L'étourdit

FIRST TURN

(5, 449)¹ In contributing to the 50th birthday celebrations of L'hôpital Henri-Rousselle for the favour that my friends and I have received there in a work concerning which I will indicate what it has been able to do, namely go beyond presentation, I pay homage to Dr. Daumézon who allowed me to do it

What follows, as is my custom, does not prejudge anything about the interest that was taken in it by those to whom it was addressed: my saying *(mon dire)* at Sainte-Anne was a vacuole just like at Henri-Rousselle, and, just imagine, for almost the same time, preserving in any case the price of this letter that I say always arrives where it ought.

I RELATIONSHIP OF MEANING TO SENSE

I start from morsels, not philosophical ones to be sure, since they are scraps from my seminar of this year (at Paris-1).

I wrote on two occasions on the board there (and a third time in Milan where on my travels I made it into a headline for a news-flash on 'the psychoanalytic discourse') these two sentences:

That one might be saying (*Qu'on dise*) remains forgotten behind what is said in what is heard.

This enunciation which appears to be an assertion since it is produced in a universal form, is in fact modal, existential as such: the subjunctive by which its subject is modulated, testifying to this.

If the welcome that responds to me from my audience is enough for the term 'seminar' to be not too unworthy for what I contribute there in terms of speech, had not enticed me away from these sentences, I would have wished from their relationship of meaning (*rapport de signification*) to demonstrate the sense (*sens*) they take on from psychoanalytic discourse. The opposition that I am evoking here will have to be emphasised later.

I.1 The signifier and the discourses

I recall that it is from logic that this discourse touches on the real by encountering it as impossible, which is why it is this discourse that

¹ L'Etourdit, Scilicet 4, (1973): 5-52. The approximately corresponding pages of the version published in *Autre Ecrits*, Paris, *Seuil*, 2001, are given for convenience.

(6, 450) raises it to its final power: science, I have said, of the real. And may I be forgiven here by those who even though involved in it, do not know it. Were I to spare them again, they would soon learn it from the outcomes.

Meaning, by being grammatical, confirms first of all that the second sentence bears on the first, by making it its subject in the form of a particular. It says: this enunciation, then qualifies it as assertive because it is posed as true, confirming it by being in the form of the proposition described as universal in logic: in any case the fact is that the saying remains forgotten behind what is said.

But by way of antithesis, in other words on the same plane, in a second phase it exposes its semblance: by affirming it from the fact that its subject is modal, and by proving it from the fact that it is modulated grammatically as: that one might be saying. Which it recalls not so much to memory but, as they say: to existence.

I.2 A relationship between heteroclite meanings or the delusion of interpretation.

I.3 The relationship of the meaning of the signifier and interpretation.

The first sentence is not then on the thetical plane of truth that the first phase of the second assures, as is usual, by means of tautologies (here two). What is recalled, is that its enunciating is a moment of existence, is that, situated from discourse, it 'ex-sists' to truth.

Let us recognise here the way in which the necessary happens: in proper logic it should be understood, the one that organises its modes by proceeding from where it gets to, namely, this impossible, modest (*modique*) no doubt though inconvenient (*incommode*) from then on, that for what is said (*dit*) to be true, one still must say it, that there should be a saying.

And this is how grammar already measures the force and the weakness of logics that isolate themselves from it, by splitting them with its subjunctive, and indicates itself by concentrating the power, to open up all of them.

For, I come back to it one more time: 'there is no metalanguage' such that any of the logics entitled propositional, could use it as a crutch (*béquille*) - to each one there remains its own imbecility- and if people believe they can find it in my reference, above, to discourse, I refute it from the fact that the sentence which appears there to become the object for the second, is no less significantly applied to the former.

For, that one might be saying this second, remains forgotten behind what is said. And this in a way that is all the more striking, since being, for its part, relentlessly assertive to the point of being tautological in the proofs that it advances – by exposing in the first

(7, 451) its semblance, it poses its own saying as inexistent, since in contesting the former as what is said as truth (*dit de vérité*), it is existence that it makes correspond to its saying, this not by making this saying exist since it simply names it, but by denying its truth – without saying so.

I.4 The universal and the existence of a saying.

By extending this process there is born my own formula that there is no universal that must not be contained by an existence that denies it. So that the stereotype that every man is mortal is not enunciated from nowhere. The logic that dates it, is only that of a philosophy which feigns this 'nullubiquity', this in order to create an alibi for what I name the discourse of the master.

Now it is not from this discourse alone, but from the place in which the others take their turn (the other discourses), the one that I designate as semblance, that a saying takes on its sense.

This place is not for all, but it ex-sists them, and it is from there that it is 'hommologated' (*s'hommologue*) that all are mortal. They all cannot but be so, because at death we assign them from this place, all it must be, since it is there that one looks on the marvel (*on veille* à *la merveille*) of the good of all. And particularly when what one looks after there creates a semblance of the master-signifier or of knowledge. Hence the ritornelle of philosophical logic.

There is therefore no universal that is not reduced to the possible. Even death, since this is the point from which alone it is articulated. However universal one may pose it, it always remains only possible. That the law is alleviated by being affirmed as formulated from nowhere, namely, as being without reason, confirms still more where its saying comes from.

