programme. Not even and especially not on the side of the unconscious. Since it is outside time, the unconscious is never programmed.

All the standards proposed – including the topology of saying – are therefore radically differentiated from the unconscious. This differentiation is moreover rather banal; it can be denounced in each discourse; each discourse presents a certain product that must be differentiated from the responsibility of producing it. Each discourse can thus veer towards saying what is there and, by what it produces, it can recuperate the responsibility of the discourse in the being of a said. ‘To say what is there’ or the incest of saying and said. Thus, for psychoanalysis, it could say ‘psychic reality’.

Freud carefully avoids this in the last pages of the *Traumdeutung*. And not in the expectation of a new founder of psychoanalysis (even if it were Lacan) who could say the psychic reality (not even as a fourth knot). Psychic reality is only a knot invented by Freud as an expedient to deal with the question: ‘What matter are we dealing with in psychoanalysis? With phantasies or with traumatic realities?’

Psychoanalysis can perfectly explicate this wavering. On the one hand, ‘to say what is there’ seems indeed to be able to touch reality itself. On the other hand, ‘to say what is there’ seems indeed to be situated in the phantasy which is substituted for the impossible task of supporting the unconscious. To fix the saying in a said depends quite simply on the phantasy. Starting from there (from the phantasy), one can still return to the first part (to reality), since this phantastical reduction to the said is always incest, namely a traumatic reality.
The phantasy of standards for the psychoanalytic discourse, the phantasy of standards for analysts (it doesn’t matter the form it takes), the phantasy is substituted for the task of supporting the burden of the unconscious and of transference. It covers over, it clothes, not simply a contingent traumatic reality, but the real of the unconscious that one most often prefers to avoid.

Why? In order to distance from ourselves what awaits us. Namely that our voice of silence, that our voice of ab-sense should have an effect. And we wash our hands too easily to distance the transference and ‘the surprising access that it offers to love’ (AE, p.478).

The thread of the psychoanalytic discourse does not leave any indication to construct some standard, to find a stabilised social bond.

Perhaps a social bond with the other discourses? Namely by means of another discourse?

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE
WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER DISCOURSES

There is no discourse without a subject being caught up in it. There is no discourse without a subject being involved in it. And this involvement is always sexual according to Freud. But how specify this ‘sexual’? Must we mobilise the technical arsenal of genitality and its slang? Or the ritual diversity of pre-genitality and its sweet nothings?

It is easy to produce sexual metaphors about anything and everything, and this in each of the established discourses. It would be better to show the structural value of the ‘sexual’ which underlies every interest and every discourse. It would be a matter of grasping how the sex-ab-sense operates in the very structure of the discourses in general.

Perception is always selective. There is no perception without a choice. No perception without the setting aside of a certain other possible field, no perception without negative hallucination.

In the same way, no established discourse without the choice of a particular discourse to the exclusion of others. No established discourse without it having to deprive itself of being another established discourse. The hysterical
discourse is only hysterical by dispensing with being the master discourse which
precisely it puts in question.
   It is starting from this exclusion of other discourses that the
psychoanalytic discourse necessarily intervenes.
   In its essence and in its consistency, the discourse is fundamentally
purified, to the point of being effaced. It does without everything, including itself.
   Even though it does without, it nevertheless is exercised everywhere. It
exercises its effects on the other discourses by its very matheme, ‘it’s that’/‘it’s not that’.
   The other discourses only ex-sist by the ‘it’s not that’ which distinguishes
them from the neighbouring discourse: the hysteric demonstrates to the master
that it’s not that, the master demonstrates to the academic that it’s not that, the
academic reverses the discourse of the hysteric. Each one breaks the sense of the
neighbouring discourse. Ab-sense, rupture which is called sex.
   The psychoanalytic discourse intervenes in each discourse by taking into
consideration sex-ab-sense.
   The real which accounts for each of the established discourses at the
same time as all reality, is the matheme of the absence proper to sex. And each
of the established discourses responds in its own way to sex, to rupture, to the
absence of the sexual relationship.
   All the Lacanian mathemes only conjugate the matheme of the absence of
the sexual relationship (‘it’s that’/‘it’s not that’). Each of the established
discourses participate in this conjugation of the matheme. And each of the four
formulae of sexuation is only a presentation of a moment of explicating the
fundamental matheme of psychoanalysis.
   Do not the diverse mathemes, discourses, formulae of sexuation have the
value of standards, whose unifying matheme would be the absence of the sexual
relationship? In short, pure phantasies, fictions?
   Their function is precisely not to imagine fictions reconstructing a World
or to produce myths like that of the Oedipus complex of that of the father of the
primitive horde. It is a matter on the contrary of deconstructing and of
encountering the impossible. The real is taught on condition of encountering it by
the impossible. To do this, one must find a suitable terrain, a terrain sufficiently
fixed to situate the impossible in it. The different mathemes have precisely this
function of giving a locus of a fixed rendezvous in order to encounter there the impossible and the real. The psychoanalytic ‘fictions’ should always function as fixions to approach the real; the mathemes thus fundamentally separate themselves out from any phantasy even if they inevitably fall back into it. The fixions serve precisely to carry the responsibility of the unconscious in its process turning around the impossible.

The matheme of psychoanalytic discourse illuminates all the other discourses by this putting in question of fictions and phantasies.

But must the analytic discourse be isolated from the others? Is the nothing of the radical real which occupies the psychoanalytic discourse heterogeneous to ‘all’ the fictions and phantasies proper to the other discourses?

By radically isolating the analytic discourse from the other discourses, one might therefore say: ‘Everything that is presented as an all is nothing’. A critique which radically disqualifies all universality, every statement and finally every truth. The truth, since it is constructed by means of universals, would be nothing.

Or again would the psychoanalytic discourse operate without any object of verification. A pure real separated out from all the fictions of a fantasised being. A pure real separated out from all the Oedipal and other phantasies?

A despairing attempt to separate out a pure real freed from all being and from all phantasy. Because nothing gets to the bottom of these beings, of these phantasies. And it is better moreover that there should be a lot of them, not in order to accumulate them, but so that they would sustain themselves in several layers as the content for the matheme of ‘it’s that’/‘it’s not that’. The o-object is constructed in several layers: the oral plate that can be counted, the anal layer that can be emptied, the scopic surface that can be relational, the vocal area that can be modulated.

But in that way do we not fall back into the ruts of a well established discourse (magisterial, hysterical, academic) including the modulation of the psychoanalytic discourse? One can note that this way of presenting the o-object takes up again the four Kantian categories (quantity, quality, relation, modality). And here we are reconnected with the discourse of the philosopher and its half-said.
Effectively, it’s true. And it is only half-said. For these Lacanian formulae taken up from philosophy or from another discourse are presented in order to make shine forth, to be a success not of sense, but of non-sense. By this practice of non-sense, the discourse of the philosopher is taken up again into the matheme which transforms it.

These first truths, found in metaphysics, are also the matter which creates the symptoms of hysteria and of obsession, of the hysterical and of the university discourse.

Far from leading us into ethereal conceptions, the consideration of the real is played out on the concrete soil of the great neuroses. And philosophy only expicates this soil before the psychoanalytic discourse can teach on it the real by the practice of the impossible.
The structure of the psychoanalytic discourse is interpretation.

BETWEEN MEANING AND ABSENCE
THE FLICKERING OF SENSE

The psychoanalytic discourse has no content, no consistency outside the established discourses. What is neither an hysterical discourse, a magisterial discourse nor an academic discourse is quite simply not a discourse. The discourse of science is inscribed in the hysterical discourse, the capitalist discourse is inscribed in the magisterial discourse, the psychological discourse is inscribed in the academic discourse, etc. Psychoanalytic discourse resists being preferentially inscribed in any one whatsoever of these three established discourses. And it nevertheless cannot ever escape from them on pain of losing all consistency.

How situate it?

We are always already engaged in the perspective of the universal proper to the concept. Whatever we say, because saying always involves the universal.

Rightly or wrongly, without rhyme or reason, the universal packs, condenses, synthesises. From the small condensation of a letter (of the W of the Wolfman), from a singular minimalist sentence up to the great condensation of a philosophical system like the Hegelian *Encyclopedia*, the same unique mechanism produces and synthesises meanings. It is Freudian condensation generalised (make no mistake).

But on what do these established and stabilised meanings repose? On a reality in itself prior to discourse? Current discourse, namely following on behind scientific discourse, imagines such a reality for itself, a thing in itself already there before any discourse. In the same way, ‘the analyst’ can imagine an element of ‘structure’ already there in his patients, a supposedly ineluctable fact, a reality
waiting for a discursive ‘interpretation’. This imagination of an unshakable rock, this ‘transcendental realism’, only acts as discourse where the subject as signifier-effect is effaced behind the ‘scientist’ or ‘the analyst’ who claims to be able to say what is there. The subject finds himself not simply put in question again in it, but much more rather radically foreclosed in the name of an ‘objectivity’ which is never anything but the one imagined by the so-called ‘scientist’ or so-called ‘analyst’.

The effects of this discourse are avowed. And there is no need to want to reverse and ‘go beyond’ this discourse in the name of another supposedly better discourse. We know a certain history of philosophy as a succession of the overtaking of one philosophical system by another, indeed as culminating in an absolute knowledge. We also know a certain history of psychoanalysis going beyond philosophy or theories of our neighbours, etc.

