

FRAGILITIES OF ANALYSIS¹

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The historical attempts of psychoanalysis to remedy its sense of fragility by forging a pseudo-solidity alongside psychiatry, psychology and anthropology have led to a deviation of its aims and an inhibition of its efficiency. Michel Foucault has argued that psychoanalysis, and psychoanalysts outside Lacan, has not had the courage to think of itself and to exercise itself as a form of spiritual exercise - as understood from ancient times, where only a transformation of the subject can permit his access to the truth. Psychoanalysts need to rediscover a sense of fragility which refuses to offer guarantees, renounces psychiatric and even early Lacanian clinical categories, abstains from classifying analysers and in particular from describing their sexual behaviour as perverse. Freud's final arrival in Moses and Monotheism, at Geistigkeit (spirituality) as opposed to psychology and religion is an illuminating guide to what is truly at stake in the Freudian field.

Key words: fragility; Michel Foucault; clinical categories; the diverse; spirituality.

Easy to break, to falsify, to damage, to destroy, with a weak composition and a lack of solidity, fragility could scarcely be said to have a good press. There is however no paradox in devoting the remarks which follow to a eulogy of the fragility of the analyst and that of analysis itself. All the more so because analysis has acquired, in the course of time, what could be designated as a false or pseudo-solidity, due to an excessive weight, which, far from suiting it, inhibits its efficiency or even deviates its aims. This excess is composed of three different strands. 1) While Sigmund Freud expected from his alliance with Carl Jung that psychoanalysis would conquer psychiatry, nothing of the kind took place since, on the contrary, it is psychiatry which has ceaselessly informed (in the sense of giving a certain form to) the treatment of problems encountered in analysis: 'psychopathology' is the name of this teratological combination of two incompatible methods. 2) While Freud knew the risk to psychoanalysis if it were to fall into the hands of priests, a far too distant, fearful and finally rigid relationship with respect to religion returned to analysis in the form of a psychoanalytic religiosity: 'psychoanalytic ethics' is the

¹ First published as 'Fragilités de l'analyse', *Critique*, Janvier-Février 2014, Paris, pp.19-31. Trans. C. Gallagher.

name given to this religion which does not assume itself as such. 3) More recently, believing itself to be able to respond to a pressing social demand for norms, psychoanalysis has got to the point of pronouncing for each and every person and for the group itself, the law of its wellbeing: ‘psychoanalytic anthropology’ is the name it is given here..

We owe it to Michel Foucault to have been able to distinguish the point of origin of this triple and weighty landslide. Psychoanalysis, he declared, outside Lacan, did not have the courage to establish itself as a form of knowledge depending on ‘the very old and very fundamental questions of *epimeleia heautou*,² and therefore of spirituality as a condition of access to the truth.’³ It will be shown that only its status as a spiritual exercise is capable of offering to analysis this lightness and fragility which, even today, it is largely lacking.

No guarantees

After more than a century of existence, has psychoanalysis conquered the status of a now recognised discipline? Despite a certain presence in the university and in different psychiatric, psychological, pedagogical, juridical settings, or again in the media, its extraterritoriality remains what most closely characterises it. It is not practised on the basis of a profession legitimated by a degree; no Professional Council (*conseil de l’Ordre*) is able to judge psychoanalysts, since moreover their acts would be very differently judged if they were evaluated by each of the numerous groups which are inscribed in a space that Jacques Lacan has described as ‘the Freudian field’. What is more there is not complete agreement on this description: for some the field is ‘psychoanalytic’, for others ‘Lacanian’, and for others finally, who envisage an alliance of psychoanalysis and anthropology, there is quite simply no field, however one designates it.

There are people, sometimes analysts, who have been able and still are able to consider this situation deplorable, and there have been no lack of moments in the recent history of psychoanalysis where an attempt has been made to put an end to it. In vain! At least in France, and for the time being, while elsewhere (but not everywhere) a juridical framework for psychoanalysis has been put in place. Not without consequences for the practice of psychoanalysis itself,

² Please refer to the explanatory notes following this paper, on specific Greek expressions in Al-louch’s text, provided by Barry O’Donnell. pp. 41 – 45.

³ Foucault, M. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Course at the Collège de France, 1981-1982*, edited by Frédéric Gros, Picador, 2005.