Before rendering to analysis the merit of this apperception, let us do our duty with respect to our sentences by remarking that 'in what is heard' of the first, is equally connected to the existence of the 'remains forgotten' which depends on the second and to the 'what is said' that it itself exposes, as covering this remains.

Here I note in passing the defect of the 'transformational' attempt to make logic out of a recourse to a more profound structure which is supposed to be a layered tree.

II. FREUD'S SAYING

And I come back to sense to recall the trouble philosophy must take – the latest one to save its honour by being of a contemporaneity

(8, 452) from which the analyst is absent – to notice what is its own everyday resource: that nothing is hidden so much as what is unveiled, as the truth, 'Aletheia = Verborgenheit.

II.1 Ab-sense or Freudian practice

Thus I did not renounce my fraternity with this saying since I only repeat it from a practice which, situating itself from another discourse, makes it incontestable.

For those who listen to me...ou pire, this exercise would only have confirmed the logic by which castration and the Oedipus complex are articulated in analysis.

Freud puts us on the track of the fact that lack-of-sense (*ab-sens*) designates sex: it is by the inflation of this lack-of-sex-sense (*sens-absexe*) that a topology is unfolded where it is the word that decides.

Starting from the expression: 'it does not go without saying' (*ça ne va pas sans dire*), one sees that this is the case with many things, of even the majority, including the Freudian thing as I situated it as being what is said in truth.

Not to go without ..., is to make a couple which, as they say, 'is not all that obvious (*ne va pas tout seul*)'.

Thus it is that what is said does not go without a saying. But if what is said always poses itself as truth, even though never going beyond a half-said, as I express it, the saying only couples with it by ex-sisting it, in other words by not being of the *dit-mension* of the truth.

II.2 The mathematical saying and the wall of the impossible

It is easy to make this sensible in the discourse of mathematics where what is said is constantly renewed by taking its subject from a saying rather than from any reality, provided this saying is summoned from the properly logical sequence that it implies as what is said.

No need for Cantor's saying to deal with that. It begins with Euclid. If I had recourse this year to the first, namely, to set theory, it was to refer to it the marvellous efflorescence which by isolating the incomplete from the inconsistent in logic, the indemonstrable from the refutable, and even adding to it the undecideable, by not managing to exclude itself from demonstrability, puts us face to face with the impossible so that there could be ejected the 'that's not it' which is the wail of an appeal to the real.

II.3 A discourse embarrassed by its language

I said discourse of mathematics. Not its language. This should be noted for the moment when I come back to the unconscious,

(9, 453) structured like a language, as I have always said. For it is in analysis that it is organised as discourse.

It remains to be recorded that the mathematician has the same embarrassment with his language as we have with the unconscious, and expresses it by this thought that he does not know what he is speaking about, even to assure it as being true (Russell).

II.4 The saying in the roundabout of discourses

Being the language that is most suitable for scientific discourse, mathematics is the science without consciousness that our friend Rabelais promised, before which a philosopher¹ can only remain dumb: gay science rejoiced by presuming of it the ruin of the soul. Naturally, neurosis survives it.

Having noted this, the saying is demonstrated, and escapes from what is said. From then on it only assures this privilege by being formulated as 'saying no', if, by going in the direction of sense, it is containing (*contien*) that is grasped in it, not contradiction – the response, not being taken up again in negation – rejection, not correction.

Responding in that way suspends what is true in what is said. Which clarifies the tangential light (*jour rasant*) that the analytic discourse contributes to the others, by revealing in them the modal loci by which their roundabout is accomplished.

Remark 2: 'To say what is there'

I would metaphorise for the moment as incest the relationship that the truth maintains with the real. The saying comes from where it [the real] determines it [the truth].

Remark 1: Philosophy and mathematical language

The philosopher is inscribed (in the sense that one says it of a circumference) in the discourse of the master. He plays the role of the fool in it. That does not mean that what he says is stupid; it is even more than usable. Read Shakespeare.

That does not mean either, and take note of this, that he knows what he is saying. The court fool has a role: that of being the replacement of the truth. He can be so by expressing himself like a language, just like the unconscious. That he is, himself, unconscious of it is secondary, what is important is that the role should be held.

Thus Hegel in speaking as accurately about mathematical language as Bertrand Russell does, loses his bearings no less: the fact is that Bertrand Russell is in the discourse of science.

Kojève whom I hold to be my master for having initiated me into Hegel, had the same bias regarding mathematics but it must be said that he was of Russell's time, and that he only philosophised under the title of the university discourse into which he had settled provisionally, but knowing well that his knowledge only functioned there as a semblance and treating it as such: he showed this in all sorts of ways, handing over his notes to whoever could profit from them and posthumously showing his derision for the whole adventure.

This contempt of his was supported by his starting discourse which was also the one he returned to: the great commander knows how to deal with buffoons as well as the others, namely, as subjects, which they are, of the sovereign.

(10, 454) But can there not also be a direct saying?

To say what there is, means nothing to you, my dear friends from the *salle de garde*, so called no doubt because it is very careful (*se garde bien*) not to contradict the body of employers to which it aspires (and whatever it may be).

To say what is there, for a long time raised its man for you to this profession that no longer haunts you except by its emptiness: the doctor who in every age and over the whole surface of the globe, pronounces on what is there. But it is still starting from the fact that what is, only has the interest of having to be conjured away.