The cobbler should stick to his last. It is better to remain in one’s own shoes and to allow each discourse proceed in its own fashion.

Must we therefore admit that each one is in his own system of meanings? Period. As one attributes, a little too easily, to the delusion of the psychotic.

Not everything can be reduced to condensation. Not everything can be synthesised in a system of meaning.

One can collect meanings, archive them, just like a historian who collects documents, treatises, the narrative of events, notarised acts, etc. These are the condensations produced by the actors of history. It remains for the historian to read a sense into all these facts, a guiding thread that is always more or less ideological. How can one go from one significant fact to another, from one meaning to another? The question can of course end up as a generalising condensation, on a super-meaning which would transcend all the documents (like ‘historical materialism’). Is it the goal of historian to give the meaning of meanings? Does he not rather seek a guiding thread irreducible to any meaning whatsoever?

The philosopher also collects a certain number of meanings and he questions them by trying to give them a new sense. This sense cannot be reduced to a general meaning synthesising the totality. The transcendental dialectic of the Critique of pure reason already showed the illusion of a general synthesis. There
is no general formula of Being, of the human, of knowledge or of morality. There
remains the question of sense, of an endless finality.

The ‘psychoanalyst’ for his part also collects the documents of meaning in
the saids of the analyser. Should he seek a super-meaning which would take up
and explain all the documents of the history of the patient? Should he re-inflate
the ‘historiette’, in the style of ‘dialectical materialism’ which would re-inflate the
whole of the history of humanity by lending it a transcendent economic meaning
for example? This general meaning is only an illusion. But what is the sense of it?

Meanings – including the project of finding a super-condensed super-
meaning – are exactly of the order of fiction or of myth. They fix a response to
plug the question and the sense which everywhere flees. In themselves they have
strictly no sense, no drift, no drive. They present themselves in the form of a
consistent ‘it’s that’. As such, meaning chokes off the putting in question
contributed by ‘it’s not that’.

How find or rediscover the sense?

Precisely starting from the moment when the meaning loosens or may
loosen. It is this loosening of meaning that the practice of free association
proposes. Sense is produced at the moment when meaning fails. At the following
stage, it is at the moment when sense in its turn has failed that there will be
produced ab-sense and transference (this will be sex). Sense properly speaking
only arises when the saids no longer have a meaning.

‘Sense is never produced except by the translation of one discourse into
another’ (AE, p.480). Translation implies betrayal, the passage from an ‘it’s that’
to an ‘it’s not that’. And it is not a matter here of a minimal approximation,
relative to the precision of one or other tongue. It is much rather a question of
upsetting meaning and this upsetting is already sense.

The philosopher, the historian, the psychoanalyst collect meanings. They
can always condense them into a super-meaning; this condensation always
implies a transcendent principle (God, dialectical materialism, one or other
psychoanalytic theory). But it would be a matter rather of betraying God,
dialectic materialism or psychoanalytic theory. No transcendence, not even that
of Freud or Lacan. The thing to do is to bypass this transcendence, to make it
divert in order to find its sense. It is only starting from this diversion of sense that there can subsequently be presented ab-sense, sex, transference.

We have thus in psychoanalysis a double embarrassment: firstly, the embarrassment of having to give a sense to what is only given to us as meanings, and secondly, the embarrassment of having to abandon this sense for what presents itself as absence, as sex, as transference. Each time, ‘it’s that’ then ‘it’s not that’. Each time, the impossibility of the real is illuminated by the matheme of psychoanalysis.

Can one count this real? A first breakdown of meaning, followed by a second breakdown of sense? Or again can one count the different impossibilities? The counting of number clearly risks leading us to a new generalisation, to the cut as meaning, to a synthesised cut from which one could make a deduction. The matheme of psychoanalysis never consists in producing a generalisation, a condensation or a synthesis.

Ought we to say then that it is a matter of a sense which escapes, in which everything is lost? Or is there in sense a recasting which takes place, a ‘topological recasting’? In this second branch of the alternative, one is not satisfied to advance from an ‘it’s that’/‘it’s not that’ to another ‘it’s that’/‘it’s not that’. On the contrary, the matheme of psychoanalysis retroacts, namely changes the value of the ‘it’s that’. But how? Is this to say that the sense changes the value of the meaning and proposes a new meaning? Sense would then be identically the correction of meanings ... and always in function or in view of a more or less distant transcendence. Thus ortho-pedagogical psychoanalysis would adapt the subject to society, to the ideal of society or to one or other theorisation of psychoanalysis.

To get out of this sense as a correction of behaviours, of phantasies, of symptoms, of dreams, of slips, etc., one must introduce the third term namely the failure of sense, sex-ab-sense. And it is only by means of the ab-sense, by means of sex, that the retroaction of sense on meaning can take place. Meaning is found quite differently here: it arises from sex, from absence, and leads to the question of sense. It implies the movement of re-launching which preceded it, it has become phallic meaning.
Sense can only retroact on meaning through the stoppage of sense, of ab-sense; it necessarily goes by way of a nonsense. This nonsense consists in hugging the wall of different forms of impossible. The sense situated by the psychoanalytic discourse between meaning and nonsense is very different to the sense found by the matheme of Plato’s Meno. It is not simply a matter of questioning what makes the teachable in the World. It is a matter on the contrary of making it appear that the sense of the World and of the universe leads to the collapse of the process of teaching itself, to ab-sense, to sex and to transference. Is this a progress? It is first of all a loss, the loss of meaning inherent in a true opinion, including the loss of all the standards produced by all the right-thinkers of psychoanalysis in its framework.

If, in the psychoanalytic discourse, true opinion is destined to lose all meaning, it nevertheless has the function of making sense and nonsense emerge. This indeed is why psychoanalytic discourse carries, indeed supports true opinion. True opinion can be the opinion of the right-thinking psychoanalyst, but also all the propositions of ‘common sense’ to direct one’s life, to resolve one’s problems, the psychotherapies, coaching etc. To carry true opinion, to make use of it is something quite different to the current opposition of psychoanalysis to all the opinions exaggerated by one or other psychological technique. On the contrary, psychoanalytic discourse can and ought to make use of these true opinions and of any true opinion whatsoever, not as something which comes to it from the outside and that it should either assimilate and approve or combat and demolish. It is a matter rather of it seeing them coming from itself, that it produces them of itself, that it forms and transforms them into a matheme.

Psychoanalytic discourse cannot provoke change, become other, unless it starts from itself (du même), from the most current self, which is presented as true opinion. The displacement of saying with respect to said can only come by starting from the said and by emerging from the said, by ex-sisting the said. The renewal contributed by the psychoanalytic discourse can only come by sustaining what presents itself as true and therefore always of the order of the half-said. This half-said, is a little piece of anything whatsoever, a sentence, a piece of imaginary content, any theory whatsoever.

One will fix oneself to this half-said (point of fixation). Not in order to add to it other fixation points, not like the builder who wants to support bricks on top
of one another to stabilise the construction. It is not a matter of adding point by point to establish an interpretation in the form of thesis and to promulgate the synthesis which would explain everything, for example ‘that is why your daughter is mute’.

It is a matter of mobilising speech in itself, the little differance whatever it may be. That is the reason why ‘this fixon must be chosen as the unique out of line point’ (AE, p.482). If true opinion is represented at one or other moment by one or other technique (for example by a behaviourist education), it is not a matter of adding to it the corrective of other true opinions that are supposed to complete it. It is a matter rather of making use of it as a unique point in order to mobilise it starting from itself. It is a matter in effect of fixing oneself on this support of the unique point, as unique meaning, to provoke sense, to provoke movement, to provoke change. Then sex-ab-sense will come.

To make the matheme function, one must start from a single ‘it’s that’. Otherwise the multitude of the ‘it’s that’’s arrange themselves in a generalising approximation. The function of this unique point is to be in relationship with the white thread, with the line of changing without point, with the line that modifies the structure, with the line that deconstructs.

It is a deconstruction which ought to keep in reserve a content and respect it infinitely. By wanting to get rid completely of the content, by wanting to be purely pure, at a single slice, the cut disappears itself in order to leave only a ravaged meaning, an incoherent shred of synthesis.

It is only by redoubling itself on the content of meaning taken as a unique point, that the cut makes room for the equivocal halo which encircles the same univocal point. In other words, the unique true opinion is projected right into the middle of the movement of the double cut. By its equivocation, the said of the cut can take on sufficient content to be opposed to the content of the unique point, sense can take on a consistency which opposes it to the consistency of meaning.

True opinion (the point of meaning taken as unique) now finds a quite different value. It is no longer a matter of fitting in things and concepts in totalising diagrams. True opinion puts in question the very notion of a whole and only plays
its role as a unique point of fixion which serves the movement of saying, which always involves a moment of deconstruction. Among others.

The double cut, the equivocation, is nourished by the impossible (contradiction, incompleteness, undemonstrability, undecidability). That is how it encircles the real. True opinion can only play the role of the real on condition of being taken as unique. The accumulation of true opinions only produces what is called the always multiple reality.

Where find the opinion? What appears. What seems. And it will only be appropriate starting from what is precipitated, started from the unique point fleeing the multiplicity that is always ready for synthesis. It is precisely this precipitation which allows the work of structure. One must precipitate oneself onto a meaning in order to work the cut on it, the ‘it’s not that’.