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since it is then largely assimilated to a psychotherapeutic practice. One of the effects of this new positioning of psychoanalysis in the social world is nothing other and nothing less than the removal of what is called the ‘professional’ secret. Thus, in Canada for example, a psychoanalyst is obliged to answer to a court about what has happened in a particular psychoanalysis if, perchance, and following the divorce of the analyser, the adversarial party demands it. But, it will be said, what is the problem? It can be seen once one poses the following question: ‘Can I confide to someone everything that comes to my mind about the man or woman with whom I am engaged while knowing that this someone may well one day report my remarks, eventually to my cost, before a court?’ It can be asked: ‘What kind of speaker would accept that there should be *a priori* guaranteed the truth of his word (his psychoanalyst as witness before a court, having sworn to tell the whole (of his) truth). Would he speak? What kind of lover would absolutely demand the guarantee of being loved? Would he love? What kind of sexual fling if in advance its ‘success’ was assured? A moment of infinite sadness. What kind of believer would demand of God the certainty of being admitted to paradise? Would he believe?’

The well-intentioned enterprise (we are worried about the ‘consumer’, while at the same time eating into his liberty, already by calling him that) of putting psychoanalytic practice into proper order ill-uses what is involved in speaking, loving, fucking, believing. In other words everything at work in madness, of which madness is woven. The absence of a guarantee that the analyst offers – this fragility – has an affinity to the never assured character of speaking, of loving, of fucking, of believing.

To whom does one speak, sometimes in a situation of great tension? Or, perhaps even, to what? It can happen that one might speak to a stone⁴, not necessarily a tombstone, which was recently shown, first in a book and then in a film, by Atiq Rahimi whose Iranian title, *Synguè sabour*, is translated as ‘stone of patience’, a black stone to which the desperate address themselves, confiding in it. Here this stone is a warrior plunged into a coma by a bullet in the neck. He will neither say nor manifest anything throughout the whole time that his wife addresses him and, speaking to him in an always more frank and resolute manner (in the way of the ancient *parrêsia*⁵), is transformed.

⁴ Or to a purely legendary personage definitively confined between two walls.

⁵ ‘The *parrêsiastês*, is the one who says everything’, Foucault, M. *The Courage of Truth. The Government of Oneself and Others II. Course at the Collège de France*, 1984 edited by Frédéric Gros, Picador, 2005.

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The only proof needed is this moving moment when she finally finds her own beautiful image in a mirror. She moisturises the body of her interlocutor by means of a probe (*sonde*), she keeps him alive minimally; despite his stone-like silence, his fragility is clear. She would never have been able to speak to him if war had not rendered him silent, available, present despite his comatose state, or again rather, thanks to it. There is certainly no question here of advancing that the analyst ought to find himself permanently plunged in a coma. Nevertheless, *Syngué sabour* allows there to be glimpsed what his silence can be, which is no less present when he intervenes, if it is from his position as analyst that he intervenes. In tune with *Syngué sabour*, has not Jacques Lacan declared that analysis is ‘a kind of reverse hypnosis’?

Speaking to someone whom one ends up by realising will not set up his own habits of thought over against the saying that is addressed to him, to someone who is able to keep to himself, to the grave, what he has heard, this is rare, exceptional, of great price in a time which wants only transparency and traceability. Friendship itself, which is nevertheless so precious, often does not offer this (and no university degree would ever be able to guarantee it).

No nosography

Formed by an active abstention, this other ascesis in which there consists the fact of never having recourse to established clinical entities was not initially acquired by psychoanalysis, far from it. Nor is it accepted today by a number of practitioners (here also dissension reigns).

Sigmund Freud, nevertheless, had opened up this path, and in at least two ways: on the one hand by inventing, pushed into this by certain young women that he was seeing, an unprecedented practice where it was no longer his knowledge that guided his action, and on the other hand by wanting that the ‘movement’ he had created should be and should remain outside the reach of the medical discourse (and that of priests). Not many followed him, and he had to resign himself to it, and analysis still today remains largely practiced by doctors (psychiatrists) or clinical psychologists. Now there is nothing self-evident in that. The takeover of madness by a specialised medicine is a historically recent given (generally dated from the French Revolution, with Philippe Pinel ‘freeing’ the lunatics from their chains), which leads us to ask whether analysis ought to be inscribed along the direct line of this appropriation (is it really one?) or indeed link up again with different acceptances