At the point to which history has reduced this sacral function, I understand your uneasiness. Not even possible for you, this no longer being the time, to play the philosopher, which was the latest moulting by which, by acting as the flunkeys of emperors and princes, doctors survived (read Fernel).

Know nevertheless, even though analysis is of another siglum – but that it tempts you is comprehensible – the one that first and foremost I testify to.

I say it, because it has been demonstrated without exception by those I called my 'dandies': there is not the slightest access to Freud's saying which is not foreclosed – and with no return in this case – by the choice of one or other analyst.

The fact is that there is no conceivable formation of the analyst outside the maintenance of this saying, and that Freud for want of having forged with the analytic discourse, the bond that would have held psychoanalytic societies, situates them from other discourses that necessarily bar his saying.

Which all my writings demonstrate.

III. THERE IS NO SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP

III.1 The absence of sexual relationship and the two ex-sistences

Freud's saying is inferred from the logic which takes as source what is said by the unconscious. It is in as much as Freud discovered this 'what is said' (*dit*) that it ex-sists.

Restoring this saying, is necessary for the discourse of analysis to be constituted (which is what I am contributing to), this from the experience where it is proved to exist.

One cannot express this saying in terms of truth since in truth there is only a half-said, properly cut, but that there can be this clear half-said (it can be conjugated by going back: you meditate, *tu médites*, I speak ill of, *je médis*) takes on its sense only from this saying.

(11,455) This saying is not free, but is produced by relaying it from others that proceed from other discourses. It is by being closed in analysis (c.f. my *Radiophonie*, the number just before of this aperiodical) that their roundabout situates the loci by which this saying is circled.

They circle it as real, namely, from the impossible, which is announced as:

there is no sexual relationship, il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel.

This presupposes that in terms of relationship (of relationship 'in general') there is only an enunciation, and that the real is only assured in it by being confirmed from the limit which is demonstrated by the logical consequences of the enunciation.

Here an immediate limit, from the fact that 'there is nothing' (n'y a rien) to make a relationship of an enunciation.

Because of this, no logical consequence, which is not deniable (*niable*), but which is not sufficient to support any negation: simply the saying that: *nya*

Nia only contributing to it just the homophony required in French in order, from the past that it signifies, to mark that there is no trace (*nya la trace*) of any present whose existence can be connoted there.

But what is at stake? The relationship of the man and of the woman in as much as they would be suitable, from the fact that they inhabit language, to make an enunciation about this relationship.

Is it the absence of this relationship that exiles them in this stable habitat (*stabitat*)? Is it by inhabiting it in a labile way (*d'labiter*) that this relationship can only be inter-dicted (*inter-dit*)?

This is not the question: much more rather the response, and the response that supports it – by being what stimulates it to repeat itself – is the real.

Let us admit it: where it is-there (*est-là*). Nothing to be expected from going back to the flood, when this is already recounted as retribution for the relationship of the woman to angels.

III.2 The absence of sexual relationship and the two universals

Let us nevertheless illustrate this function of the response by an apologue, a logue that is hard pressed (*aux abois*) having been provided by the psychologist, since the soul has its back to the wall (*aboi*), and even, by pronouncing (a) *petit a*, (*a*)*boi*.

The trouble is that the psychologist, since he can only support his sector by theology, wants the psychical to be normal, and as a result he elaborates what would suppress it.

Especially the *Innenwelt* and the *Umwelt*, when he would do better to pay attention to the volte-man (*homme-volte*) which makes up the labyrinth from which man does not get out.

(12, 456) The stimulus-response couple leads to the avowal of his fabrications. To call response what would allow the individual to keep himself alive is excellent, but that this ends up quickly and badly, opens up the question which is solved by the fact that life reproduces the individual, and therefore also reproduces the question, which means in this case that it is repeated (*ré-pète*).

This indeed is what is uncovered from the unconscious, which from then on proves to be a response, but from the fact that it is what stimulates.

'Tis (*c't*) also why, whatever happens, the psychologist re-enters into *volte-man* of repetition, the one that we know is produced from the unconscious.

Life no doubt reproduces, God knows what and why. But the response only gives rise to a question where there is no relationship to support the reproduction of life.

Except for the fact that the unconscious formulates: 'How is man reproduced?', which is the case.

-- 'By reproducing the question', is the response. Or 'in order to make you speak', in other words, that the unconscious has, by exsisting.

It is from there that we must obtain two universals, two *alls* sufficiently consistent to separate among -- speakers who, by being plural (*des*), believe themselves – beings, two moieties such that they will not get too entangled in coiteration when they get there.

III.3 The absence of sexual relationship and the phallus

Moiety in French means that it is an ego-affair (*moitié/moi*), the half-chicken which began my first reading book having besides opened up for me the division of the subject.

The body of speakers is subject to being divided by its organs, enough to have to find them a function. It sometimes takes ages: for a foreskin that takes on usage in circumcision, indeed for the appendage to wait for it for centuries, from surgery.

It is thus that from psychoanalytic discourse, an organ makes itself the signifier. The one that can be said to be isolated in corporeal reality as bait, by functioning in it (the function being delegated to it from a discourse):

- a) as a phanere favoured by its aspect of detachable addition accentuated by its erectility,
 - b) by being a snare, to which this last accent contributes, in the

(13, 457) different catches (*pêches*) that make discourses of the voracities by which the inexistence of the sexual relationship is plugged.