As long as I remained at true opinions in their exponential multitude where the perspective of a final meaning is infinitely distant, the totally teachable remained a pure Utopia (cf. dogmatic and sceptical psychoanalysis). The movement of the matheme allows one to be taught by the transformation. But this movement is conditioned by the fixion of the unique true opinion. No way of exercising the matheme on two things at once.

From where does this doxa-point come, from where comes this true opinion? I don’t know. By wanting to know it, I would re-enter the multitude of true opinions which would be constructed in a system, which bars all access to the matheme.

This true opinion which serves the matheme, one could call Lacan’s Ω-object.

We see that the Ω-object is unique. It is not constructed by an assemblage of materials or perceived phenomena, it is much more a fixed point for a deconstruction.

It is encircled by the double turn of an equivocal line, it is encircled by the impossible.

The so-called different Ω-objects (oral, anal, scopic, vocal) are only different ways of presenting the same. These ways of presenting same point of fixation do not find their reason in the anatomy of a body, even if they are supported by one or other organ. But much more rather the different ways of
presenting the o-object are supported by the logical necessities of the cut and raises them up to give them consistency (anatomy).

The o-object is not drawn from a body cavern of Ali Baba; it is chosen as the unique supporting point for the matheme. One can choose the o-object anywhere at all. It will then be necessarily what is presented as true opinion (including under the form of a lie). The question here is always to allow oneself to plot the matheme, to wholly teach oneself on condition of remaining completely in the local, the punctual, the unique.

STRUCTURE

Structure is the business of sense insofar as on the one hand it goes beyond meaning and on the other it leads to sex-ab-sense.

Sense is not the accumulation of true opinions or different fictions: this production is only the common sense of ‘sense’. It is only a huge condensation, namely a meaning. Sense properly speaking only appears at the moment that meaning fails. Or again at the moment of translation, at the moment of a tipping over of a discourse which loses meaning, at the moment of a tripping over which loses its footing in order to advance.

Structure is the sense developed in the matheme in the content of a unique point taken as fixion.

If such is the structure, there is no ‘diagnosis of structure’, which would sum up the meanings of different symptoms in one great condensation.

For structure betrays every fixed meaning; to betray, is its proper business. Sense, which is only found in translation-betrayal which loses the fixed meaning, presupposes in itself the diachronic difference of the signifier. Reciprocally, the betrayal inherent in the signifier is always a matter of sense (and not of meaning). A signifier changes meaning and thus finds its sense being renewed.

Language which finds a certain consistency in a signifying chain is always a matter of structure. Structure is the ‘retroaction of the chain-like order of which language consists’ (AE, p.483). This retroaction, as we have seen, cannot be simple. It is not a question of retracing one’s steps and correcting the meaning: ‘it’s that’, then going back starting from an ‘it’s not that’ by managing to stipulate
more correctly the meaning of what is involved. Thus, one or other word of the sentence which is presented initially as a first approximation finds itself modified at the end of the sentence by the sentence as a whole. The end of the sentence thus specifies the meaning. The retroaction of the chain-like order is in no way reduced to this completion which ameliorates the meaning.

The structure which develops starting from the simple difference of the signifier is much more complex. In a first phase, one must insist on the production of meaning, a signifier is what represents the subject for an Other signifier; which means that the structure creates a subject-effect, which does not exist without sense. But sense is not enough. In a second phase, it must be said that the signifier represents the subject insofar as it is necessarily absent; the subject brought back to the presence will always remain marked by its own absence, or again the subject of the signifier, whose presence one can note, is not without the unconscious individual, which does not cease to absent itself. The sense of the subject goes towards ab-sense.

The sense-effect provoked by the signifier is in no way reduced to a new meaning. It is on the contrary directed towards a beyond of sense, to a beyond which already presupposes the subject effect. This beyond is sex. Indeed the absence proper to sex, the absence of sexual relationship always ends up by being plugged in a meaning (the phallic meaning).

With the circuit of meaning, of sense, of sex-ab-sense, it is always possible to end up at the establishment of a thing-like subject, which depends on a signifier whose meanings have been stopped: the signifier is closed onto itself, as the condensation of meanings, and the subject has been packaged as a person. Point bar. Here, the absence is filled and the ‘sense’ etiolates into common sense and comes to be equal to meaning (and we fall back into the truth which would have itself completely adequate to reality). One analyses the subject and one objectifies with decency.

On the contrary the pure matheme does not reduce the ‘it’s not that’ by an adequate correction. It rather creates a whirlwind to which there bears witness the double turn, the equivocation of the cut at every leap, the equivocal leap of meaning to sense, the equivocal leap of sense to ab-sense, the equivocal leap of ab-sense to meaning. The ‘it’s not that’ suggests a hole in the structure
which can only create successively a sense-effect, a nonsense-effect, a meaning-effect, a drift.

In this endless whirlwind, the cut of the said may well no longer forget the saying.

Meanwhile, nothing prevents the proper functioning of predicative logic which continues to put things in their proper boxes clearly delimited in their univocality. The simple cut cuts out there ‘the concept on which the language-market reposes’. One can shop around in the multitude of true opinions. One can exchange one opinion for another; with the question ‘of value’, one can bargain and in the framework of this ‘universal concession’, one can always come to an agreement. Consensus, namely common sense, polarises the classical groups notably in their ‘scientific’ aims (evidence based medicine and the psychiatry of consensus). The functioning of saids with a univocal cut is the business of an established discourse, inscribed in the ‘dit-mensions’ without emerging from them. Saying and structure are forgotten.

How can the psychoanalytic discourse get out of this? We can only start from saids, from the three dit-mensions (real, symbolic, imaginary). They only serve as a clothing, as content for the invisible structure. It is only from their material that saying can re-emerge.

The saids, functioning in the mode of pure meaning, may only encircle a void. The expression ‘squared circle’ is well and truly a condensation carrying two meanings and it is starting from these meanings that it is contradictory. A sense has to be found for it, if possible. Free associations abound in squared circles. All of that is of no use, it all encloses nothing. It is only the breakdown of the system of a well-constructed world of meaning.

Said must indeed be grasped, not to remain with them, but to demonstrate their inanity. Any unique object at all can do the business on condition of emerging from it, namely on condition of making there appear in itself the absence of size (a pure being of meaning), the absence of quality (a nothing without reality), the absence of substance (an imaginary being), the absence of every possibility (a purely negative nothing) [cf. the Kantian deduction of the table of nothing in the Critique of pure reason].
This said which encloses only nothing can rightly be used by structure, precisely because it appears as a unique impossible point to be condensed with other meanings. How could one construct a new chapter of Euclidian geometry by the addition of a squared circle? Impossible to deduce a new meaning from it. And nevertheless a direction, a sense is announced. And, by going further, it is the necessity of this sense which at best leads us to the failure of sense; and it in ab-sense that sex is revealed. The treatment of sex for itself? Have we reached what had to be proved?

Once again, one must not short-circuit things. There is indeed meaning, sense, and sex. The three are irreducible and irreplaceable. To forget one of the three in the modification proper to structure would mean leaving structure and forgetting saying, as we have already seen in connection with two pairs of them. Thus, with the forgetting of sex, the retroaction of sex on meaning would operate as a simple correction of the meaning (one enjoys sense, as we have seen, in the ‘interpretation’ that says what there is). Thus again, the forgetting of sense would lead us to the couple of meaning-sex; the retroaction of meaning on sex would correct sex (in function of a radical Other, enjoyment of the Other).

Let us come to the third pair which forget meaning. With the forgetting of meaning, the retroaction of sex continually corrects sense (one might define it simply as phallic sense and one would plunge into a purely phallic enjoyment). Homosexuality affirmed as such takes its place here: it corrects sense by sex and sex by sense. That can last indefinitely. But the whirlwind properly so-called becomes a simple oscillation insofar as a fixed point, an ineradicable and eternal meaning assure the re-launch of sense and of sex as a coming and going. Insofar as it is a reciprocal re-launcing of sex and of sense in function of a meaning established until the end of time, homosexuality (Greek, Arab, without forgetting the homosexuality of the Eucharist, go and eat the one that one loves) is well designed to be recuperated in religion. The matheme of psychoanalysis – ‘it’s that’/it’s not that – is indeed at stake in this indefinite re-launching of sense by sex or by the radical Other, but it operates at the service of true opinion, The Truth. This indefinite re-launch is assured under the auspices, under the species of bread and wine, which take the place of the o-object and replace it. ‘Nothing will prevail against the Church until the end of time’ (AE, p.485) since it lives on the matheme itself, by sustaining it with its body which acts as a true opinion.
These three solutions of joui-sens, the enjoyment of the Other and of phallic enjoyment each involve a movement of bipolar re-launching. Saying is restricted in it to a particular enjoyment which blocks the whirlwind of meaning, of sense and of sex. Those who accord no interest to this blocking, the theologians for example, can only work in structure, in the whirling matheme. God, ‘is that’, is always what people speak about. But ‘is not that’. Without a supporting point that holds up. It is because of having no stable supporting point (neither in sex, nor in sense, nor in meaning) that the structure can be a structure of change, of modification.

How can the said obtain the modification proper to the structure?

The psychoanalytic discourse is a modification of the structure or is not. In other words, it is the very structure of modification (which is not reduced to either the sense of meaning, nor the meaning of sex, nor the sex of sense).

Every said is a cut. It separates what is said from what remains outside this said. In that, the said establishes true opinions which can accumulate. Access not to the real, but to an indefinitely multipliable reality (which ensures moreover that the truth will always be half-said).