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which, in a more distant past, were reserved for madness in the ancient philosophical schools. As regards the relationship of analysis to medicine, one of the most illuminating remarks of Freud is the following:

*For the victim of a neurosis is someone into whose conflict we can gain no insight if we first meet it in a fully established state. But, per contra, if we recognise the conflict we forget that he is a sick man, just as, if he himself recognises it, he ceases to be ill.*⁶

The very advance itself of each analysis de-medicalises it! What at the beginning was envisaged under the heading of an illness ceases to be so in the course of the ‘treatment’ once one has been able and knows how to get acquainted with it. It is hard to see how an analyser would continue to consult an analyst, once he no longer looks on himself as sick, if the status of his analyst was that of a healer. Hence the accuracy of a humorous petition which circulated at the time when the French state envisaged regulating the exercise of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis: ‘Leave our charlatans alone!’ And we see here the incidence of some equivocation with respect to what Michel Foucault, following in the steps of the ancients, highlighted under the heading of ‘minding yourself, *souci de soi*’. Does it depend on medicine (alone)?

Jacques Lacan has greatly contributed to giving body, consistency and value to the three clinical entities respectively designated as perversion, neurosis, and psychosis (with a word: pernepsy, *pernépsy*). On this terrain there seemed to converge for quite a while a psychiatry henceforth qualified as ‘classical’ and psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, this enterprise was less and less fulfilled in his teaching. This up to the point of culminating in a final definition of the clinic (spoken at the opening of a section precisely described as ‘the psychoanalytic clinic’ on May 1st 1977):

*What is clinical psychoanalysis? It’s not complicated. It has a basis – it is what you say in a psychoanalysis*⁷.

One could not, in effect, be more simple. And one could not set aside more definitively any nosographical perspective. All the more so in that Lacan then clinches this nail by referring the psychoanalytic clinic no longer to the analyser (whose ‘blabla’ simply furnishes the ‘basis’ of this clinic) but to the psy-

⁶ Freud, S. *Psychopathic Characters on the Stage*. (1905/1906). SE VII, London, Hogarth Press. P. 310.

⁷ Lacan, J. *Opening of the Clinical Section*. *Ornicar?* No. 9, 1977, p.7-14

choanalyst – which is self-evident if this blabla, like all speech, only takes on some consequence by the welcome that is reserved for it. The psychoanalytic clinic questions the analyst, the analyst is its object. Thus orientated, that day Lacan qualified the Freudian clinic as ‘lucubration’; he recognises then that he has contributed to it, and specifies his current position: ‘That is not a reason for me to hold on to it.’ In a word, the one that Erasmus took up from Rabelais: all *morosophes*.

Nothing in common

What then finds itself most in question, on the side of psychoanalysts, whose refusal leads to more than one of them clinging to nosography like a buoy without which they would be excluded from practising? It is the relationship of the analyst to the diverse (*divers*) as such which poses a problem and presents itself as a new fragility, linked, for its part also, to a renunciation: regulated by the diverse, the analyst can only abstain from putting forward this authoritative (since it is issued by an authority) word which is the assigning of a subject to a predefined clinical entity.

Regulated by the diverse, the analyst will be led to welcome anyone by abstaining from any identificatory action and thought. We can see that this is not easy, that it is perhaps even impossible. For it is not simply a matter of excluding an identification of the nosographical type, but, on the part of the analyst, any identification whatsoever it may be. To think ‘I have just seen a woman, or a child, or an emigrant, or a poor person, or a colleague, or a sportsman, etc.’ is already an abuse, even if, envisaged in themselves, such names are not defined descriptions. For such descriptions are as it were summoned up by the name, because the imaginary follows. Now how can the analyst know that he is dealing with a woman, a child, an emigrant, a poor person, a colleague, a sportsman? This ‘woman’ does not perhaps have the sensibility of a woman, nor this child the soul of a child, this emigrant the condition of an emigrant, this poor person the status of a poor person, this colleague the virtue of a colleague, this sportsman the endurance of a sportsman. Such attributions are only based on glimpses of a phenomenological order, if not on a weighing scales (*pèse-personne*). Their clouding effect is guaranteed.