We recognise, even from this mode of evacuation, of course the organ which by being, let us say, 'credited to' the male, makes the active of the verb in what is said about copulation, be decerned to the latter. It is the same one that its diverse names, in the tongue that I use, quite symptomatically feminise.

One should all the same not be deceived by this: because of the function that derives it from discourse, it has passed to the signifier. A signifier can be used for many things just like an organ, but not for the same. As regards castration for example, if it makes use of it, it has not (luckily in general) the same consequences as if it were the organ. As regards the function of bait, if it is the organ that offers itself as a hook for the voracities that we were situating just now, let us say: of female origin [d'origyne], the signifier on the contrary is the fish to gulp down what is necessary for discourses to maintain themselves.

This organ, gone on to being the signifier, hollows out the place from which an effect is had on the speaker, let us follow him in that he thinks himself: to be, the inexistence of the sexual relationship.

The present state of the discourses which feed therefore on these beings, is situated by this fact of inexistence, by this impossible, not to be said, but which, squeezed by all these 'what is saids', shows itself as the real.

Posed in this way Freud's saying is justified first and foremost by what he said, from which it is proved, what I said, -- is confirmed by having been acknowledged by the stagnation of analytic experience, that I expose, -- might develop from the re-emergence of the analytic discourse, at which I occupy myself, since, even though without resources, it falls under my jurisdiction.¹

III.4 From Freud to the phallic function

In the confusion where the parasitic organism that Freud grafted onto his saying, itself makes a graft of what he said, it is no easy matter for a cat to find its kittens, nor the reader a sense.

The muddle is insurmountable about what is pinpointed there about castration, about the defiles by which love is sustained from incest, about the function of the father, about the myth in which the Oedipus complex is reduplicated by the comedy of the orang-Father (*Père-orang*) or the speechifying Outang.

¹ Here stops what appeared concurrently in the memorial d'Henri Rousselle

(14, 458) It is well known that for ten years I had taken the trouble to make a French garden of these tracks Freud was able to stick to in his design, the first, even though it could always be spotted how twisted they were by whoever wanted to get to the bottom of what supplies for the sexual relationship.

It was still necessary that the distinction of the symbolic, the imaginary and the real should come to light: this so that the identification to the man moiety and to the woman moiety, where as I have just called to mind the business of the ego dominates, should not be confused with their relationship.

It is enough for the business of the ego like the business of the phallus where you were kind enough to follow me just now, to be articulated in language to become the business of the subject and to no longer fall under the jurisdiction of the imaginary. Just fancy that since the year '56 all of this could have been taken as acquired, if there had been consent about the analytic discourse.

For it is in the 'question preliminary' of my *Ecrits*, which was to be read as the response given by the perceived (*le perçu*) in psychosis, that I introduce the Name of the Father and the fields (in this *Ecrit*, put in a graph) by which it allows psychosis itself to be arranged, that one can measure its power.

There is nothing excessive with regard to what experience provides us, to put under the heading of being or having the phallus (cf. my *Bedeutung* in the *Ecrits*) the function that supplies for the sexual relationship.

Hence a possible inscription (in the meaning where the possible is foundational, Leibnizien) of this function as Φx , to which people are going to respond in their fashion by arguing about it. This articulation of the function as proposition is that of Frege.

It is simply of the order of complement that I contribute above to every position of the universal as such, that it would be necessary at a point of the discourse that an existence, as they say: opposes the phallic function, so that to pose it may be 'possible', which is the little of which it can lay claim to existence.

It is indeed in this logic that there can be summarised everything (*tout*) involved in the Oedipus complex.

IV. THE PHALLIC FUNCTION AND THE FORMULAE OF SEXUATION

IV 1 The first two formulae and the Oedipus complex

All of it can be maintained by being developed around what I advance about the logical correlation of two formulae which, being

inscribed mathematically $\forall \mathbf{x}.\mathbf{\Phi}\mathbf{x}$ and $\exists \mathbf{x}.\mathbf{\Phi}\mathbf{x}$, are enunciated: *the first*, for all x, $\mathbf{\Phi}\mathbf{x}$ is satisfied, which can be expressed by a T

(15, 459) noting truth-value. This, expressed in the analytic discourse where the practice is to make sense, 'means to say' ('veut dire') that every subject as such, because that is what is at stake in this discourse, is inscribed in the phallic function to guard against the absence of the sexual relationship (the practice of making sense, is precisely to refer oneself to this ab-sense);

the second, there is by exception the case, familiar in mathematics (the argument x=0 in the exponential [sic] function $1/\chi$), the case where there exists an x for which Φx , the function, is not satisfied, namely, by not functioning, is in effect excluded.

This is precisely from where I combine the all of the universal, more modified than is imagined in the *forall* of the quantifier, to the *there exists one* that the quantic pairs with it, its difference to what the proposition that Aristotle described as particular implies, is patent. I combine them from the fact that the *there exists one* in question, by creating a limit to the *forall*, is what affirms or confirms it, (which a proverb already objects to in Aristotle's contradictory).

The reason for this is that what the analytic discourse concerns is the subject, which, as effect of meaning, is response to the real. This I articulated, from 11 April 56, having recovered the text, from a quotation about the non-semantic signifier, this for the people who might have taken an interest in it for feeling themselves called by it to a function of waste product (*déjet*).