The access to the real can only be done through the encounter with the impossible. But where find the impossible? It is uniquely the double turn which would encircle a true opinion taken momentarily as a fixed point (fixion). With this double turn, true opinion is in the perspective of the movement of transformation which ex-sists this true opinion. True opinion as unique fixion is the cause of desire. But saying only appears through the fall of the cause of desire. It is by ‘avowing itself’ false that true opinion can leave room for the existence to saying. It is by throwing itself (se defaussant), it is because it is thrown away that the α-object can make saying ex-sist. The cause of desire (of the order of the said) can only make saying exist by being circled by the double turn of equivocation (‘it’s that’ followed by ‘it’s not that’) which shows it itself as impossible, fragile, ephemeral.

It is only by reason of the equivocation of the said and of the cause of desire that the subject is divided. And any definitive illumination of equivocation only ends up with the disappearance of the question of the subject.
Starting from true opinion (any one at all provided it is unique) there are knotted together two very different ‘subject’-effects: if the said remains equivocal, there is supplied in it the perfectly teachable matheme which saying is and the subject is divided, flickering between three positions, the apparition of the subject, its disappearance (fading) and its meaning; if the said is clarified in univocality, the ‘subject’ is imagined, is identified, the question of the subject is blocked at the same time as the subject becomes rudderless and takes on the imaginary consistency of a personage.

The imagination of the subject is not without consequences in the field of the psychoanalytic discourse. The (modal) demand can be perfectly well illuminated. One will speak, for example, of oral, anal, scopic, vocal demand. The subject is identified then to the oral hole, to the anal hole, to the scopic hole, to the vocal hole. No doubt the mystic clearly experiments the impossibility of such an identification, the impossibility of condensation, the deceitfulness of the stoppage of the question, the inanity of the said and the real will be characterised as ‘unsayable’.

Psychoanalysis has rendered possible a more precise, more sayable real: one can now say not what hole is at stake (as if there were a certain number, a certain set of them), but how the hole is tackled. It is possible to say how the hole can be demonstrated in each of the three well-established discourses: one can imagine the specific impotence of each of the three established discourses. We have indeed here certain consequences of the psychoanalytic discourse on the different established discourses.

But with this reduction of the hole to the image, nothing is made of the psychoanalytic discourse. We will only produce the semblable, always worse, since it distances itself from saying. For saying is not provoked by a wink, a simple gap in memory, a cry, a word, the highlighting of a lack. All of this can be inscribed in a master, hysterical or academic discourse. The reduction of the hole to its mention does not make the question of saying appear.

To produce saying, there is necessary the double turn and the effacing of the stable point. Hence the matheme ‘it’s that’/‘it’s not that’ and everything that it implies without falling into the solidification of true opinion (even if it were Lacanian). Might it be a matter of oscillating between ‘it’s that’ and ‘it’s not that’?
A sceptical position of indecision grounded on a metaphysics of equivocation generalised in principle?

So once again, let us start from saids.

First of all, the turns of saids ought to be numerable. It is not a matter of going vaguely, continually from a position of ‘it’s more or less that’ to ‘it’s more or less not that’. We can say precisely in what way ‘it’s that’: the precise said of the analyser can be told and be counted, just like the idea or the act of the analyst; he has said that and ‘it’s that’ or he has such an idea and ‘it’s that’. In the same way for ‘it’s not that’: it is a particular type of the impossible which makes us say ‘it’s not that’ and that can be demonstrated: the said of the analyser is contradictory with another said, or it is incomplete as regards the idea that it conveys, or it is undemonstrable in the process of knowledge, or again it is undecidable, it does not lead in itself to any action determined by a programme and, in that way, it leaves room for the pure act. Repetition, as psychoanalytic concept, only has sense in rigour and order.

Nevertheless it is not a matter of counting the order of repeated phenomena. It is impossible precisely because it would first of all be necessary to be able to define and isolate what the ‘phenomenon’ is. From then on, have we not reversed into a conception of repetition which reduces it to a vague coloured description of the cyclical life: ‘He repeats behaviours of failure with an oral, anal, etc. coloration’?

Order (to be understood as the ordinal) is fundamental for repetition. How can we conceive of it if we cannot count the phenomena? Precisely by the impossibility of counting them. It is a matter of stopping indefinite repetition, of fixing repetition to the matheme ‘it’s that; and ‘it’s not that’ as a structure that animates us as the only ‘master’ on board, as hysterical as you wish, not without knowing it as being the structure of modification. It is a matter of entering into the ternary whirlwind animated by the matheme ‘it’s that’/‘it’s not that’ which is not resolved either in the correction of meaning, nor in the assurance of sense nor in the faith in sex. It is the order of three that counts us.

It is only then, by finding an order of retroaction which is not simply reciprocal, that the (unique) true opinion can be used to make the real of saying re-emerge, encircled by the impossible resolution of the equivocal.
The analyst was able to play the fixed point in all the roles that may have been given to him. These are the roles of the semblance, for the fixed point, the o-object, is only there in the double turn of equivocation and it is destined to efface itself. Fixed/not fixed. Fixed point for the re-launch of the movement. Movement which effaces the point. And the movement is only assured by the equivocation of the matheme which allows the saying to ex-sist.

Psychoanalytic treatment is this movement of modifying the structure which implies true opinion encircled and effaced by the double turn of interpretation. And interpretation, always equivocal starting from a matheme ‘it’s that’/’it’s not that’ is not resolved around a consecrated true opinion; it is not ‘analysed’. An analysis without analysis.

For that, we nevertheless need the content of true opinion. This true opinion is presentified by the analyst. And it is as such that the analyst is cause of desire. The analysis is terminated by rejecting the representative of this function of the fixed point, namely the analyst. One can manage without him. Since he is waste product, one can reject him and find another form of waste product. What remains, is the movement of saying and of the modification of structure independently of the said, of true opinion, of the o-object.

The subject supposed to know is now this movement of saying which is modification of the structure.

But what is more precisely at stake in this movement of saying, which is the structure qua modification?

There is indeed ‘it’s that’ and ‘it’s not that’. But the two are irreconcilable, because they put in question the fixed point. The matheme operates at every stage of meaning, of sense and of sex. Sense does not rediscover meaning. Sense does not lead back to meaning, but to the breakdown of sense, to sex; sex is always the fundamental subversion of a sense supposedly seeking a common meaning.

Sex, the stoppage of sense, sex ab-sense. Sex remains irreducible and, if it sometimes couples quite simply with meaning (the phallus) or with sense (castration), it is to show the irreducibility of the sexes, the irreducibility of castration and of the phallus: there is no dialogue between the sexes. ‘You are not listening to me’. Of course. ‘There results from this some inconvenience for
the dialogue within each sex’ (AE, p.487), namely within each sex, a new irreconcilable meaning.

Sense, the sequence of movement seriously ordered starting from the loosening of meaning, sense which does not stop, sense forms a series. But it only takes off starting from the comic, from the enormity of one or other meaning condensing the whole destiny of man or of psychoanalysis (‘the prodigious victories of psychoanalysis’). And sense can always infinitely raise itself up. There is no sublime without the comic from which the movement of sense starts.

Sense leads to the Thing, to the void, to the stoppage of sense. Sense rises up towards ab-sense.

Sex betrays itself, translates itself into meaning. The final word of the end of dialogue – ‘there is no dialogue’, and notably no dialogue between the sexes – gives way to the only dialogue where the question of sex is closed by meaning. The soaring of communication, of meaning, provided it is outside sex. And the judgement which made sense and came to a halt in absence is reduced to the imaginary flattening out of phantasy and of meaning. Provided the meaning fails and provokes the new sense, etc.

The subject supposed to know, ‘the psychoanalyst’, namely the analyser who has plunged into psychoanalytic discourse, must sort himself out with this knot.

‘Of all that he will know how to make himself a conduit. There is more than one of them, even a lot, to suit the three dit-mensions of the impossible: as they are deployed in sex, in sense, and in meaning.’ (AE, p.487). The three dimensions are nonetheless saids and not about saying. We can specify them, only under the heading of provisional support, as the real for sex, the symbolic for sense and the imaginary for meaning. These three dimensions have content (which must be said to be imaginary). And this content is beautiful because it has a meaning, a sense or a sex. It can be said. On this hither side of these three beauties, it is the function of the real of saying. ‘The beautiful is nothing other than this beginning of the Terrible that we still support, and if we admire it, it is because it disdains, indifferently, to destroy us. Every angel is terrifying’. (First of Rilke’s Duino Elegies).

Nothing obliges us however to go beyond this threshold of beauty, splendour of the true, splendour of saids. But if we want to remain sensitive to
what the beautiful contributes, we cannot avoid posing the question of the
terrible, we cannot remain in one or other of these dimensions (meaning, sense
and sex), any more than in the binary coupling of two of them. To remain
sensitive to this value of the beautiful, rampart of the terrible, one must each time
situate oneself in the breakdown expressed by an ‘it’s not that’ which is repeated.
A breakdown which places us, like Antigone, in the uncomfortable between two
of two dit-mensions destined to die. Each time between two deaths. Between
the death of meaning and already the death of sense. Between the death of
sense and already the death of sex. Between the death of sex and already the
death of meaning. In this interplay of breakdowns, retroaction is never reciprocal,
but ternary: meaning, sense, sex.