For all that, there is nothing to ensure that regulating oneself on the diverse is easy. Inspired by a celebrated fragment of Heraclitus (numbered 64 by Diels) Lacan even admitted that it is ruled out that anyone could maintain himself

permanently regulated on the diverse. What does this fragment enounce? That it is a flash of lightning that rules the universe (*ta panta*). Nevertheless, according to the reading which Eugen Fink and Martin Heidegger proposed of it⁸, the flash of lightning would regulate not the universe but ‘the all, *les tous*’ – ‘all’ not referring here to a totality taken as such but...to the diverse. The flash of lightning reveals the all, and therefore that there is no universe, while, Lacan adds, we are ‘by our subjective position’ ‘obliged to think of the world as universe’. The Heraclitean enunciation, he continues, ‘proceeds from a truly fundamental idea about the heterogeneity among things’.⁹

If remaining in the diverse is ruled out (as bearer of categories, the tongue opposes it), perhaps it is nevertheless not necessary to stress in an insistent way the cord of universality. This is what Lacan did on the 2nd November 1973 when, prolonging his meditation on the diverse, he comes to the point of challenging the notion of ‘clinical type’. The ‘old clinic’, in creating these types, neglected the diverse which it claimed to account for and which it only obliterated.

This question could also be tackled from another angle. For what reason did Lacan speak not so much about Freud as about the Freudian *thing*? Why, in his case as in that of Heidegger, this problematic of ‘the thing’ which led him to the point of discovering *das Ding* in Freud? Response: one is less distant from the diverse, one neglects the diverse less by summoning up the Freudian thing than when one calls on Freud. It was not so much Freud who spoke of a certain speaking thing, the thing Lacan describes as ‘Freudian’. In the same way Heidegger and Fink were working to reach not so much Heraclitus (that would be rather crude) as the thing of Heraclitus. Nevertheless, while this access would be in the case of Heidegger an access to Being, in the case of Lacan, on the other hand it is to the diverse that the experience of the lightning flash gives access. An opening, therefore, that is each time eminently punctual, due to the lightning flash, and which the analyst has not the mastery of: fragility. The temporality here is that of the *kairos*, of the opportunity to grasp it in flight, and which could be missed.

It is nevertheless not from that time that there dates, in Lacan’s case, the interest, the concern about the diverse. For a poem, his unique poem traverses

⁸ Fink, E. and Heidegger, M. *Heraclitus*. Seminar of the Winter Semester (1966-1967).

⁹ *Intervention on the Passe* during the congress of the *Ecole freudienne* held at La grande Motte in November 1973. Accessible on the site of *Ecole lacanienne de psychoanalyse*, under the heading *bibliothèque*.

his whole saying¹⁰. Written in 1929, sent to his friend Ferdinand Alquié and published four years later, he republishes again in 1977. In it one already finds Heraclitus (the *panta rhei*), also the thing (and the forms), whose fire makes of Jacques Lacan 'the immortal lover'. Like the fire making the lover of things, the lightning flash makes that of the diverse. Each time this loving relationship to things or to the diverse is threatened, that to the diverse because it is untenable permanently, that to things because there intervenes what Lacan calls in his poem his '*démon pensant*, his thinking demon'.

Why is the thing so decisive in the exercise of psychoanalysis? Because what is at stake is that, the thing of each analyser and not him, the analyser. To identify this analyser, in other words to assign him to something common, comes down to distancing his thing to the point of rendering it inaccessible.

No frontier

'*Divan*, couch': the word, of Arabic origin, is supposed to have given '*douane*, customs' in French. Ought one to see in the analyst a customs guard? If there is a place where he is solicited to behave as such, it is at the frontiers of the Freudian field. A frontier, we may as well say a fragile point – as check-points and other barriers show. The history of analysis, so rich in anathemas, shows that the question was permanently posed about what is admissible or not in the Freudian field. This from inside the field. But its frontier is also concerned with what is presented from outside. Current events offer several cases of it which, most often, divide custom-guard analysts. Thus some observe, not without dread, the precipitation of psychiatry under North American influence into a methodology of a statistical order, while others find there an opportunity to better specify the status of analysis by putting an end to its flirtation with psychiatry. Thus some welcome favourably the recent advances of the neurosciences by showing that Freud had anticipated them, while others reject them as dangerous. Thus some, we have already noted, plead in favour of an opening up of analysis to anthropological data considered to assure its salvation, while others set them aside as so many worms in the apple. Thus some see a quasi-satanic presence in gay and lesbian studies while others find in them a fruitful opportunity to put in question what was believed to be established in terms of knowledge. This point deserves to be evoked, because it is not an insignificant step to no longer know what one believed one knew, to no longer consider as established what one believed to be established.