A clearing of the way to be sure not suited to anyone who having come out of the academic discourse, diverts it into this hermeneutic, indeed semiologising dripping, that I see myself responding to, streaming from every corner, due to the failure of analysis to fix its deontology.

That I enunciate the existence of a subject by posing it from a saying no to the propositional function Φx , implies that it is inscribed from a quantifier from which this function finds itself cut off because of the fact that at this point it has no value that can be noted as truth, which means not of error either, the false simply to be heard as *falsus* as what has fallen, which I have already stressed.

In classical logic, when one thinks about it, the false can only be perceived as being the inverse of the truth, and it designates it just as well.

It is therefore correct to write as I do: $\exists x.\Phi x$. The one that exists, is

(16, 460) the subject supposed from the fact that the phallic function is forfeited in it. This is a simply hopeless way of gaining access to the sexual relationship, the syncope of the function which only supports itself by resembling it (*d'y sembler*), by precipitating itself on it from the beginning (*de s'y embler*), I would say, not being able to suffice to simply inaugurate this relationship, but being on the contrary necessary to achieve the consistency of supplement that it makes of it, and this by fixing the limit at which this semblance is nothing more than the fall of sense/decency (*dé-sens*).

Nothing operates therefore except from signifying equivocation, or from the trick by which the *ab-sens* of the relationship might be plugged at the suspension point of the function.

It is indeed the fall of sense that by putting it under the heading of castration I denoted as symbolic, also from 1956 (at the beginning of the academic year: object relations, Freudian structures: there is a report of it) thus distinguishing it from imaginary frustration and real

The subject found itself already supposed there, merely by grasping it from the context that Schreber, through Freud, had furnished me about the exhausting of his psychosis.

It is here that the Name-of-the-Father, by acting as the locus of its beach-head (*plage*), demonstrated its responsibility for it according to tradition.

The real of this beach-head, since the semblance lands on it, 'realises' no doubt the relationship of which the semblance acts as the supplement, but it is not so any more than the phantasy supports our reality, no less so either since it is everything, except for the five senses, if I am to be believed.

Castration in effect relays a link to the father, that which in each discourse is connoted as virility. There are therefore two *dit-mensions* of the forallmen (*pourtouthomme*), that of the discourse by which he is foralled (*il se pourtoute*) and that of the loci by which this is man-cut (*dont ça se thomme*).

The psychoanalytic discourse is inspired from Freud's saying by proceeding initially from the second, and from an established decency by starting from these -- to whom biological heritage makes a handsome gift of the semblance. Chance which does not seem to have to be reduced right away to this breakdown (*répartition*) is formulated as the 'sex ratio' of the species, stable it seems, without being able to know why: these -- are valid therefore for a moiety (*moitié*), unluckily (*mâle heur*) for me, a male..

The loci of this *thommage* are located by making sense of the semblance, – through it, of the truth that there is no relationship, – of an enjoyment that supplies for it, – indeed of the product of their complex, of the effect called (through my good offices) surplus enjoying.

(17, 461) No doubt the privilege of these elegant pathways might be advantaged by apportioning in a more reasoned dividend than this game of heads or tails (the proportions of the 'sex ratio'), if it was not proved from the other dimension by which the man-cutting is foralled, that this would aggravate the case.

The semblance of good luck for one moiety proves in effect to be of a strictly inverse order to the implication that makes it seem destined to the office of a discourse.

I will limit myself to proving it from what the organ itself suffers from it.

Not simply because its man-cutting is an a priori prejudice by placing the subject there in his parents saying, because for the girl, it can be worse.

IV.2 The prejudice of the first two formulae

It is rather that the more it is snapped up $(happ\ell)$ by the a posteriori of the discourses that await it $(\underline{happiness})$ as it is called in the U.S.A.) the more does the organ have things to carry from them.

It is put down to it being emotional...Ah! Could it not have been better trained, I mean educated. For that you have another think coming.

We see clearly in the *Satyricon* that to be constrained, indeed implored, supervised from the earliest years, studied *in vitro*, changes nothing in its moods, that one is mistaken to make its nature responsible, when, on the contrary, it is simply because of the fact that it is not happy with what it is made say, what it is coming up against.

To tame it, it would be better to have this topology on which its virtues depend, which is the one I spoke of to whoever was willing to hear me while the conspiracy intended to shut me up was being pursued (the year '61 -'62 on identification). I drew it as a <u>cross-cap</u> or a <u>mitre</u>, as it is also called...It is not surprising that the bishops *s'en chapotent* [*s'en coiffent+ s'en chipotent+ s'en capotent*, cap themselves with it, quibble about it, hood themselves with it – *capote* also means condom)).

It must be said that nothing can be done if one does not know how with a circular cut, – of what? what is it? not even a surface, being separated by nothing as regards space, – it is nevertheless undone.

It is a matter of structure, in other words of what is not learned from practice, which explains for those who know it that it has only recently become known. Yes, but how (mais comment)? Just like that: mécomment.(c.f. méconnaissance)

It is indeed from the angle of this function that the bastardy of organo-dynamics explodes, even more than from elsewhere. Can it be (18, 462) believed that it is by the organ itself that the Eternal feminine draws you on high, and that it works better (or worse) because the marrow frees it from signifying.