This ternarity is constitutive of the psychoanalytic discourse. It is
interpretation.

THE EQUIVOCATION OF INTERPRETATION

With the benefits procured by analysis, the analyser may be sufficiently content.
The analysis can stop. And the psychoanalytic discourse can also disappear.
Saying is forgotten in the saids that have become benefits of the treatment
behind what was understood in the treatment itself. Everything that is said and
understood has emerged from the movement of the structure.

Beyond the benefits of the treatment, is it possible to preserve the
movement of saying? Can the psychoanalytic discourse pursue its structuring
effects beyond the benefits of the treatment? Is it possible for the analyser to
remain an analyser beyond the treatment?

‘The first said, ideally from the spontaneity of the analyser, only has its
structuring-effects from the fact that saying ‘parsoit’, in other words that
interpretation makes it parêtre’ (AE, p.488). The said can only have its structure-
effects through saying; and saying remains fundamentally and always alongside
the said; it only appears through the said, but it remains cut off from the being
aimed at by the said. It is the saying which is concerned by interpretation and not
that about which something is said.

How protect saying? How bring it out of forgetfulness?
It appears through the said inasmuch as the said does not refer directly to a being. It is the equivocation of the said which assures the questioning of any univocal reference to a being. This equivocation of the said should not be confused with the interplay of equivocations between several divergent saids, a reflection of the eventual perversity of the speaker. And, in analysis, it is in no way a matter of pursuing the multiple equivocations that it is always possible to imagine in any phonematical sequence. On the contrary the equivocation of the unique said is rare: it is unary. The equivocation of the unique true opinion makes a new field appear, the ‘parêtre’, namely a said which to be sure still refers to a possible being, but which above all brings into play what is to one side, what is parêtre (the question, the subject and saying). This saying can only appear (paraitre) or parêtre if it is pen-etrated (pen-étré, is almost being) by this something unique, by a ‘unary trait’, inasmuch as the difference is at work there. It is by means of the equivocation of the unary trait that saying borrows all its parêtre, all its content; it has no other. Without it, it disappears (dis-parait).

Lacan invented the o-object, namely what is almost a being (presque un être) and which is taken as unique in the equivocation of the said: a nothing -- This ‘being’ has no consistency by itself, it only subsists with the equivocal experience that I have of it, by its journey. I can imagine this ‘being’ of the o-object, I can say it is ‘real’. But the real of this o-object or of this ‘being’ is only touched by encountering it as impossible. What psychoanalysis encounters, is the unconscious as impossible (contradictory, incomplete, undemonstrable, undecidable) and the impossible is brought into play in the impasse and in the equivocation irreducible in language.

The unconscious is structured like a language. Which does not mean that the unconscious is language, nor indeed that it conditions all languages, but much more rather that it only ex-sists thanks to the operation of a local language and its modifying structure of meaning, of sense and of sex. It is a matter of making the unconscious ex-sist starting from a unique point and from the equivocation of the language that encircles it. ‘It is manifestly through language (le langage) that I account for the unconscious’ (AE, p.488), not through a particular language, but through the local structure of a language presented as matheme of equivocation.

The matheme, always the same, aims at a whole without however making a universe, without reaching it. The structure of the unconscious is given in the
search for the all, in the movement turned towards the one, in universalising it. But this movement does not reach its goal. It remains in the punctual. And the movement in question only works by the point, by the unique o-object, by sense as one. And starting from this unique point, there is played out the equivocal structure proper to language.

The matheme, even though universal in its imagination, namely in its presentation in saids, is always unique. The science which wants to be academic, linguistics for example, only has to deal with this unique, with this purely local. It only has to deal with saying properly speaking (it does not deal with the discourses), nor with what sustains the appearance of saying; it has only to deal with the unique o-object in its equivocation.

It is this latter that leads us (nous mène) in the psychoanalytic discourse, it is the ‘noumènè’ of psychoanalysis, in other words the unique empty point which is only there because I construct it, because I ‘matheme’ it. The analyser allows himself to be played with in the equivocation proper to psychoanalytic discourse and the leader of the game has only an auxiliary place with respect to the play of equivocation. It is the unique object that renders it possible by furnishing the material. The aforesaid ‘analyst’ has only this auxiliary function of serving as unique pivotal point in order that saying ‘parsoit’, in order that the saying should be alongside...in order that the saying of the analyser should ex-sist outside the said. The place that the analyst takes can only be to sustain this unique o-object, so easily buried under the multiplication of loaves, the piling up of shit, the iridescence of looks or the polyphony of voices which fill the void of the unconscious. ‘The analyst’, auxiliary of the analyser, can only precipitate himself to this place of true opinion, of o-object, provided that he is there of himself, unique, alone to allow the equivocation to work and to allow himself to be effaced.

This unique is not at all the sought-for saying. It is the waste product, the dross, the collapse of the psychoanalytic discourse. To hold this place, ‘this the analyst pays for by having to represent the collapse of a discourse, after having allowed sense to be tightened around this collapse to which he devotes himself’ (AE, p.489).
All the discourses operate by language. Linguistics, which busies itself with it, could thus act as a central discipline. But psychoanalysis has only a single medium: speech (la parole). The material with which it deals must be strictly resumed in what is necessary to get speech to circulate: it is the unique and equivocal true opinion, it is the o-object, which plays a central role as pivot in the exercise of speech. Linguistics occupies itself with the competences necessary in order that there should be language, it busies itself with the tongue, but it sets aside from its field of investigation singular speech. Speech is always unique. Let us not believe that a discourse is a set of words (paroles). Speech always corresponds to the matheme, ‘it’s that’, eureka, and such a universal fits into another universal, that is a condensation, a metaphor of the one in the other. Around the axis of this unique ‘that’s it’, there turns the equivocation of an ‘it’s not that’, in which the universal does not manage to universalise, and the all fails to be for all (à se pourtourer).

Through speech – qua matheme turning around a unique point – ‘the analyst is since Freud much further on in this than the linguist’ (AE, p.489). Analysis will keep this advance insofar as the psychoanalytic discourse is sustained by this matheme of speech in its unicity. If Lacan was able to be supported by Saussure and Jakobson in the elaboration of the psychoanalytic discourse, it was purely under the heading of recreation. And if linguistics were in return to benefit from psychoanalysis, it would be purely secondary, the discourse of linguistics would remain the same, it would only integrate a little piece into the totality of the mechanisms of the tongue without modifying its structure.

The saying of analysis – and this is the contribution of the analyser – is efficacious as such. It realises. Can we say that it realises certain saids, certain true propositions? To be sure, it separates, it cuts in the style of a concept which cuts up wholes. Thus, the child is separated from the mother, it cuts the cord. Or again saying cuts the excess of enjoyment (castration). But that is not what is most important. It realises something which is absolutely distinguished from the cut which separates two sets, from the cut proper to the proposition or to truth (always half-said).

It realises a performance, a transformation from top to bottom of structure; and this transformation implies not alone the cutting of the content, but moreover the creation of content including its effacing. It is done, it is
indisputable. What is realised by speech, is not at all a subjectivist coloration of wishing, of desire, of prayer or of demand which would come to be added to the fact of the said. Creation is God’s doing, it is the doing of the analyser, who is not reduced to the personage who comes into analysis. Creation arises: ‘Let it be’ and ‘it’s that’. An indisputable creation which is not sustained by a difference to another said, but of itself by means of a difference from itself, by means of a second turn which poses ‘it’s that’ and in the same movement ‘it’s not that’.

This naming/renaming, is interpretation.

That it is not possible to reduce it to a pure ‘it’s that’ can be embarrassing. It is a fruitful embarrassment because it is heavy with the ex-sistence of saying, irreducible to the said.

The embarrassment proper to interpretation takes up again the embarrassment of the oracle. An enigmatic sentence of which one knows that it is that, while knowing perfectly well that it is not that, the oracle precisely opens up the field of an act where it could be realised; it’s the whole history of Oedipus. A half-said to be sure, but a half-said which is not completed by any science, not even by that of Tiresias, a half-said which opens the field of saying.

The embarrassment proper to interpretation takes up again the embarrassment met [in] ‘the outside-discourse, l’hors-discours, of psychosis’ (AE, p.490). It must be understood in two ways: ‘during, lors du, the discourse’ and, ‘outside, hors du, the discourse’. The ‘hors du of discourse’ will resonate on the ‘psychoanalytic discourse’; it has to be explained how the psychoanalytic discourse is situated ‘hors du every established discourse’, in other words saying how it is inscribed outside any common topology, how it implies a new topology.

But first of all ‘lors du discourse’.

Psychosis is an affair of discourse. It is indeed lors d’un discourse that psychosis appears. It doesn’t matter which. Not simply that man is an animal sick of language and that he can endure psychosis as an eventuality among others. Psychosis is so knotted to the exercise of discourse that all speech summons up the question of psychosis. It forms part of the conditions of existence of the one who speaks. How does he have a concrete experience of psychosis? By any true opinion whatsoever, provided it is taken as unique. We rejoin directly the first condition of the psychoanalytic discourse. The one who is going to find himself
confronted with what is called psychosis is caught up in this unique. He is caught up fundamentally in the matheme of speech: ‘it’s that’, it is altogether that, there is nothing other than that. And it side-slips precisely starting from this unique ‘it’s that’ to go towards an ‘it’s not that’. How explain it? The delusion attempts to bring a solution to it. It turns around this unique starting point. It still turns. Second turn, it turns on a reduplicated path which makes itself exist, which is derailed around this unique point.