¹⁰ The two versions of this poem can be read on the site mentioned in footnote 10.

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The so recent de-pathologisation of homosexuality, followed by that of transsexualism and other so-called ‘sicknesses’, cannot be attributed to psychoanalysis but to militants who ‘created a movement’ (in the two senses of this expression). Psychoanalysis and psychiatry its ally at the time, had to put up with it, sometimes only verbally, but not thinking it any the less. Those who were shamed by ‘clinical’ descriptions that are today largely outdated and the often normalising practices that went with them have thrown this shame back in the face of psychoanalysts. It follows that the number of these objects carrying this shame grows and that, already because of this fact, should be revisited. This is the case for sado-masochism which, after the descriptions made of it by Gayle Rubin, can no longer be caught in the net in which it was ensnared, and which, with Lynda Hart, is rethought of as a performance. Or again sodomy, whose status Mark Jordan shows is properly theological. Why then were we not able to see it? It is, in truth, the very concept of perversion, whose genesis Vernon Rosario has described, which finds itself more than shaken and, along with it that of heterosexuality which we also learn, this time from the pen of Jonathan Katz, that far from being universal, is a recent construction. In addition, with the work of John Winkler and David Halperin, the relationship of analysis to Greek antiquity is put in question.¹¹

A field of studies was born half a century ago, whose objects intersect partially, at least at first sight, with some of those over which analysts had wished to exercise their domination. Those about whom we wrote the psychosexual ‘truth’ while accusing them (or just about) of not having assumed their ‘castration’ henceforth teach those who claimed to say who they were. They have taken on a way of speaking which we were not able to accept at the time of its emergence despite the beautiful and soothing discourses on ‘listening’. Entire areas of the erotic remained unexplored for half a century; much was done to arrive at such a result (or, much more rather, lack of result).

We were not able to render a frontier porous when this was required.

No psy

It is now more than 20 years since Gérard Granel proposed to suppress the Ψ of ‘psychoanalysis’.¹² Is it to this, this small and nevertheless imperialist

¹¹ The proper names mentioned above refer to works in the collection of *Les grands classiques de l'érotologie moderne* published by *Epel*.

¹² ‘Lacan et Heidegger, réflexions a partir des Zollikoner Seminaire’, in *Lacan avec les philosophes*, Paris, Albin Michel, 1991, p.209

psy, that the blindness which has just been evoked might be responsible? The equivocations that it gives rise to, the wavering that it gives a place to, here also allow a fragility to show through.

It took several decades in order that in France, and despite a very high number of publications commenting on Freud's writings, and coming from different psychoanalytic schools, before people ended up by noticing that two terms figured in them: *Psyche*, adjectively *psychisch*, and *Seele*, adjectively *seelisch*. The translations of Freud into French for a very long time got rid of the problem that this cohabitation gave rise to by rendering indifferently one and the other of these two terms by '*psychisme*' or '*psychique*'. Is this due to the accent laid on the signifier by Lacan? It still remains that people ended up by asking themselves if there was not something in the wind. And that is the case. All the more so in that the problem thus initiated is complicated, but perhaps simplified, by the presence, in Freud of a third term, *Geist*, adjectively *geistig* or *geistlich*, which in his final work *Moses and Monotheism*, could not yield its place in order to take in it the same heuristic function to either *Psyche* nor to *Seele*. The history of the spirituality (*Geistigkeit*) which this book unfolds cannot be equivalent to a history of the psyche nor to a history of the soul. In the same way, one can measure the impropriety that would consist, in French, by calling the *mot d'esprit* [witticism] '*mot psychique*'. The importance of *Geistigkeit* in Freud as he delivers his final message is such that Bruno Karsenti does not hesitate to devote to it a chapter of a recent and extremely precious work: *Moïse et l'idée du peuple juif*.¹³

One can see that the sort of wavering that is manifested in Freud by the co-presence of three terms while only one of them figures in the name 'psychoanalysis' indicates a question that has remained unresolved and, by that, another fragility. It appears moreover in the usage which would make us understand and read 'psychoanalysis' and 'analysis' as if we had here one and the same meaning even though by isolating the 'psy' in this way one highlights a problem while not posing it explicitly. At the same time, we can only recognise a wavering in Freud by envisaging his work synchronically. Taken diachronically (which is necessary once it is not a matter, any more than with Lacan, of a 'system of thought'), it shows on the contrary that what finally occupies him is the spirit. It is enough to read him to know that this spirit does not present to his eyes anything ethereal, 'spiritualist' indeed 'spiritist'. A question is then posed: can analysis follow up this final indication of Freud,

¹³ Paris, Ed. du Cerf, 2012.