I say that for the good old times of a *salle de garde* which by allowing itself to get lost in all of this, admits that its reputation for vulgarity does not simply depend on the songs yelped out there.

Fiction and the song of speech and of language, all the same, might not the boys and girls have permitted themselves against the Father Masters (*Permaîtres*) whose habits it must be said they had already acquired, to take the two hundred steps to get to where I spoke for all of ten years. But not one of those to whom I was interdicted actually did so.

After all who knows? Stupidity has its own impenetrable ways. And if psychoanalysis propagates it, I have been heard, precisely at Henri- Rousselle, re-assuring myself that more good than harm results from it.

Let us conclude that there is a misdeal (*maldonne*) somewhere. The Oedipus complex is what I say, not what is believed.

Remark: The discourses and their racism

This through a slip that Freud was not able to avoid by implicating - in the universality of the interbreeding of the species where it talks (où ca parle), or in the seemingly fruitful maintenance of the sex ratio (moiety-moiety) among those who form the greatest number, of their mixed blood – the universal significance that he discovered for the organ, among its bearers.

It is curious that the recognition, so strongly emphasised by Freud, of the bi-sexuality of somatic organs (when moreover he lacked chromosomatic sexuality), did not lead him to the blanketing function of the phallus with regard to the *germen*.

But his allmanity (*touthommie*) acknowledged its truth from the myth that he creates in *Totem and Taboo*, less reliable than that of the Bible even though carrying its mark, to account for the twisted ways along which the sexual act proceeds, where it speaks (*ou ça parle*).

Will we presume that if there remains a biological trace of *allman*, it is because there is only a race by being man-cut and zilch (*qu'dale*) by being foralled.

Let me explain: the race of which I speak is not what an anthropology calling itself physical supports, the one that Hegel well denoted as of the skull and which still deserves it by finding in it, well after Lavater and Gall the most weighty of its measurements.

(19, 463) For it is not there, as was seen in a grotesque attempt to found on it a Reich described as third, the way in which any race is constituted is not there (nor in effect that particular racism).

It is constituted according to the mode in which symbolic places are transmitted by the order of a discourse, those by which there is perpetuated the race of masters and no less of slaves, of pedants (*pédants*) also, to respond to which there must be the fags (*pédés*), the bores (*scients*), I would say, even though they are not to be found without the shits (*sciés*).

Therefore I will dispense completely with the time of *cervage* [*servage* +*cervix*; slavery and the chained neck], of the rejected Barbarians from which the Greeks situate themselves, with the ethnography of primitives and the recourse to elementary structures, to secure what discourses in action involve in terms of racism..

I would prefer to base myself on the fact that as regards races, what we hold to be most reliable is the achievement of horticulture, or indeed of animals which live from our domestication, the results of skill, therefore of discourse: these races of man are maintained on the same principle as those of the dog or the horse.

This before observing that the analytic discourse foralls that by a reverse slope, which can be imagined if it happens to close the real by its buckle.

Because it is the one where the analyst must first of all be someone analysed (*l'analysé*), if, as we know, this indeed is the order in which his career is traced out. The analysand, even though it is only due to me that he is so named (but what powder-trail is equal to the success of this activation), the analysand is indeed the one whose *cervice* [*cervage* + service] (oh, *salle de garde*), bowed neck, must straighten itself.

IV 3 Feminine sexuality

Up to now we have no more than followed Freud on what is enunciated about the sexual function in terms of a *forall*, but moreover by remaining at one moiety, of the two that he located, as far as he was concerned, of the same measure by referring them to the same *dit*mensions.

This carryover onto the other sufficiently demonstrates what is involved in the *ab-sens* of the sexual relationship. But it is rather to force this *ab-sens*.

It is in fact the scandal of psychoanalytic discourse, and it says enough about the way things are at in the Society that supports it, that this scandal is only expressed by being stifled, as one might say, at birth. (20,464) To the point that it requires the utmost effort to raise this debate defunct since the 1930's, not to be sure that to the Master's thought, there are not confronted those of Karen Horney, Helene Deutsch, indeed Ernst Jones, and still others.

But the lid kept on it ever since, since Freud's death, by sufficing to ensure that the least puff of it no longer filters out, says a lot about the retention-splint (*contention*) that Freud, in his pessimism, deliberately relied on to lose his discourse, in wanting to save it.

Let us simply point out that the women here named, appealed in it – this is their leaning in this discourse – from the unconscious to the voice of body, as if precisely it was not from the unconscious that the body took its voice. It is curious to note, intact in the analytic discourse, the lack of measure that exists between the impression of authority that these women give and the triviality of the solutions by which this impression is produced.

I am touched by the flowers, all the more so because they come from rhetoric, with which Karen, Helene – it does not matter who, I forget now because I do not like to reopen my seminars –, with which therefore Horney or Deutsch furnish the charming fingerstall which acts as their water reserve on the bodice as it displays itself for <u>dating</u>, or that from which a relationship is expected, were it only from what he said.

For Jones, the angle of service (c.f. the final line before the last break) that he takes in qualifying the woman by deutero-phallicity, sic, in other words in saying exactly the contrary of Freud, namely, that they have nothing to do with the phallus, while all the time appearing to say the same thing, namely, that they bypass it by castration, is no doubt here the masterpiece by which Freud recognised that for the cervilité to be expected of a biographer, he had his man.