It would not be here a matter of wanting to recuperate the process of psychosis in a said or again ‘of interpreting the delusion’ in the sense of making it change into a reductive statement or into a discourse acceptable by society. One can understand the necessary prudence with respect to any practice which would simply make the psychotic chat away in order to collect from him an assemblage of multiple sais. It would be better to allow him to speak, because it is not a matter of getting the saying of psychosis to change into a said. The incest of saying and said, the one who would want to reduce the saying underlying a delusion to a conventional said, only stirs up the fire of the matheme which is constructed of itself and which is perfectly teachable for the aforesaid ‘psychotic’.

The ‘lors-du-discours’ said of psychosis, just as the oracle, remain demands since there obviously operate in them modulation, the modality introduced by the subjective in the propositional said, but, just as in the psychoanalytic discourse, these demands are very embarrassing in that they imply the impossible of saying.

If one wants to grasp saying in them, it would be necessary, firstly, not to explain everything by the personage declared psychotic; secondly it would be necessary to fix the unique point cause of desire and again accept that the cut is closed by a double equivocal turn. The impossible that appears as much in the statement of the oracle as in the statement of delusion will then appear quite different. The treatment of the impossible (one must hug the wall of the impossible) should lead to the contingent that we cannot master and which is the condition of liberty. The oracle opens out onto contingency of the act that it will provoke. Psychosis in its outside-reason, opens up onto creation. For the impossible ought to be followed in function of ‘there is no sexual relationship’, and not in the incest of saying and said, to which there are often reduced interventions on the delusion (it doesn’t matter here whether they aim at making
it flame up or at putting it out). And the possible will only take up its place in function of the necessary; in other words the always possible universalisations evoked as much by the oracle as by psychosis would take their value in function of the transcendental necessity of the process already at work, in its necessity in function of the matheme as it is effectively realised in the saying of the oracle or of psychosis.

Only psychoanalytic discourse renders to the oracle and to psychosis their full dimension of equivocal saying, of which the unconscious is made up.

Starting from this matheme, one can give its place to the tongue, object of linguistics: ‘One tongue among others is nothing more than the integral of the equivocations that its history has allowed to persist in it’ (AE, p.490). The tongue is the integral of all the possible equivocations of its history. They are the carriers of saying. They are present in order that one can make use of them in speech. The real of the equivocation one makes use of is something quite different to all the linguistic competencies that interest the linguist. The equivocal real of the unary trait operates wholly in the act of speech, in the act of the unique, local saying; and only psychoanalytic discourse has its key. The tongue of linguistics only gathers together results, saids and understoods, and the very process of saying remains in parenthesis in it.

Language, in its unique functioning, proposes, to be sure, the ‘one’, what wants to make one, stretched out towards the universalising one, the said that ‘that’s it’. But it is to justify in it the incidence of an impossible, of an ‘it’s not that’, of an Other. One and Other: irreducibles. Language is inscribed in this movement of the matheme.

Language appears at the outset as a language of communication (so we speak about the language of animals). But communication is only the fixed point starting from which there can operate the double turn of each of the formations of the unconscious, of the dream, of the slip, of the witticism, of the symptom of which Freud has shown the compromise, in that they are all founded on the fundamental equivocation opening up the question of saying. We can, of course, always map out the function of code in every human speech and in every formation of the unconscious; our vital behaviours are organised in symbols like the animals, altogether comparable to ‘the erection of an object to the rank of
signifier of master in the order of the flight of migration’, to the ‘symbolism of display whether amorous or aggressive’, to the ‘signals of work’, ‘to the marks of territory’ (AE, p.491). Provided that one of these symbols is taken up by the speaker as wholly and actually equivocal and not simply as inserted into the totality of equivocations. As a fixed point, one of these ‘symbols’ ought to serve precisely to divert and, in that way, to efface. In other words, it will be taken up into the movement of transformation proper to the matheme ‘it’s that’ and ‘it’s not that’. Or again, it will serve by the very operation of the equivocation to re-launch the movement of the structure. The speaker will only employ such a symbol in reference to this modification. Such is the phallic function, the re-launching proper to the phallus. One can comprehend the privileged place of the phallic ‘symbol’ (in the singular) for psychoanalytic discourse.

THE THREE KERNEL POINTS OF EQUIVOCATION AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE AS BORROMEAN

The matheme of psychoanalysis cannot be resolved either into an ‘it’s that’ nor into ‘it’s not that’. It cannot be a matter of an objective examination of affirmations and objections which would culminate at a conclusive said. So then, what is the re-launching movement of equivocation? How should interpretation sustain itself qua movement of modification, qua movement of saying? It is a matter of following the wall of the impossible, without ever becoming hooked onto a fixed point. It is a matter of not of adding equivocation to equivocation, but of detecting and tracking down what the unique equivocation requires of itself as transformation.

It is in the speech of the analyser that equivocation emerges.

Let us take equivocation first at the level of meanings. The same sequence of phonemes can mean several things, can carry several meanings. ‘It is for me the greatest of pleasures (dés plaisirs) to...’ has of course the opposite meaning to ‘it is for me the greatest displeasure (déplaisir) to...’ it is the real context that will decide. In the field of psychoanalysis, this context is itself essentially deceptive and equivocal since we are dealing with the unconscious. No doubt the reasonable conscious-preconscious attempts to secondarily elaborate the material coming from the unconscious and to find for it a univocal
context and meaning, but analysis aims precisely at the context of the *unconscious*; and through the principle of free-floating attention, the same phonemes understood in free associations refer on to an equivocal meaning, which appears all the better when the meaning proper to secondary elaboration is blurred.

But could we not demand a clearer language, a univocal language sought by logicians like Frege? Even if the unconscious meaning is opposed to the conscious or preconscious meaning could one not find for it its own univocity? Equivocation would only be the artefact of a passing misunderstanding between the unconscious and the conscious-preconscious. One could separate out the meanings of the one and the other and thus sweep away all ambiguity. Psychoanalysis demonstrates on the contrary that equivocation always comes from enigmatic sex and that it is irreducible (there is no sexual relationship). Its logic is completely transformed; it is no longer a matter of finding the univocal tongue which does not exist, but to account for sex as a logical principle of inescapable equivocation. A logic of sexuation, in which sex is not something established, but a mathematical performance. Homophonic equivocation reposes necessarily on the matheme, which is here everywhere at the disposition of what wants to make it function. It reposes on the *change* of logic and not on a logic. Not alone do homophonic equivocations necessarily appear in the presentation of the analytic discourse, but they are still motivated by the structure itself, by the structure of logical change within each concept: said/saying, étourdie/étourdit, deux/d’eux, parêtre/paraître, semblant/s’emblant, etc.

At this level, ‘no holds are barred’ (*AE*, p.491). Not of course that it is a matter of imagining amphibologies, of making word-plays or of making a slogan of them. The permission to have no holds barred is the permission that the unconscious itself takes, in its structure, to operate on us by its effects without our being able to recognise ourselves in it immediately. No holds are barred so that we can become dupes of the real of the unconscious. And it is in no way a matter of resolving the ambiguities of homophonic equivocation and of replacing it by a range of univocal meanings where ‘interpretation’ would aim at saying what is there.
How can we find our way when we are lost in polysem, in multiple meanings?
How can we find our way when we are wandering in homophonic equivocation?
If we can support ourselves on true opinion, which gives the imaginary content for interpretation, the structure of interpretation is never given by a set of true meanings or statements, supposedly adequate to ‘the unconscious’. It is a matter on the contrary of losing the fixity of interpretation to find the trace of sense. The meaning of demands included under the condensation of desire must be cut in order to make there appear a structure of movement and the change proper to the structure. It is a matter of losing the material of meaning to find the form of sense. ‘It’s that’ (the meaning, including the tendency to synthesis inherent in meaning) must give way to an ‘it’s not that’ as a way out of the register of meanings (not in view of a correction in the order of meanings).

Let us place ourselves in the experience of a said where the register of meaning fails. It is the very experience called for in the practice of free association: ‘Say everything, without regard for meaning.’ What happens when one loses the thread of any assignable meaning? And the question is all the more crucial when it concerns not only the practice of free association but interpretation itself. In the Traumdeutung (in the chapter on dream work), Freud avows his own embarrassment when his method of interpretation fails to find the meaning of a dream. He then takes support on an auxiliary method of interpretation, the classical symbolic method which would furnish for him the meaning sought for. But what he effectively finds, is not a meaning, it is the sense of the ‘phallus’; unless we plunge it into the obscene imaginary, the aforesaid phallus has no meaning. It is because I do not understand, it is because the meaning escapes me, that I glimpse the senses: ‘I comprehend nothing about it, but it must have some sense.’ It is when the semantic of the dream or of any other formation of the unconscious fails that a grammar with its multiple senses is required; for the effacing of meaning leaves an extract which is not chaotic. There remains a noun, a verb, an adjective, a preposition or a morphology of the word. This equivocal remainder is ‘letter’. Far from being simply an alphabetical character with respect to a meaning, the letter is a trait of discourse, outside meaning. It is the carcass of a grammar, of a syntax outside semantics.