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and admit, under his suggestion, the spirit as being what it is dealing with? In other words, to not neglect what was already known by many of Freud's contemporaries, and not the least of them: Wittgenstein, Mann, Andreas-Salomé, Jung, Pfister, Auden, etc.

With Lacan we are dealing with a similarly oriented movement towards an abandonment of the 'psy'. Just as in 1953 (the effective beginning of his 'teaching'), the reader of Daniel Paul Schreber's *Memoirs* recognised in them the account of a 'spiritual catastrophe' and not a 'psychical' one, just as, the same year, he linked his teaching to the 'spiritual line of descent of Ferenczi', just as in 1964 he founded a school with an explicit reference to the ancient philosophical schools, just as in 1967 he proposed to analysts to model themselves on the spiritual exercises of the sceptics, just as spirituality was the common soil from which there emerged his taking into account of Heideggerian thinking, there is, to finish, a clear declaration on 11th February 1975 which dots the i's: what Freud calls 'psychic reality' is 'exactly the same thing' as religious reality. To recognise in analysis a still unprecedented figure of spirituality, could by itself allow there to be distinguished analysis from this 'same thing' which could just as well be called 'psychology' or 'religion'. Such a refusal of the psychological is not moreover new: Ludwig Wittgenstein and with him a good number of those who held to analytical philosophy, Martin Heidegger, George Canguilhem, Michel Foucault, notably these, clearly manifested it.

By thus admitting to itself what it is, analysis would remove an ambiguity, would lose the inhibitory and deviating force that comes from what it surreptitiously carries in terms of psychology and religion; thus it will become fragile, finding in that way its own particular way of being efficacious. It will thus make its own a proposition of Michel Foucault who, in 1981, remarked that it did not have up to then (outside Lacan) the 'courage' (the word is his) to think of itself and to exercise itself as a form of spirituality. Spirituality, what does that mean? The definition that Foucault proposes for it is appropriate for analysis: only a transformation of the subject can permit his access to the truth. It is certainly not by chance if, in Foucault as in Lacan and even though in a different sense, there is summoned up the concept of subjectification. For both one and the other the subject is not a given, does not have this fixity starting from which all the rest is ordered. A subject can become, divided, giving itself over to a certain otherness (*alterité*). It still remains that this otherness must be appropriate.

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In his *Cahiers de jeunesse* Ferdinand Alquié wrote: ‘When Eluard says ‘My pain like a little sun in cold water’, doubtless one must not see in this verse an effort to translate an initially given pain. One must rather start from the sun in cold water. That is the given. And it is what creates the pain.’¹⁴ ‘To translate a pain initially given’: that is psychology. ‘To start from the sun in cold water’: that is spirituality; and analysis according to Jacques Lacan, who had to end up by indicating, no one having noted it, that the word ‘*expression*’ did not figure anywhere in ‘The function and field of speech and language.’¹⁵ The poet does not express himself, nor does he metaphorise. This ‘sun’, this ‘cold water’, act as signs which, linked as they are, produce his pain while they remain waiting for their decomposition. To de-compose is to analyse. The figure is undone, its components arrive as signifiers outside sense. Pain gives way to this fragility which, from then on, bears witness to the dependence of the poet delivered to language.¹⁶

¹⁴ Alquié, F. *Cahiers de jeunesse*. Paris, L’âge d’homme, 2003. p.84.

¹⁵ Lacan, L. *Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966. p. 237-322.

¹⁶ Jean Allouch practises psychoanalysis in Paris. He was a member of the *EFP* directed by Jacques Lacan from 1966 until its dissolution in 1980. Currently a member of the *Ecole lacanienne de psychoanalyse*, he directs in the *Editions Epel* the collection ‘The Great Classics of Modern Erotology’.