I add that logical subtlety does not rule out mental deficiency which as a woman of my school demonstrates, results from the parents' saying rather than from an inborn obtuseness. It is because of this that Jones was the best of the *goyim*, since with the Jews Freud was sure of nothing.

But I am going astray by coming back to a time when I chewed this over, chewed it over for whom?

The *there is no sexual relationship* does not imply that there is not a relationship to sex. This indeed is even the very thing that castration

(21, 465) demonstrates, but not anything more: namely, that this relationship to sex may not be distinct in each moiety, by the very fact that it apportions them.

I underline. I did not say: that it apportions them by restarting there from the organ, a fog in which Karen, Helene, may God receive their souls if it has not happened already, lost their way. For what is important, is not that it starts from the tickling that these little darlings feel in the moiety of their bodies which is to be put under its high-ego (moi-haut), it is that this moiety takes the stage there as empress so that it only comes on again as m'être-signifiant of this affair of relationship to sex. This in a quite unified way (there in effect Freud is right) from the phallic function, for the reason that it is indeed from a unique phanere that by originating in a supplement, for its part, this function, organises itself, finds the organon that I am revising here.

I am doing so in that over against him, – as regards women nothing guided him, this is even what allowed him to advance so much about them by listening to the hysterics who 'play/make the man' (font l'homme) –, over against him, I repeat, I will not impose on women the obligation of measuring by the yardstick of castration the charming sheath that they do not raise to the signifier, even if this yardstick, on the other hand, helps not only the signifier but also joy (pied).

By being exactly suited, to be sure, for this joy, women (and may I be pardoned among them for this generality that I soon repudiate, but men are hard of hearing on this subject), women, I say, make use of it on occasion. That a shoe-horn is recommended for it, follows thereafter, but that they can do without it should be foreseen, this, not only by the *M.L.F.* [Movement for the Liberation of Women] which is in the news today, but from the fact that there is no sexual relationship, which the current state of affairs is only the testimony of, even though, I fear, temporarily.

For that reason the Freudian lucubration about the Oedipus complex, which makes the woman like a fish in water in it, since in her case castration is the starting point (Freud *dixit*), woefully contrasts with the fact of the devastation that is, in the case of the woman for the most part, her relationship to her mother, from whom she seems indeed to expect as woman more substance than from her father – the trouble she has with him is secondary, in this devastation.

Here I lay my cards on the table by posing the quantic mode under which the other moiety, moiety of the subject, is produced from a function to satisfy it, or to complete it by it its argument.

IV 4 The third and fourth formula of sexuation

(22, 466) That the subject here proposes itself to be called woman depends on two modes. Here they are:

$\exists \mathbf{x}.\mathbf{\Phi}\mathbf{x}$ and $\forall \mathbf{x}.\mathbf{\Phi}\mathbf{x}^1$

Their inscription is not usual in mathematics. To deny, as the bar over the quantifier marks it, to deny that *there exists one* is not done, and still less that *forall* is fornotalled (*pourpastoute*).

It is here nevertheless that there is revealed the sense of the saying, from the fact that, combining there the *nyania* (thereisnotonewasdenied), that produces the sound-effects of the sexes in company, it supplies for the fact that between them, there was no relationship (*de rapport nyait pas*).

This, which is to be taken not in the sense that, to reduce our quantifiers to their reading according to Aristotle, would make the *nexistun* (onedoesnotexist) equal to the *nulnest* (thereisno) of his universal negative, would bring back the *me pantes*, the *notall* (which he nevertheless was able to formulate), by testifying to the existence of a subject to say no to the phallic function, this by supposing it from the contrariety described as that of two particulars.

That is not the sense of the saying, which is inscribed here from these quantifiers.

It is: that by introducing as moiety those to be called (à dire) women, the subject is determined by the fact that, not existing as being suspended on the phallic function, everything (tout) here can be said about it, even if it proceeds without reason (du sans raison). But it is an all (tout) outside universe, which is read right away from the second quantifier as notall.

The subject in the moiety where it is determined by denied quantifiers, arises from the fact that nothing existent creates a limit to the function, that would not be able to secure for itself anything whatsoever from a universe. Thus even basing oneself on this moiety, 'they (*elles*)' are not *notalls* (*pastoutes*), with the consequence and by the very fact, that none of them is all (*toute*) either

I could here, by developing the inscription that I constructed by a hyperbolic function, of Schreber's psychosis, demonstrate in it how sardonic is the effect of push-to-the-woman (*pousse-à-la-femme*) that is specified from the first quantifier: having clearly specified that it is from the irruption of *A-father* as without reason (*sans raison*), that there is precipitated here the effect experienced as forcing, in the field of an Other in thinking itself as most foreign to all sense.

But to carry the function to its power of extreme logic, would lead away from the right path. I was already able to measure the trouble that good will took in applying it to Hölderlin: without success.

How much more easy is it not, indeed a delight to promise oneself, to

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¹ A correction of the formulae in the original French text.

(23, 467) attribute to the other quantifier, the singular of a 'confine' ('confin'), from the fact that it might make the logical power of the *notall* be inhabited from the recess of enjoyment that femininity conceals, even to the point of being espoused to what plays/makes the cut-man (thomme) ...