What does this grammar mean? We cannot respond to it in a univocal way and the letter oscillates between several different senses. Thus, the V of the
Wolfman can be a noun (‘a butterfly’), a sentence (‘a woman with open legs’), a figure (‘five wolves’), etc. I have just designated the possible senses by the meanings noted in parenthesis. It is already too much, it is once again to fill up the sense. And this filling up must not lead to avoiding the absence where the equivocal sense ought to lead.

Grammatical equivocation operates outside meaning. What is operating in what I do not understand? A nomination? An affirmation? An agreement in gender and in number? A conjunction? A modality? Grammar is equivocal not with respect to the multiplicity of meanings which can lead to blocking up absence, but in itself. It brings into play the equivocation of structure. This equivocation outside any meaning ought to be located as the very condition of possibility of discourse. I have a clear presentiment that there could be some meaning in the trait, but it is absent. And it is this absence that the analysis would do better to hear rather than to put a stopper in sense by the meanings that are always ready to carry and to nourish the symptom. For it is only when meaning is absent that I can suspect a saying which advances in the pure grammatical structure: I understand that a saying is implied there, a saying which is not justified either by a particular person (the analyser or the analyst), nor by a determinate meaning. ‘I did not make you say it’. Is that not the minimum of interpretative intervention?’ (AE, p.492). With this minimum, it is not a matter of emphatically highlighting some meaning or other located in the recording of the said of the analyser. On the contrary, the sense of it is to highlight a saying of structure. To be sure, one can say that the said has emerged from the mouth of the analyser (‘you have said it’), but what counts is the saying at stake when the meaning fails. It is a saying in its pure state, outside comprehension, which germinates, and this is the mainspring of analytic discourse. It is the sense of the psychoanalytic discourse and this sense is divided, equivocal in the very measure of the loss of meaning that has caused it.

One further step and the crazy senses stop. Then there emerge ab-sense, sex, its logic.

Sex is the interruption of sense. This is where the phenomenon of transference appears. If interpretation had to remain without the weight of transference, without elaboration of the question of sex, namely without the
development of logic, ‘interpretation would be imbecilic’ (*AE*, p.492), without a crutch (*béquille*). Not that it would be foolish or defective. Hoping for meaning, sense would indeed continue its path indefinitely without having recourse to a crutch, a baton that could direct it. Sense goes towards ab-sense insofar as it stays outside semantics, insofar as it can operate as pure grammar. The phallus, outside meaning, is the relay of sense which leads to absence. It is starting from the phallus that there is developed the logic called ‘phallic’ and the formulae of sexuation. One can of course attempt to exclude all logic when it is a matter of the unconscious on the pretext that this latter is ‘indifferent’ to contradiction, *dixit* Freud. And one would come back to an unconscious as a transcendent in itself, a new figure of the supreme Being (in goodness or in wickedness it doesn’t matter), the God of psychoanalysis. But contradiction is a question full of sense and it indicates on the contrary the impossibility of Being, the impossibility of such transcendence of the unconscious. In other words, the equivocation of sense is irreducible and the impossibility of sense can only culminate in the ab-sense proper to the unconscious. To sustain this ab-sense, it is better to have at our disposition the crutch of the phallus. Not as a universal pass-key outlining the possible senses of the sexes (and putting them into relationship), but as the question developed by all the impasses encountered when it is a matter of saying sex, ab-sense. These impasses are precisely the impossibilities (contradiction, incompleteness, undemonstrability, undecidability) encountered in the development of structure. These impasses are all constructed as para-doxx; they develop by turning around the *doxa*, around true opinion which serves as a fixed point for us. These impasses constitute the logical formulae of sexuation which are at the same time the formulae described as phallic. This coincidence must be understood: the logical formulae produce the question of sex, sexuation (logical equivocation), in as far as they first bring into play the question of the sense and the grammar of the phallus (grammatical equivocation).

Before being theorised these logical impasses are first present in the real text of what the analyser contributes, provided he can find the fixed point around which to turn.

The interpretation proper to analytic discourse thus presupposes three degrees of equivocation: the homophonic equivocation of meanings is not
enough to make an interpretation; the grammatical equivocation of sense (the location of saying) is enough for there to be a minimal and still ‘imbecilic’
interpretation; logical equivocation opens up the full interpretation in which there are articulated meaning, sense, sex or again the imaginary, the symbolic, the real.

This articulation reverberates on meaning itself which is no longer what it was. And there follows a new sense and a new sexuation.

Phallic meaning, armed with the movement of structure, re-launches a new start, a new turn of structure. And here we restart. But it is not a matter for all that of a great condensation, of a universe generalising the movement of the structure. It is still a matter of the practice of a renewed unary trait. These dit-mensions of interpretation (homophony in the order of meaning, grammar in the order of sense and logic in the order of sex) remain local and can be as reduced as you wish. They are points. Provided they remain equivocal, because they are never pre-established points, points in themselves. They only exist by means of the cornering in which each one of the three dimension is summoned in a dynamic of reversal of one for the other. In that way, they are always knots. They are ‘knot-points’.

But must they be conceived as three points which should be connected into a big knot, together and always three, by a supplementary operation, a fourth point which would be the generator of their knotting, of their connectedness? Thus interpretation would go through the cycle of homophonic, grammatical and logical equivocations by knotting them in a set which would make them coherent. Interpretation would be the Borromean knot of the consistencies of meaning (imaginary) of sense (symbolic) and of sex (real). Interpretation would presuppose the gathering together of three consistencies. The neutral locus of interpretation would presuppose the counting of three types of equivocation, without forgetting the generalised equivocation hanging over the three others. Equivocation in general would be the set of three equivocations as the dit-mension in general would be the set of imaginary, symbolic and real dit-mensions

Each of the three never functions as an element of a set. There is no way of taking one of them independently of the others. Every attempt to couple two dit-mensions (or two equivocations) necessarily ends up by soliciting the third.

There is no way of expressing (de dire) equivocation in its homophony and its grammar without opening up the question of impossibility, of ab-sense and of
sex. No way of expressing equivocation in its grammar and its logic without letting oneself be caught up by a trait which already contributes a unary meaning. No way of expressing equivocation in its logic and its homophony without a sense and an non-comprehension appearing.

We must combine three manners of equivocating said to evoke saying, the three dit-mensions which are the imaginary, the real, the symbolic.

I presented homophony as imaginary, grammar as symbolic, logic as real. But it is in the reciprocal interplay of these dit-mensions that each one takes in turn the imaginary, real, symbolic colour. The attribution of a particular equivocation to one or other dit-mension does not matter provided one can make the three operate in concert. For example for the imaginary: if I express the said as ‘imaginary’, it is already to open up the question of the symbolic in the understanding, without forgetting the real of saying; if I understand understanding as ‘imaginary’, it is already to open up the symbolic of saying, without forgetting the real of the said; if I take saying as ‘imaginary’, it is already to open up the symbolic of the said, and understanding the real in the understood.

In the presentation of the discourses, the academic discourse is occupied above all by meanings, the master discourse consecrates itself by preference to senses, the hysterical discourse is more interested in the sexes. One can stabilise each one of the three respectively around meaning, sense and sex. These indications are still only means to fix one’s ideas. But it is a matter of making the structure turn.

The psychoanalytic discourse has no consistency in itself, it is absolutely labile. The moment that it would like to purify itself, it evaporates into a caricature of sublimation. Is it a fourth discourse after the three others? Is it a fourth point that would manage to connect or knot the three knot-points? It is much more rather identically each of the three knot-points insofar as they only take their consistency in relationship (or, better, breakdown of relationship) to each of the two others.

It is the Borromean knot strictly limited to three (without a fourth ring) and it does not strictly add anything to the three other discourses. Simply, it is
their completely intimate, intimate life, since each of the points only works as a knot broken away from the two others.

By losing the consistency of the academic magisterial and hysterical discourse, the psychoanalytic discourse loses face, any face, any consistency.

So then, can one still say that the psychoanalytic discourse contributes a renewal, a ‘fountain of youth’?

*The psychoanalytic discourse touches on the real by encountering it as impossible*

It should thus renew the figures of the impossible as they are presented in the traditional paradoxes. Thus the set of all the sets that do not contain themselves (Russell). Or again the demonstration of the power of the continuum greater than the enumerable starting from the reals included from 0 to 1 (Cantor) [we know that the demonstration does not work in an intuitionist perspective]. By coming up against the impossible, these paradoxes have provoked a renewal starting from which the saying of Russell or the saying of Cantor ex-sist. It is not difficult in the framework of psychoanalysis to produce paradoxes more or less copied from these models. Thus the ‘genital drive’ would be ‘the catalogue of pre-genital drives’ insofar as they do not contain themselves’ (AE, p.493). Or again, ‘desire’ would be the power of the continuum that exceeds the enumerable of all the demands. And there you are! Naming the paradox of the genital drive or of desire would make the saying of the psychoanalyst (disguised as Russell or Cantor) ex-sist.

The ‘genital drive’ is not the universal in which there would come to be embedded the pre-genital, we would say pre-general, drives. There is no generality of drives (a generality which would act as a fourth genital consistency beyond the pre genital). The drive is always caused ‘punctually’. And the ‘genitality’ which is presented as general does not determine the rest, does not take the helm over the rest, except as a function of the helm, namely of the passage to the phallus, as a purely local re-launch, or the passage from an ‘it’s that’ through an ‘it’s not that’ opening out onto something new.

In the same way, desire is not the continuum that infinitely goes beyond demands. There is no continuity of desire. It is always caused punctually. And
desire only acts as a general formula (‘every dream is the accomplishment of a desire’) thanks to the work of presentation which imprints its re-launch on every singular work of the dream (passage to the phallus as a re-launch, passage of an ‘it’s that’ through an ‘it’s not that’ opening out onto something new).

It is this breakdown which has to be taken into account.

All the rest is imaginary fixation, always ready to be rooted in a condensing and stabilising meaning. Including the matheme of psychoanalysis. From this matheme, one can produce all the imaginable saids. Lacan devoted himself to that. And this matheme re-launches psychoanalytic practice. One will always be able to collect testimonies of what was produced by it. Starting from that, anyone can collect these testimonies ‘from the very mouth of analysers’ (AE, p.493). These testimonies, these statements produced as a consequence of the psychoanalytic structure, only depend on the production of discourse in general. Men in general make their own little bubble starting from the results of their discourses, whatever they may be. ‘Psychoanalysts’ also, by means of these results. But through that, they are reversed into the discourse of the master as guides, into the discourse of the academic as pedants or the discourse of the hysterical as shits (sciants). Would it not be appropriate that in the frame of these established discourses, they work more as slaves, as pupils and as bored? That perhaps would open up other doors.

What is the specificity of the psychoanalytic discourse?

Contrary to this imaginary outcome which collects results, the condition of the psychoanalytic discourse is initially to be not the agent of a discourse (even if it were the psychoanalytic discourse), but the dupe of the unconscious (The non-dupes err). The condition of the psychoanalytic discourse is the analyser, namely the unconscious in the process of doing its work as analyser. The result, the analysed person, is something else.

The said in its equivocation, in its double loop ‘it’s that’/’it’s not that’, closes around the real: there is no sexual relationship. The hole that results from it is not reduced to the result that one can imagine in a theory or in a clinical case; we have to always re-begin. Each of these imaginary results can just about serve as an ephemeral fixed point (as fixation) for a new re-launching of the process. Because for the Borromean re-launching of interpretation, for the practice of ‘it’s
that’/it’s not that’, we must presuppose a fixed, equivocal and unique point which serves as an axis for the movement of transformation of structure. Such is the only place of ‘the analyst’, a place of semblance, destined to be rejected as waste product.

This re-launch of the process that is always to be re-begun does not however go into the vagueness of the indefinite (by which a ‘not-all’ of prudence would be defined). It is a matter indeed of getting to the end of the process which presented the phallic truth as reference. Including under the form of The woman. Femininity. The ‘not-all’, etc. Such a finishing, in function of the reference whatever it may be, is precisely a lie, a lure; it does not see that the truth is no more than the said. Of saying in its development as changing structure, there is only seen the part that culminates in the truth, there is only seen a half-said.

The path opened by the ‘feminine’ formulae of sexuation is applicable in every fragment of the World, of ideas, of stars and of any point whatsoever which can serve as true opinion or as fixion. The one who still held onto the said can set en route the process of meeting the impossible and of finding there the real.

The end of the process would therefore be only the promotion of opinion, of fixion, of the result in other words the putting into function of the structure of transformation, of the Borromean movement of change. And for that it would be better that the o-object should be, that it should be unique but also that it should be rejected as a waste product.

‘It would not necessarily be more disagreeable than before’ (AE, p.493).
Perspectives for the psychoanalytic discourse

The psychoanalytic discourse does not contribute the progress of a supplementary accumulation of new things or of new knowledge. The psychoanalytic discourse is not a new discourse which would come to be added to the three others. What it contributes in each discourse, is rather a loss.

Every established discourse avoids a form of impossibility, which gives to each one of them a certain modality: academic meaning seeks the coherence of all the possibles, magisterial sense will aim at completeness starting from a necessary point, hysterical sex tracks the demonstrable in the contingency of desire. The statements of a discourse are modulated by one or other of these modalities.

But the laughter of the witticism undermines each discourse. Academic negation forbidding contradiction founded the stability of meaning. One can laugh at these meanings. There is no longer any meaning which holds up and contradiction reappears. Magisterial negation excluding incompleteness founded a final and complete goal for sense. One laughs at these senses. There is no longer a sense that holds up and incompleteness reappears. Hysterical negation proscribing the undemonstrability of gender (masculine or feminine) invented an origin for sex. One can laugh at the sexes. There is no longer a sex that holds up and the undemonstrable reappears.

Each time, laughter mocks negation to its face. This ‘negation’ of negation goes much further than an affirmation. Laughter unveils what hides itself and what is forgotten in each discourse. Laughter unveils the real of each knot-point, the elementary, punctual, real of a saying, which implies the whole structure. This saying is not material as such. The real is not to be taken as a substance that would aim at speech. The real is not a material. It cannot be signified, it cannot be of the order of meaning, of a sense or even of a sex. It is grasped in the movement of meaning, of sense and of sex.
It is not sure that Freud remained completely materialistic; from a certain point of view, he indeed remained outside saying. The kabalist tradition certainly nourished him. But why? Perhaps this play of letters, these ‘mots ravis’ (he was born in Moravia), these laughters led him to hypostasise the couple of death to life (mort à vie), a death drive and a life drive, results to be sure of a saying. It is laughter itself that must not be forgotten.

For all this matter which is required in any case (cf. true opinion) ‘a lot of spirit is needed’ (AE, p.494), in other words the displacement of the sense/nonsense present in the witticism, but also the displacement of sex and again the displacement of meaning. Freud was surely sensitive to this. Perhaps he wanted progress, progress in the collection of meanings, of senses and of sexes? Perhaps he wanted to avoid loss and therefore to fall back on results in their imaginary, presented in the dit-mension of truth?

To avoid falling back on established results, one must be sensitive to antinomies. For Kant, the antinomy is situated in the idea of the World or the universe. For Russell the antinomy is situated in the set of all these sets which do not contain themselves. For Freud, the antinomy is situated between meaning and sense. The antinomy of psychoanalytic discourse is situated in the speech caught sometimes between meaning and sense, sometimes between sense and sex, sometimes again between sex and meaning.

How resolve these antinomies?

The word is a pure idea of which we do not have and will never have the slightest knowledge; but this ignorance leaves place for the moral law implying liberty. The whole is only valid as a concept and a movement of posing the concept. The antinomy of speech engenders signifying symptoms, of which one can find a meaning, and then sense and then sex. But each time a leap: a leap of meaning which seeks its sense, a leap of sense which falls into nonsense, a leap of sex which deviates into meaning.

What is intolerable in Freudian truth does not simply reside in the meaning and the sense to be given to infantile sexuality. It also the intolerable of the sense which goes as far as non-sense, the intolerable of sexual logic. The intolerable, is indeed what unveils the triple antinomy of the signifier itself. The intolerable of the Freudian truth thus pushes us to go beyond and to dispose of one after another meaning, sense and sex.
From the point of view of meaning, the psychoanalytic discourse is radically sterile. For sense, it only procures nonsense. For sexuality, it provides absolutely nothing; far from assuring some stable position for one or the other sex and to make a relationship between them, the formulae of sexuality put the definition in question (there is no sexual relationship).

There remains the question of saying inherent in the structure which is said in meaning, in sense and in sex. That one might be saying. From where support it? By what can we support the psychoanalytic discourse.

By the laughter of the matheme. By what is taught of itself.

And here, madness does, once again, much better than neurosis which always remains supported by another. The psychoanalytic discourse ‘proves itself to be supported even by psychosis’ (AE, p.494).

To speak about psychoanalysis and its structure, Freud had to support himself with a ‘psychotic case’, he had to have recourse ‘to the wreckage of the Memoirs of a dead person’, Schreber. It is because he was caught up in meaning (it was a matter of reconciling the phantasy of all-powerfulness and the phantasy of being transformed into a woman, cf. the passage from the first to the second chapter of his study of the case). To speak about the signifier, Lacan had to sustain himself by the structure itself, as it is clearly presented in what is called ‘psychosis’. The seminar on The psychoses is consecrated more to the signifier than to the psychotic and the Preliminary question is the question of structure before being concerned with the treatment of psychosis. If psychosis presides over the presentation of structure, it is by very reason of the place that it takes with respect to the pivot around which there turns the modification of structure. It only does so in function of the double turn, of the whirling of the structure. ‘President Schreber’ only presides at the presentation of structure in function of the reprise of speech and its equivocation.

This way of seeing the question of psychosis, from a Freudian point of view then from a Lacanian point of view, is still only an opinion, no more. An opinion in the register of the true. Half-said, it can only be bad. But as bad, it can serve as a fixed point which permits equivocation. This opinion permits a good reading, namely a reading that is propitious for saying. To laugh at it?
Psychoanalytic discourse must be supported in the locus of analysis. It is the challenge that ‘analysts’ must take up. The analyst only takes on his existence from there. Far from being an assured place, far from being a role, the analyst can only hold out from the place of the o-object, of true opinion, the ephemeral fragile place of semblance. Destined to be set aside in order that the structure of modification can operate, he will take the place of what must be rejected. The analyst is in no way the absolute knowledge by which some power prevails. Even if he is put at this place of the subject supposed to know (neurosis puts him there), he is not this absolute.

‘The analyst withdraws himself’ from all the roles that people would want him to play. Just the sufficient semblance for the movement of the structure.

There remains love, a new love. Why has analysis not (yet?) shown more resourcefulness as regards the creation of a new love?