Because this 'confine' though enunciated here from logic, is indeed the one behind which Ovid protects himself by depicting it as Tiresias in myth. To say that a woman is not all, this is what the myth points out to us in that she is the only one in that her enjoyment goes beyond, the one that is created from coitus.

It is moreover why it is as the only one that she wants to be recognised from the other side: we know about it only too well.

But it is again where there is grasped what is to be learned there, namely, that though one satisfies there the requirement of love, the enjoyment that one has of a woman divides her, making her a partner of her solitude, while union remains on the threshold.

For to what could the man acknowledge as best serving the woman he wants to enjoy, than rendering to her her own enjoyment which does not make it all his: to re-surrect something of it in her.

IV. 5 The notall or the Heteros

What is called sex (or even the second, when it is by a ninny) is properly, by supporting itself from *notall (pastoute)*, the *Heteros* which cannot be staunched by a universe.

Let us call heterosexual by definition, one who loves women, whatever may be his/her own sex. This will be clearer.

I said: to love, not: being engaged to them by a relationship that is not there. This is even what the insatiability of love implies, which is explained by this premise.

That it should have required the analytic discourse that this might come to be said (à se dire), sufficiently shows that it is not in every discourse that a saying comes to ex-sist. For the question was tossed around for centuries in terms of the intuition of the subject, which was very well able to see it, indeed to gloat over it, without it ever having been taken seriously.

It is the logic of the *Heteros* which must be got going, the remarkable thing about it being that the *Parmenides* ends up with it starting from the incompatibility of the One and Being. But how give a commentary on this text before seven hundred people?

There remains the career always open to the equivocation of the signifier: the *Heteros*, by being declined into the *Hetera*, is etherised, or even hetaerised.

(24, 467) The prop of the *deux* to make *d'eux* that this notall (*pastoute*) seems to offer us, creates an illusion, but the repetition which is in short transfinite, shows that it is a matter of an inaccessible, starting from which, the enumerable of it being sure, the reduction also becomes so.

It is here that there is precipitated (*s'emble*), I mean: is sown (*s'emblave*), the semblable whose equivocation I alone have tried to unknot, by having dug it out from the 'hommosexed' (*l'hommosexuê*), or from what was called up to now man as an abbreviation, who is the prototype of the semblable (c.f. my mirror stage).

It is the *Heteros*, let us note, which beginning there from discord, erects man in his status which is that of the hommosexual. Not with my help, I underline, but that of Freud who, spelling it out, restores this appendage to him.

It is nevertheless only precipitated in this way from a saying when it is already well advanced. What is striking at first, is the point to which the man of the what is said (hommodit) was able to make do with the run-of-the-mill of the unconscious, until the moment when, by saying it was 'structured like a language', I allowed it to be conceived that in speaking so much about it, what is said about it is not very weighty: that it causes, that it chatters (que ça cause, que ça cause), but that it is all it is able to do. I was so little comprehended, so much the better, that I can expect that one of these days someone will make objections.

<u>The congruence of the phallic function</u> In short we float away from the islet phallus, to what is cut off from it because of what fortifies itself against it.

In this way history is made up of naval manoeuvres where the boats perform their ballet from a limited number of figures.

It is interesting that some women do not disdain to take up the running in it: that is even why dance is an art that flourishes when the discourses hold in place, those who have what it takes, for the congruent signifier, leading.

FROM ONE TURN TO THE OTHER

The riddle of the notall

But when the *notall* (*pastoute*) has just said that it does not recognise itself in them, what does it say, if not what it finds in what I brought to it, namely:

the quadripod of the truth and of the semblance, of enjoying and of that which from a surplus –, slopes away having failed to protect itself from it.

and the bipod whose separation shows the *ab-sens* of the relationship,

then the tripod which is restored by the re-entrance of the sublime

(25, 469) phallus which guides man towards his true bed, the one he has lost his way to.

'You have satisfied me, littleman (*petithomme*). You have comprehended, that is what was required (*fallait*). On [you] go (*Vas*), there is not too much *étourdit* for it to return to you after being half-said (*l'après midit*). Thanks to the hand that will respond to you, because you call her Antigone, the very one who can tear you apart because I sphynx my notall (*pastoute*) in her, you will even be able towards evening to make yourself the equal of Tiresias and like him, because of having played the Other, divine what I told you'

Here is a superego/moiety-ness (*surmoitiê*) which doe not superego itself as easily as the universal conscience.

What is said by it (*ses dits*) can only be completed, be refuted, be shown as inconsistent, as indemonstrable, as undecideable by starting from what ex-sists by way of its saying.

A logic for the analyst

Whence the analyst from a source other than this Other, the Other of my graph and signified as S of O barred: *notall (pastoute)*, where would he be able to take exception to what flourishes from the logical chicane in which the relationship to sex goes astray, by wanting its paths to go to the other moiety?

That a woman here is of use to a man only when he ceases to love another one: that not being able to do so is held against her by him, so that it is indeed by succeeding in it, that she misses it.

- that being awkward, he imagines that to have two of them makes her all (*toute*),
- that the woman should be the boss among the common people, that elsewhere the man would want her to know nothing:

where would he be able to find his bearings in these sweet nothings – there are others – , except by the logic which is exposed here and which I claim to break him into?